

CovertAction Quarterly

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The Globalization of War and Poverty

East Timor,
Colombia,
Yugoslavia,
and the U.S.A.



Dear CovertAction Quarterly:

I am so fed up with seeing the views of the Serbian Ministry of Information represented word for word in your magazine, in particular by Diana Johnstone, but also by Greory Elich and Mark Cook, that even where I agree with you on other matters, I feel like throwing it at the wall.

Western policy, you say on your contents page of your Spring-Summer 1999 issue, is the further fragmentation of Yugoslavia.

No matter how desirable that aim might be in the light of events since the rise of Milosevic to power, your statement is balderdash: The former Yugoslavia deconstructed itself over a period of 10 years, thanks to Milosevic's efforts, and has only been assisted in its fragmentation since shortly before Dayton. For long, western policy appeared aimed at shoring up Serbia as the cornerstone of Yugoslavia and "a force for stability in the Balkans," in the face of Belgrade-organized attempts at reconquest, mass killings, destruction, and massive expulsions of populations. Fact: When Slovenia, followed by Croatia, and later and very reluctantly Bosnia, declared independence, western policy makers such as François Mitterand, Douglas Hurd, George Bush, and early model Clinton, all tried to cripple them and hamstring any defense against the overwhelming might of the "Yugoslav" (i.e., Serb) military machine. That policy was maintained but on a steadily diminishing level until it was obvious that Milosevic was only committing ever greater excesses. "We do not have a dog in this fight," was only one of the weaker excuses for inaction.

Where was the CAQ when Hurd was running around trying to make sure that the Croats and Bosnians were refused independence, arms, and allowing

the Yugoslav People's Army to use its heavy weaponry against the Yugoslav peoples? What did you have to say when Mitterand made sure that NATO did not intervene in the Bosnian bloodbath and left it to an enfeebled U.N. to dicker with Karadzic, Mladic, and Milosevic? Dreaming in Sleepy Hollow? Or being paranoid about Foggy Bottom?

If the West in general, or the U.S.A. in particular, has any policy, it is hard to see what that policy is, apart from trying to keep public opinion from Washington to Moscow happy, just as in the bombing, it was hard to see that it had a feasible campaign strategy except to sustain no casualties of its own, and just as in post-bellum Kosovo, it appears to have very few aims in terms of civil development or diplomacy and just invents them as it goes along, in the best short-termist tradition.

Because of your impossible positions on the former Yugoslavia, I am not renewing my subscription. Can I have my money back, please?
Yours faithfully,
Bernard Meares, Geneva, Switzerland

Diana Johnstone replies:

Since Mr. Meares seems to be familiar "word for word" with the views of the Serbian Ministry of Information, perhaps he could cite some of these surprising coincidences between my articles and Serbian government texts with which I am unfamiliar.

The next step would be to determine: Have they quoted me? Or is this simply a matter of chance?

In either case, I concede that such an identity of expression would prove absolutely nothing about the veracity either of my articles or of the statements of the Serbian Ministry of Information, although one could argue that it would tend to substan-

tiate us both.

The rest of Mr. Meares's complaint is of scant interest, since it comes down to the fact that he is unable, in regard to U.S. policy, "to see what that policy is...." Fortunately, others are more capable than he.

Mr. Meares appears to have been very impressed by a certain propaganda version of the Yugoslav conflicts, to the point where he is unable to renew his subscription to a publication which puts this version into question, and even wants to be paid for his fidelity to the official line.

This sort of thing is to be expected when propaganda reaches a point beyond the wildest dreams of Goebbels and other initiators of the big lie.

Greg Elich replies:

Mr. Meares makes several curious claims in his letter, and appears to have paid more attention to the rhetoric of western leaders than to their actions. It is not surprising he finds it "hard to understand what that policy is."

Yugoslavia did not "deconstruct itself." Western policy, from the beginning, has been to tear it asunder. The process is on-going, as the West supplies arms to pro-secessionist forces in Montenegro.

The U.S. threatened Yugoslavia with a cutoff of aid if it did not hold elections in 1990, and stipulated that those elections could only take place on the republic, not the federal level. When Yugoslavia agreed, the U.S., through the NED and various CIA fronts and similar-thinking outfits, provided funding and election advice to rightwing nationalist parties, in an effort to promote the break-up of Yugoslavia into weak client states. Rightwing parties won everywhere except in Serbia and Montenegro.

(continued on page 67)

CovertAction Quarterly: Issue Number 68, Fall-Winter 1999. Chris Agee, William Blum, Mark Cook, Dorothy Dixon, Malaya R. Drew, Anne Gallivan, Bill Montross, James Murphy, Dolores Neuman, Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Michele Stoddard, Louis Wolf. Cover pages designed by Michael John Carley. Front cover: East Timorese refugee walks past gutted and burning homes in Dili (AP/Wide World Photos). Back cover: top: Locked-out union members escape the sun at Salvadoran *maquiladora* (AP/Wide World Photos); bottom: Seattle demonstrators protest World Trade Organization (Scott Eklund, *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*).

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
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EAST TIMOR: FROM "HUMANITARIAN" BOMBING TO INHUMANE APPEASEMENT

BY EDWARD S. HERMAN AND DAVID PETERSON

"What is so special about Indonesia that nobody will directly call them the liars, thugs and mongrels that they are? Why can't the world help?"

—Sister Anne, Sisters of Mercy,
Dili, September 9

“W”ithin half a year the western establishment moved without embarrassment from “humanitarian” avenger in Operation Allied Force, the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia, to Operation Don’t Ruffle Indonesia’s Feathers, the callous appeasement of Indonesia’s campaign of terror in East Timor. While the war against Yugoslavia was allegedly rooted in what British Prime Minister Tony Blair called the West’s “moral perspective and conscience,” the inaction in East Timor was based on western “interests” and a recognition, according to National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, that the West cannot “go everywhere, do everything.”

The contrast has been especially marked for several reasons: the indignation with which the NATO leadership and supportive media declared the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo morally unacceptable, hence intolerable; the aggressive documentation of Serbian crimes; the claims that the world had entered a “New Era” in which the Great Powers have the responsibility and are willing, according to Blair, “to right wrongs and prosecute just causes,” irrespective of questions of national sovereignty; and the alleged “yawning gap between the West and much of the world on the value of a single life.”¹

Less than three months after NATO troops rolled into Kosovo, the value of single or even thousands of East Timorese lives seemed to mean nothing to western leaders and elites. Now, there was no mention of war crimes by Madeleine Albright or Robin Cook. Sharp limits on Great Power responsibilities and Washington’s ability to police the world were discovered; furious indignation over human rights violations was replaced by token regrets and

de facto indifference to what Berger called a “chaotic situation”; and hollow appeals to the killers to restrain themselves were substituted for sanctions and, in the case of Yugoslavia, bombing.

The contrast is also notable in other respects. One is that both the U.N. and Great Powers had committed themselves to a “popular consultation” in which the people of East Timor, long abused by Indonesia, would finally be given the right to vote whether they accepted or rejected Indonesia’s “proposed special autonomy for East Timor within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.”² In the wake of the August 30 vote, in which the large majority of East Timorese rejected the “special autonomy” option, the Indonesian army and army-sponsored militias went on a pre-planned rampage of destruction and killing. The United States and other western powers continued to refuse to take any serious action to stop the killings. This non-response amounted to a betrayal of western honor as well as a direct violation of the “humanitarian” principles for which it supposedly waged its war against Yugoslavia.

Another important feature of the western response to the East Timor crisis is that, in contrast to their long-hostile relationship with Yugoslavia, the U.S. and Australian governments have enjoyed very close relationships with the Indonesian armed forces in training, supplying intelligence, and provision of arms, dating back several decades. As described below, substantial evidence has surfaced indicating western intelligence foreknowledge of Indonesia’s plans for vicious attacks on the population of East Timor, should it opt for independence. That the West did not take direct preventive action or empower the United Nations Assistance Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) to prepare for this contingency, makes it complicit in the murders, and casts its foot dragging, even after Indonesia’s rampage began, in a still more sinister light.

The West’s inaction in 1999 underscores a continuity with earlier U.S. and western acquiescence in, and support of, the Indonesian invasion and genocidal oc-

cupation of East Timor, which, from 1975 to 1979 resulted in the death of some 200,000 East Timorese, one-fourth or more of the population. Philip Liechty, a CIA desk officer in Jakarta in 1975, told the Australian journalist John Pilger, “Suharto was given a green light by the United States to do what he did. We sent the Indonesian generals everything they needed to fight a major war against somebody who doesn’t have any guns ... they got it direct, straight to East Timor.”³

The difference between then and now is that, whereas in the 1970s hardly anyone knew about the atrocities Indonesia was committing against East Timorese (except, of course, Free World officials⁴), in 1999 the U.N.-sponsored referendum and the global publicity that accompanied it have made the Indonesian atrocities front page news. Since August 30, the day of the referendum, Cable News Network has aired daily reports from East Timor, after having virtually ignored the story for the entire preceding year. Although the terror forced CNN’s crew to evacuate Dili by September 5, its coverage remained steady through the arrival of the first Australian troops in Dili on September 20. Coverage by the major U.S. print media was much the same.⁵ By the time the 21-member Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation group (to which both Indonesia and the U.S. belong) convened for its annual summit in Auckland over the weekend of September 11-13, the high-profiled bloodshed in East Timor could no longer be ignored. The West’s continued support of Indonesia is

3. From a speech delivered by John Pilger on the campus of University of New South Wales in Australia, July 17, 1999, “Timor Conspiracy: Australia’s Role,” reprinted in *Green Left Weekly*, July 28, 1999.

4. Pilger also states: “The Australian government, along with other western governments, watched the genocide unfold. We now know from leaked documents that the Defence Signals Directorate spy base in northern Australia knew everything the Indonesians were doing. This was confirmed to me by Philip Liechty.” *Ibid*.

5. In sharp contrast to the Australian media, U.S. print media reports on East Timor were virtually nonexistent until just days before the August 30 referendum. For example, until the *New York Times* published an op-ed by Dili’s Roman Catholic Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo on August 24, it had not run anything more than a blurb on East Timor since July 20.

Edward S. Herman is an economist and media analyst. His latest book, just released, is *The Myth of the Liberal Media: An Edward Herman Reader* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999). David Peterson is an independent journalist living in the Chicago area.

1. Michael Wines, *New York Times*, June 13, 1999.

2. Annex II, sec. B of the General Agreement of May 5, 1999.

thus more exposed, and it has been obliged to make at least gestures of concern and action.

WHY WAS A REFERENDUM HELD?

The referendum was a spinoff from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the resultant collapse of the Indonesian economy, and the ouster of Suharto in May 1998. In a sense, the market helped bring Suharto down, along with the policies of the IMF and World Bank. Market enthusiasm for Suharto's "investors' paradise" had led to a huge influx of speculative capital prior to the start of the financial crisis in July 1997, and the rapid exit of these same funds ravaged the economy, leading to a 90 percent fall in the Indonesian rupiah by March 1998, a debt and banking crisis, soaring inflation, food shortages, massive unemployment, and serious urban riots.⁶ Student protesters, whom Suharto's forces in the past had either crushed or confined to university campuses, now tried to take over the streets of Jakarta and elsewhere. Importantly, workers joined them. By May, massive riots were striking Indonesia's major cities. As the Singapore-based analyst Chia Siow Yue noted at the time, "Restoring confidence has gone beyond pure monetary and financial measures. The political-social environment has so deteriorated that [correcting] it has become a crucial part of confidence-building."⁷

This collapse of "confidence" was centered in the West, whose investors and transnationals with interests in the Asian-Pacific region were then gripped by a panic over their deteriorating positions overseas. Western apologists have contended that the Indonesian meltdown shows the global "market" declaring for democracy. Thus,

6. In a report that it released in September, Moody's Investors Service estimated that stabilizing the Indonesian banking system will require an injection of some \$140 billion in new loans, an amount worth approximately 70 percent of Indonesia's GDP. Concluded Moody's: "The cost of the bank guarantee and restructuring program relative to Indonesia's GDP looks set to become the highest of any country in modern history." Tim Dodd, "Indonesia paints itself into tight economic corner," *Australian Financial Review*, Sept. 13, 1999.
7. "The Asiaweek roundtable tackles the problem of regional confidence," *Asiaweek*, Mar. 27, 1998.

the *New York Times*'s Thomas Friedman stated that "When market forces concluded that Indonesia's economic growth was unsustainable without more democratic reform, they stampeded."⁸ But this ignores the fact that the "market"—and the governments serving its interests—had supported the Suharto dictatorship for 32 years with lavish capital inflows and government financial and diplomatic support, and was now toppling its prized dictator in a panic reaction to its own prior excessive enthusiasm.



East Timorese vote August 30 overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia. Massacres intensified the next day.

At the same time that the "market" was helping destabilize Indonesia, so was the IMF. Although it had put together a \$43 billion bailout package for Indonesia by early 1998, the IMF conditioned the delivery of the funds on policies that would both intensify hardships within Indonesia and force it to accept structural changes that would begin the dismantlement of the vast empire of family, military, and ruling party corruption sardonically known as "Suharto, Inc." Both the IMF and the World Bank seized upon the crisis as an

8. "Where's the Crisis," *New York Times*, May 23, 1998.

opportunity to reduce corruption and open up further opportunities within Indonesia for transnational investors. As Suharto was an obstacle to these ends—resisting the IMF changes, in political trouble anyway, and obsolete as a heavy handed dictator—the western political and economic elite was prepared to see him go in favor of a civilian leader in their familiar compliant mold.

However, the United States was by no means withdrawing its support from the armed forces that were the base of Suharto's

authoritarian rule and directly responsible for the mass killings and repression so integral to his exercise of power. As a swift countermeasure to the panic over Indonesia, Washington's response was to step up its training and support for the Indonesian military, while it ushered Suharto out the back door. As U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen said after a 1998 meeting with the Indonesian military in Jakarta, "The U.S. is close to and loves the Indonesian army."⁹ In an important sense, the Indonesian army has long been and remains today a U.S.-agent army, supplied and trained, and serving perceived U.S. interests in southeast Asia, which for 32 years included protecting the dictatorship from internal democratic ("security") threats.

It is crystal clear, then, that the East Timor referendum was not the result of any western desire or demand for freedom for the East Timorese. It happened because the Indonesian crisis and turmoil weakened Indonesian control, diminished U.S. and western support for the Indonesian government, and created a small opening

that East Timor and its supporters were able to take advantage of. In the first month after he replaced Suharto, the new President, B. J. Habibie, therefore raised the possibility of reviewing the status of East Timor, perhaps even granting it some form of "special autonomy." Negotiations toward this end between the governments of Indonesia and Portugal over the next eleven months led to the signing of an agreement at the United Nations on May 5 of this year to hold a referendum allowing

9. Allan Nairn, "Indonesia's killers; U.S. support of military repression in Indonesia," *The Nation*, Mar. 30, 1998.

East Timorese to choose between remaining within or exiting from Indonesia—an “historic opportunity to resolve the question of East Timor,” Secretary General Kofi Annan rightly called it.

UNAMET's BUILT-IN FLAWS

It should be recognized that the West's response to the possibility of East Timor's freedom and the referendum plan was something less than enthusiastic. At best, the West merely tolerated the referendum arrangements. Its leading members remained attached to the ruling military-Golkar regime in Jakarta that had created the “investors' paradise.” The leading western powers continued to regard Indonesia as an ally to be cosseted and protected, whatever its behavior. Its military may have killed hundreds of thousands of innocents at home and abroad, but by virtue of its client-state status, Indonesia has never been declared a “state sponsor of terrorism,” much less a “rogue” regime. It should also be noted that while the U.N. has never recognized the illegal Indonesian seizure of East Timor, the United States and its allies have done so for years.

This basic stance of friendly and supportive relationship undermined the possibility of a successful referendum in advance. It manifested itself in the strategic handicaps built into the General Agreement of May 5. Foremost among these, responsibility for the “general maintenance of law and order” in East Timor until such time as Indonesia officially disengaged from the territory was to rest “with the appropriate Indonesian security authorities.”¹⁰ But by May 5, Indonesia had already displayed its unwillingness to honor such a responsibility. Beginning in July 1998, then escalating dramatically last January, Indonesia's regular military had been organizing and providing technical assistance to upwards of 24 armed “militia” groups that were guilty of committing some of the worst atrocities in East Timor since the Indonesian army massacred more than 250 mourners at Dili's Santa Cruz cemetery in 1991.¹¹

Indeed, that the May 5 agreement suffered from grave weaknesses was recognized from the start. In the very first of what would be several reports to the Security Council on East Timor (May 5), Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged the “logistical and other problems that the United Nations will face in carry-

ing out the consultation in such a short time-frame.” These included the “high level of tension and serious incidents of political violence” which had already become commonplace, and the “opposition to the proposed consultation by some political elements in East Timor,” namely the pro-Jakarta militias and their backers.¹² Worse, UNAMET's relatively spartan \$52.5 million mandate allowed it no more than 271 civilian police officers, and a meager 50 liaison officers whose job it was to work with the Indonesian military.¹³ (These numbers were to be modestly increased—but only after the referendum.) Crucially, no member of the UNAMET staff was permitted to carry firearms, leaving them completely at the mercy of the militias, which repeatedly harassed the mission after its members began arriving in June. When one considers the vast amount of resources and human talent that the U.N. has committed to its more successful diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts—for example, the 1992-94 U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia had a \$1.9 billion budget and consisted of close to 16,000 armed troops from 34 different countries, 3,359 civilian police monitors, and recruited the help of more than 50,000 Cambodian nationals¹⁴—it is tempting to conclude that in UNAMET's case, the United Nations was set up to play the fool.

In the months leading up to the referendum, Kofi Annan insisted that several conditions had to be met before he would give the referendum the go-ahead. On the two occasions when he postponed the referendum, his reason was the failure of the Indonesian authorities to live up to their responsibility to guarantee a secure environment. Moreover, at no stage in his several reports to the Security Council (May 5, May 22, June 22, July 20, and August 9) had the Secretary General ever concluded that the “necessary security conditions exist” for the “holding of a free and fair popular consultation” on the question of East Timor—Annan's main responsibility under the May 5 agreement. In fact, by August 9, Annan dropped all references to East Timor's non-existent security from his report to the Security Council on the status of UNAMET's mission—after the referendum, “the situation in East Timor will be rather delicate,” was all he could bring himself to say.¹⁵

Despite repeated warnings from international human rights groups and, more important, from UNAMET's own staff that

elements of the Indonesian military were clearly behind the violence and terror gripping East Timor, the U.N. decided to take a gamble and proceed with the referendum. “Nobody had the balls to say, ‘Excuse me, the whole reason we are here is because of your brutal behavior in East Timor. It doesn't make any sense for you to be in charge of their security,’” one source told the *Australian Financial Review*. “But nobody wants to offend the Indonesians. This is what we get when we don't push them. How much worse could it be?”¹⁶ Of course, underlying the U.N.'s lack of willingness to challenge Indonesian authority was the fact that Indonesia's western allies would have brooked no such challenge in the first place.

THE KILLINGS: WHAT THE WEST KNEW

“In January, the army and the militias worked out a division of labor,” American journalist Allan Nairn writes. “Now the ABRI [Indonesia's regular army] was ‘protecting’ the [pro-independence] Fretilin,” militia leader Herminio da Costa told Nairn back in May, “and we were the ones who were assaulting Fretilin and CNRT [pro-independence] homes.”¹⁷

This “division of labor” served Jakarta well. On countless occasions prior to the referendum, militia attacks on independence supporters took place in plain view of the military, which did nothing to stop them. “We talk about the ‘militias,’ but they are really just a mask for the Indonesian military,” pro-independence leader David Ximenes told the *Los Angeles Times*.¹⁸ As the summer passed, the truth of this observation became very clear. In early July, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* David Jenkins reported that “senior army officers,” infuriated at the Habibie Government's decision to hold a referendum on the future of East Timor, “are working to have the vote called off or, if that is not possible, to ensure that it goes the right way.” At the heart of their effort was Kopassus, the red-bereted Special Forces unit notorious for its brutality. A “well-placed source in Jakarta” told Jenkins that Kopassus was conducting a “psy-war” operation in East Timor. “You remove not only your opponents but the people who provide leadership in that community. It's Phoenix.” State terror

16. Joanne Gray, “US eyes wide-open on Timor,” *Australian Financial Review*, Sept. 13, 1999.

17. “License to kill in Timor,” *The Nation*, May 31, 1999.

18. David Lamb, “Odds of Curbing East Timor Violence Seen as Slim,” *Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 3, 1999.

10. General Agreement, Annex III, para. 1, May 5, 1999.

11. Estimates of the number of separate “militia” groups that have operated in East Timor vary. We take the number 24 from the Secretary General's May 22 Report to the Security Council, S/1999/595.

12. Question of East Timor, S/1999/513.

13. UNAMET Fact Sheet, Aug. 9, 1999.

14. *The United Nations and Cambodia 1991-1995*, The United Nations Blue Book Series, Vol. II, 1995, pp. 12, 23.

15. S/1999/862, Aug. 9, 1999.

would have been the better term, but the point is well taken. The "tactics being pursued in East Timor bear a more than passing resemblance to those pursued during the CIA's Phoenix program in South Vietnam," Jenkins noted, alluding to the CIA's notorious assassination program. "They also have more than a little in common with the tactics employed by the Contras."¹⁹

Clearly, the Indonesian military hoped that by setting up the "militias" and directing them to terrorize East Timorese independence supporters, it would be able to maintain plausible deniability, the military leaders back in Jakarta feigning confusion and frustration over their inability to control what was going on. Reports from East Timor during the first days after the referendum told grim tales of the "implementation of a 'scorched earth' policy—under the direction of the Indonesian military," in the words of the Security Council Mission that visited Jakarta and Dili from September 8 to 12. This campaign included the assassination of "many pro-independence activists and other community leaders, including the clergy," with as many as one-half of East Timor's Catholic priests and nuns having been murdered, the Vatican feared. In Dili, "virtually every home or building has been systematically looted of its contents, and a large proportion of them have been burned."²⁰

In the eastern regencies where the militia terror was most severe, there was "massive forced displacement of the population to refugee camps in West Timor."²¹ Estimates at the time put the number of East Timorese refugees forcibly removed to West Timor at between 140,000 and 250,000.²² Allan Nairn re-

ported that while he was being held by the Indonesians at the Koren military base in Dili, he saw "a police intelligence document referring to a specific operation which had moved out a total of 323,564 people from East Timor."²³ There the mil-



Relatives grieve for pro-independence supporter Adlinda da Silva, 24, shot by military-supported militia.

itary was holding the refugees under concentration-camp-like conditions, banning independent media and foreign observers, and purging them of any leading independence supporters they could identify.

In yet another important lapse of U.N. authority, the U.N.-sponsored multinational force sent to East Timor on September 20 was unable to gain a mandate to police the refugee camps in West Timor, leaving refugees at the mercy of the militias. Literally hundreds of thousands more had fled into East Timor's mountainous interior regions, though no one knew for sure; the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that as many as 600,000 people had been displaced internally.²⁴ If these estimates were even remotely accurate, it meant that virtually the

drove foreign observers from the land.

23. Lim Yun-Suk, "Deported American activist says military chief behind Timor killings," *Agence France-Presse*, Sept. 20, 1999.

24. David Lamb, "Peacekeeping Troops Arrive in East Timor," *Los Angeles Times*, Sept. 20, 1999.

entire population of East Timor had been driven from their homes during the first two weeks after the referendum. By the second week of September, old and young alike faced harsh conditions, including starvation and lack of drinking water, disease and lack of medical care. Many thousands more were presumed dead, often by the most horrific means.²⁵

"The preparations to launch a campaign of terror in East Timor were spotted as early as July 1998," a group of investigators for the London Observer Service reported, "when it was reported that the Indonesian army was starting to establish civilian militias in East Timor. No one paid any serious attention to the report." Their investigation revealed that "western intelligence services were also aware of the army's plans—and warned the United Nations, many months ago." The evidence western intelligence had accumulated was considerable, including documents of the Indonesian army and the militias, intercepted cables and satellite telephone conversations, satellite photographs of troop movements along the border of East and West Timor, and of course first-person testimonies.²⁶ By March 4, 1999, the Australian Defense Intelligence Organi-

zation had already concluded that the Indonesian military was "clearly protecting and in some cases operating with" the militias. In one of the intercepted telephone conversations, senior officers in Dili and Jakarta "said the militias would implement a scorched-earth policy if the vote went against them." One captured document dated "May" instructed that the "Massacres should be carried out from village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro-independence supporters win," and targets "should be elim-

25. One Sister of Mercy described to a reporter with the *Sydney Morning Herald* what she had seen done to the East Timorese nephew of one of her fellow sisters: "The militia hammered nails into his head and cut off his flesh," she said. "They told other people that they were going to eat the flesh, but I doubt that they did that." Lindsay Murdoch, "Time to pray, and run the militia gauntlet," Sept. 10, 1999.

26. Details of intercepted messages proved so concrete that at one point, Australian intelligence was able to acquire "copies of the militias' catering orders—paid by the Indonesian military!" Paul Daley, "Timor's pain, Australia's shame," *The Age* (Melbourne), Sept. 11, 1999.

AP / Wide World Photos

19. "Army's dirty tricks brigade unleashed in fight for East Timor," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 8, 1999.

20. "East Timor Capital Dili in Ruins," AP Online, citing Fides, the Vatican news agency, Sept. 13, 1999. The Vatican also described the killings in East Timor as "genocide," and accused leading western nations of a "huge hypocrisy" for their refusal to take any action.

21. "Report of the Security Council Mission to Jakarta and Dili," S/1999/976, Sept. 14, 1999.

22. "Horror in East Timor worse than U.N. believes: support group," *Agence France-Presse*, Sept. 13, 1999. These estimates are only tentative. In fact, virtually all of East Timor was under a news blackout as the terror escalated after the referendum, and

inated from its leadership down to its roots."

All of this intelligence was passed along to the U.N.; Washington, Canberra, and London at the very least must have shared it as well. A UNAMET security briefing in mid-August shows that it believed the Indonesian military and militias would conduct a "full-scale offensive after the [referendum]," precisely as they did.²⁷ After studying several militia-related incidents over the course of the summer, UNAMET also reported—internally, that is, never publicly—that the "operations' modalities demonstrate an intention to create an impression of a conflict between East Timorese, with the Indonesian authorities hopelessly caught between two warring factions."²⁸ While western intelligence possessed such rich evidence of Indonesian complicity in the militia terror, straight-faced western officials, like U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth in Jakarta last summer, reminded the Indonesian military "that they have a responsibility to discuss every possible way to ensure the situation does not deteriorate." This surpasses criminal negligence; indeed, by its silence and its unwillingness to take any kind of preventive action, the West was an accessory before the fact.

SLAUGHTER AND APPEASEMENT

On the same day in September that the first Australian troops with the International Force for East Timor landed in Dili, Kofi Annan delivered his Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly—the 54th and last of the 20th Century. "[O]ur commitment to humanitarian action must be universal if it is to be legitimate," he said in his prepared remarks, echoing a theme espoused by the international human rights movement, if not by sovereign states. "Even the costliest policy of prevention is far cheaper, in lives and in resources, than the least expensive use of armed force."²⁹

In East Timor, the West's latest failure to live up to Annan's principle of "humanitarian action" was blatant. In this case, the West eschewed the least costly policy of all: simple prevention, or bringing real po-

litical pressure to bear on the Indonesian government to persuade it not to disrupt the referendum or destroy East Timor in its aftermath. Instead, with full knowledge of what Indonesia was planning, the West adopted a policy of malign neglect that it had every reason to believe would prove terribly costly in terms of East Timorese lives, but far less costly in terms of its relations with Jakarta's military-Golkar regime.

In a nationally televised speech the night NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia began, allegedly concerned with the "dangers to defenseless people and to our national interests," President Clinton stated that, "I am convinced that the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers of

[T]he West adopted a policy of malign neglect . . . of Indonesia's planned slaughter.

not acting."³⁰ But the real danger in Kosovo turned out to be NATO's decision to resolve the conflict by military force, dramatically worsening the situation for both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.³¹ In Kosovo, real prevention (i.e., real negotiations, not threats and "final warnings") would have been far cheaper, but the West ruled it out in favor of a policy of violence. In East Timor, prevention (i.e., serious pressure on Jakarta to call off its planned slaughter) also would have been far less expensive, but the West did not select this option, but chose instead to let the Indonesians destroy East Timor.

The "division of labor" that Indonesia worked out between its regular military and the "militias" served the West as well. Western leaders joined Indonesia in the denial game. "[W]e don't want to create a situation in which the responsibility that is the Government of Indonesia's is shifted to the international community," a Clinton administration official explained as the terror soared following the referendum.³²

Australian Prime Minister John Howard's comments were even more revealing. "Unless the Indonesian authorities agree for the deployment of some peacekeeping

force then it's just not legally possible. If we try to send troops without the permission of the Indonesian Government, we are in effect invading Indonesia."³³

The formulas for taking no real action were clearly understood in Jakarta—just as Jakarta had always understood that UNAMET's unarmed and grossly understaffed mission posed no real threat to its plans to disrupt the referendum during the months leading up to it.

On September 9, while on his way to the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Auckland, President Clinton made his first public comments on the slaughter, comments hardly intended to send shivers down Jakarta's spine. "If Indonesia does not end the violence, it must invite the international community to assist in restoring security," he said.³⁴ At the time, UNAMET chief Ian Martin described Dili as a "ghost town"; the UNAMET compound was under siege; and security had become so grave that the U.N. had ordered the staff evacuated within 24 hours. Even so, an emergency session of the Security Council on September 8 decided against taking any action; the "obligation to restore security and stability [in East Timor]" remained Jakarta's, the Council announced, in complete denial of the facts on the ground.³⁵ In Washington, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen was asked whether the "United States at least [was] making contingency plans to possibly put peacekeepers in [East Timor]?" He answered: "The United States, like other nations, are calling upon Indonesia to deal with this problem as swiftly and effectively as possible. We're calling upon the government of Indonesia to bring the East Timorese situation under control. The responsibility is theirs. They understand the consequences of failing to act in terms of what the reaction of the international community would be."³⁶

The "reaction of the international community" had already proved quite unthreatening, and the West's deference to Indonesia's killers continued long after 33. "UN staff to be airlifted from Dili," *Asia Pulse*, Sept. 6, 1999. These comments were reported on Monday, September 6 (September 5 in the United States), just one day after the U.N. announced the outcome of the referendum, and after the Indonesian military had resumed the terror. Australia's Rapid Deployment Force had been sent to Darwin and was ready to go as far back as July—but only in case Australian nationals needed to be evacuated from East Timor, not to deter Indonesia from killing East Timorese.

34. Joanne Gray, "US offers strong words but little action," *Australian Financial Review*, Sept. 11, 1999.

35. Michael Richardson, "Peace Operation in East Timor Enters Critical Phase," *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 22, 1999.

36. Federal News Service, "Q&A With Defense Secretary William Cohen," Sept. 8, 1999.

27. "How the Indonesian army plotted to destroy a nation," *Toronto Globe & Mail*, Sept. 13, 1999.

28. Craig Shehan, "U.N. finds high-level army terror role," *The Age* (Melbourne), Sept. 6, 1999.

29. Kofi Annan, "Secretary General Presents His Annual Report To General Assembly," SG/SM/7136, Sept. 20, 1999.

30. "In the President's Words: 'We Act to Prevent a Wider War,'" *New York Times*, Mar. 25, 1999.

31. See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 1999), pp. 16-17.

32. "US not keen on Australian peace-keeping coalition plan," *Australian Financial Review*, Sept. 6, 1999.

they had demonstrated their deadly intentions. The indifference toward East Timor from the same western power that only months before in Kosovo had discovered a "new willingness to do what it thinks right—international law notwithstanding,"³⁷ underscores the prevailing hypocrisy. What the West was demonstrating once again was that in the New World Order, just as in the Old, power is used or not used on grounds that have no connection whatever to human rights and moral values.³⁸

THE MEDIA ON THE TIMOR CRISIS

The mainstream media's treatment of the East Timor referendum and related Indonesian terrorism put U.S. inaction and de facto support of Indonesian terror in the best possible light.³⁹ The killing in East Timor was still sometimes labeled a "civil war,"⁴⁰ although the media rarely questioned, at least in the wake of the post-referendum killings, that the strife was organized by the Indonesian army. The genocidal Indonesian operations of 1975-1979 are still described by Seth Mydans in the *New York Times* as "clumsy and self-defeating," the war of resistance a "separatist" war, and the Indonesian army is portrayed sympathetically as "defeated ... humbled, hesitant, embittered and compulsively [not calculatedly] violent."⁴¹ The use of the word genocide for the earlier or current Indonesian opera-

tions is exceedingly rare, in contrast with word usage in reference to Kosovo.

The apologetic framing of issues suggests there is a split in authority, between Habibie and the army, and within the army, with some army units out of control. This was how the *New York Times* and other media dealt with friendly state terror in Argentina and El Salvador, ask-



Gen. Wiranto, long a Pentagon favorite, will rule whoever is President.

AP / Wide World Photos

ing whether the "moderates" at top would bring the uncontrolled "extremists" to order.⁴² This formula allows selective condemnation of the extremists while treating the people on top as reasonable, and it distracts attention from murderous behavior to whether the "moderates" will be able to control their underlings.

This model was employed comprehensively throughout the East Timor crisis, the media spending a great deal of time on Habibie's and Defense Minister General Wiranto's alleged efforts to bring order, and western appeals to these moderates to provide the "security" that they promised. Thus in the *New York Times*: "The moderates at the top who seek to professionalize and modernize the army face resistance from some hard-line subordinates," and peacekeepers have been called in from abroad because of "the inability of military commanders in Jakarta to rein in their troops..."⁴³ An earlier ar-

ticle entitled "Jakarta Concedes A Loss of Control" takes a self-serving claim by the "moderates" as truth.⁴⁴

With targeted enemy states, by contrast, it is taken for granted that people at the top are in control and are therefore to be held strictly responsible for reprehensible behavior. With the splintered-authority model, we can appease as we placate the moderates and wait for their internal discipline to do the job. Thus, people like Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein are leaders responsible for their subordinates' behavior and can be labeled war criminals, while Habibie and Wiranto, moderates who "concede" their inability to prevent the killings done under their authority, are therefore not cast as war criminals by western leaders or editorial writers.

Evidence that the Indonesian Army had long-standing plans to disrupt the election, and to wreak havoc in case of loss, had to be ignored to sustain the splintered-authority model. Such plans, of which the upper echelons of the army were fully aware—indeed participants in—make the pretense of an army divided between moderates and extremists untenable. And if Habibie is powerless to contain the army, this suggests that the army still rules and that Indonesia is still a far cry from a working democracy. The media handled these problems by simply suppressing the information on western intelligence's advance knowledge of the army's pre-planned terror, playing down the evidence that the army has simply overridden Habibie, and gullibly accepting the splintered-authority model.

The media also played down long-standing links between the U.S. and Indonesian military, suggesting apologetically that because our military aid to Indonesia was now only a mere \$6.8 million, our "leverage" with the Indonesian military is weak.⁴⁵ This, of course, fails to explain why our "democratic values" had no impact over 32 years, when, at times, our aid was much larger.

The fact that intelligence knew of Indonesian terror plans and did nothing about it, the extremely unthreatening Clinton-Blair response to Indonesian terror, and the long record of support for Suharto and his earlier genocide in East Timor, suggest that the United States and Britain have not merely appeased Indonesia, but have colluded with it to give it freedom of action within the limits of constraining global opinion. Thus, "leverage" is irrelevant—we do not use

37. Michael Glennon (University of California at Davis, School of Law), "The New Military Interventionism," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June, 1999.

38. In one particularly loathsome display of appeasing Jakarta, Australia's Foreign Minister Alexander Downer appeared before the Parliament, where he was asked to comment on an Australian Defense Intelligence Organization report from March that "implied General Wiranto turned a blind eye to militia activities." "This of course has been a great debate here in Australia, what did General Wiranto know, what didn't he know," Downer replied. "It's been impossible to be conclusive about precisely who knew what, when, how, why. And intelligence assessments are never such that you can very seldom be conclusively sure of these things." "Australia FM unable to say if Wiranto turned blind eye to militias," *Agence France-Presse*, Sept. 20, 1999.

39. Although the citations that follow are virtually all to the *New York Times*, the authors' survey of hundreds of U.S.-based news sources that included the *Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Boston Globe*, *Philadelphia Inquirer*, *Chicago Tribune*, AP and Reuters dispatches, and CNN and network news broadcasts, points to the fact that the *New York Times*'s perspectives, widely reproduced themselves, reflect closely the primary themes and coverage of the mainstream media at large.

40. Thomas Friedman, "The Four Questions," *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1999; Seth Mydans, "East Timor Violence Rises as Referendum Nears," *New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1999.

41. Mydans, *op. cit.*, n. 40; "In East Timor, Decisive Vote For a Break From Indonesia," Sept. 4; "Army Pullout Shows Indonesia Fault Lines," Sept. 19, 1999.

42. According to Juan de Onis, writing in 1976, regurgitating the claims of the Argentine military junta, the junta "has been unable to control the rightwing extremists, who are clearly linked to the military and police." Juan de Onis, "Rightist Terror Stirs Argentina," *New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1976.

43. Mydans, *op. cit.*, n. 41, Sept. 19, 1999.

44. *New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1999.

45. Jane Perlez, "America Talks and (Some) Others Listen," *New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1999.



Kiki Syahnikri, Indonesia's commander in East Timor and liaison with militia groups greets Australian U.N. peacekeeping head, Maj.-Gen. Peter Cosgrove.

leverage to constrain friends and clients; "quiet diplomacy" and "constructive engagement" serve to reassure them of our support and that our occasional slaps on the wrist, done to satisfy public relations needs, are not to be taken seriously.⁴⁶

This view of the U.S.-Indonesian relationship as one of tacit support and protection is excluded from the mainstream media altogether, as is the context that would give it credibility: the history of U.S. support for the Suharto dictatorship; its consent, arms supply, and diplomatic support during Indonesia's first genocide; and the facts produced by Allan Nairn and others on the continued warm and supportive relations between the U.S. and Indonesian armed forces.

What the media do countenance, however, is the Big Picture, or Realist Model, which justifies U.S. and western inaction on the grounds that Indonesia is big, important strategically and financially, and is allegedly a "fragile" economy and democracy that we wouldn't want to "destabilize."⁴⁷

46. For a further discussion of this point, see Edward S. Herman, "The United States Versus Human Rights in the Third World," *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, Spring 1991, pp. 92-96.

47. "Indonesia's future is important to us, not only because of its resources and its sea lanes, but for its potential as a leader in the region and the world. It is the fourth most populous nation in the world; the largest Muslim nation in the world. All Asians and

While offering this model, the media do not stress the closely related fact that "realism" led to U.S. support of the Suharto dictatorship and his triple genocide (Indonesia, West Papua, East Timor) over three decades. The media also fail to raise two questions: Can U.S. support for "democratization" be taken seriously in light of its long alliance with Suharto; and wouldn't "destabilization" that weakened army power in Indonesia and loosened its murderous grip be a big plus for democracy?

The media accepted the argument that NATO "credibility" called for protecting the Kosovo Albanians, but they have not pressed the point that U.S. and U.N. credibility were seriously damaged by the failure to protect the East Timorese. Before the referendum, little attention was paid to the army-sponsored militia violence, and no one in the mainstream media uncovered the army's planned post-referendum assault. Barbara Crossette mentioned the failure of the May 5 agreement to provide for independent peace-keepers and protectors of the election,⁴⁸ but neither she nor her colleagues ever crit-

Americans have an interest in a stable, democratic, prosperous Indonesia. Our fundamental values are also at stake in East Timor." President Clinton's White House Statement, Sept. 16, 1999.

48. "Security Council Presses Indonesia to Restore Order," *New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1999.

icized those weaknesses. This reportorial failure "followed the flag" as the Clinton administration did nothing in the face of the gathering threat.

In the post-referendum holocaust, as the administration continued to appease and defer to the killers, the media played down the sordid record, refused to attack the administration's feeble response, and called at most for more pressure on Indonesia, perhaps modest sanctions. They did not contrast such inaction with the aggressive resort to violence in Yugoslavia. The big question for weeks was "will Indonesia allow peacekeepers into East Timor," with no hint that Indonesia never had valid authority in East Timor, or had forfeited such as it had by the commencement of a second genocide. The fact that the peacekeepers were landing only in East Timor, with little attention to the many thousands of East Timorese forced into West Timor, in dire conditions and under serious threat, was also off the media agenda. The notion that the Clinton administration is not only appeasing but at least tacitly colluding with Indonesia in its second genocide is unmentionable.

CONCLUSION

The system works! The U.S. and its allies can manufacture a war of destruction against Yugoslavia on "moral grounds," shortly thereafter appease and collude with a murderous client state as it destroys a country and people that had simply voted for their freedom under a U.N.- and Great Power-sponsored referendum, and come out of this essentially untarnished as leaders in the ongoing "global spread of freedom and democracy."⁴⁹ This required a large dose of doublespeak and doublethink, with moral indignation for the one and pragmatic realism for the other, the responsibility model for one and the splintered-authority model for the other, a massive dichotomization and selectivity of information, an ignoring of the historical continuity of western support for the genocidal Indonesian army, and a blacking out of a great deal of other information on western military and intelligence cooperation with Indonesia. The media's success in normalizing and putting a positive gloss on the U.S. and western policy turnabout from "humanitarian war" to "inhumane appeasement"—and de facto support of further genocide in East Timor—would be hard to surpass. ■

49. This is a *Business Week* vision of what we are witnessing in the world today. Sept. 27, 1999, p. 26.

COLOMBIA: THE POLITICS OF ESCALATION

BY MARK COOK

The U.S. government is sabotaging the Colombian peace process through the classic strategy of imperialist intervention and massive escalation of that country's civil war. It is the same strategy that was used in Vietnam and Central America.

The escalation can only be understood in a regional context. The aggressive land takeovers in Colombia by transnational oil and mining corporations and their use of paramilitary death squads to expel the peasants has inevitably contributed to the rapid growth of the insurgency. More and more of the poor join the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).

The events in Colombia, largely produced by transnational and Colombian big business, come on top of the overwhelming election of Hugo Chavez as President of neighboring Venezuela and his commitment to policies of national sovereignty. Domestic developments in both countries are seen as endangering U.S. imperial domination in the area.

In an incident that suggests serious concern in U.S. business and government circles about threats to corporate and military control of the strategic and oil-rich Colombia-Venezuela sector, the U.S. media blacked out coverage of a summit of 48 countries of the European Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean, held in Rio de Janeiro in late June. The meeting proclaimed a "new era" in European-Latin American relations. The meeting of so many heads of state and government, with potentially profound consequences for U.S. corporate dominance in Latin America, was completely censored from the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, as well as the major television networks, although they could not possibly have been ignorant of it. The *Wall Street Journal* gave the story three paragraphs on page eight.¹

U.S. officials are responding by pressuring Ecuador, Argentina and unnamed Central American countries to set up a string of new U.S. military bases. They speak openly of attempting to "revise" (that is, abrogate) the Panama Canal Treaty which requires the abandonment of all

U.S. bases in Panama. But opposition to bases is intense throughout the region, and U.S. officials acknowledge that they dare not name the Central American states they are approaching for fear of fomenting discontent in those countries.²

In Colombia, Clinton administration officials claim to be supporting President Andres Pastrana's peace negotiations with the country's leftwing insurgents, a process initiated a year ago by Pastrana in fulfill-

Pastrana's peace negotiations, while joining the Colombian military in denouncing Pastrana for "giving away the store" in the negotiations.³

The decision by the Clinton administration to name General Barry McCaffrey, former head of the U.S. Southern Command, or SouthCom, as the White House "drug czar" was interpreted at the time as a way of escalating Colombia's almost unbelievably bloody civil



Manuel Marulanda, leader of FARC (right) meets with President Andrés Pastrana in historic peace talks in which land was ceded to insurgents.

ment of an election campaign promise. But Washington's multibillion dollar arms shipments and troop deployments strengthen the dreaded Colombian army, which has made clear that it has no interest in peace.

Clinton policies bear a striking resemblance to the Reagan administration tactic in the mid-1980s of professing support for the Contadora Central American peace process as an excuse to escalate the Central American wars. Now, Clinton administration officials give perfunctory praise to

war by dressing it up as a war on drugs. His replacement at SouthCom was Gen. Charles Wilhelm, who immediately began to speak of direct counterinsurgency assistance for the Colombian military. Wilhelm declared that criticism of military abuses of human rights was "unfair" and said that guerrillas abused human rights more often than Colombian security forces or paramilitary death squads. This was wildly false, even con-

3. "Despite their early hopes for Mr. Pastrana, however, United States officials generally describe his efforts to negotiate with the guerrillas as a failure that has left the insurgents stronger and more defiant," wrote the *New York Times* in a front-page story Sept. 15. It added that administration officials "say they have made it clear to the Colombians" that increased American support will come with pressure for "a new, probably tougher Government approach to the peace talks with the insurgents."

Mark Cook has reported extensively on Latin America for the last two decades.

1. *Agence France-Presse report, El Diario/La Prensa, June 30, 1999, p. 11.*

2. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering and drug czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, Oct. 6, 1999. Honduran military bases used in the Central American wars of the 1980s are ruled out because they are surrounded by mountains and lack sufficiently long runways for AWACs and other heavy aircraft.

AP / Wide World Photos



AP / Wide World Photos

White House drug czar Barry McCaffrey reviews new Colombian battalion of U.S. Special Forces-trained soldiers.

tradicting the State Department's own annual report.⁴

NO MENTION OF DEATH SQUADS

Few of the reports in a massive U.S. media campaign supporting increased aid to Colombia even mention the existence of "paramilitary" death squads trained by U.S. Special Forces and closely tied to the Colombian military.

Presented instead is the new line, as summed up by *Investors Business Daily*: that Colombia's insurgencies control "40 to 60 percent of the countryside"; that they "lack popular support" but are awash in drug money, some \$600 to \$800 million; that the U.S. has spent years trying to "fight the drug war but not Colombia's guerrilla insurgency,"⁵ but that "this month, U.S. drug czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey finally admitted that's no longer possible."⁶

Selling such a story is hard. Even official and semi-official agencies of the Empire have conceded that the bulk of the killing and the drug-dealing is being done by their own allies. The U.S. State Department, as well as establishment human rights groups, blame the govern-

ment-connected paramilitaries for the overwhelming majority of all political killings in 1998.⁷ And as the *Economist* of London has written, "the right-wing paramilitary groups and the traffickers they protect are far deeper into drugs—and the DEA [U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration] knows it."⁸

It is an open secret that the military units sponsored by SouthCom are among the largest drug traffickers, as are the rightwing paramilitary death squads formed by U.S. trainers years ago. They also hold a northern fiefdom from which they control "land, people, drug laboratories, and shipping routes for drugs and arms to and from the Caribbean and Central America."⁹ The Colombian air

7. "Colombia on the Brink," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1999, p. 17. As Human Rights Watch has noted, *op. cit.*, n. 4, although exact figures remained difficult to confirm, the Data Bank run by the Center for Research and Popular Education (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular, CINEP) and the Intercongregational Commission of Justice and Peace (Justice and Peace), human rights groups, reported that of those killed for political reasons in 1998 where a perpetrator was suspected, 73 percent of the killings were attributed to paramilitaries, 17 percent were attributed to guerrillas, and 10 percent to state agents.

8. Quoted in Nick Trebat, "U.S. Policy Towards Colombia About To Massively Veer Off-Track: Drugs replace communism as the point of entry for U.S. policy on Latin America," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, Aug. 24, 1999.

9. "Guns, drugs and a slim chance for peace," *Irish*

force is widely reputed to be a major drug cartel itself. In November 1998, a half ton of cocaine was found on board the airplane of the chief of the Colombian Military Air Transport Command when it landed in Miami.¹⁰

U.S. officials publicly denounced the government of Pastrana's predecessor, President Ernesto Samper, for his alleged receipt of millions in campaign contributions from drug dealers. Colombia was "decertified" for its failure to collaborate with Washington in the "drug war," and cut off from a wide range of aid and trade deals. But at the same time, the U.S. was sharply increasing aid and arms sales to Colombia's military, while loudly and repeatedly "decertifying" the government the military was sworn to support. For the last two years of Samper's government, when he was publicly declared "persona non grata" by Washington, U.S. ties to Colombia's military grew exponentially. Pastrana assumed office in 1998.

STOPPING PARAMILITARIES

President Pastrana has said he would comply with the insurgents' key demand, to stop the paramilitaries, but seems unwilling or unable to do so. Leaders of paramilitary organizations operate with impunity, giving press interviews and even walking in and out of Colombian military bases.

In the same fashion, the real history of the paramilitaries is studiously ignored by the U.S. media. The FARC negotiated a settlement at the beginning of the decade, formed the UP, an electoral political party, and won a stunning series of victories in local and regional elections. Almost all of the thousands elected have since been systematically murdered.

When complaints were recently raised about the U.S. government and media failing to mention the paramilitaries, Gen. McCaffrey changed his tune slightly and asserted that the U.S. military aid plan was to help the Colombian military fight the "narco-guerrillas" and the paramilitaries.¹¹ The *Washington Post* and the *Miami Herald* followed suit with stories claiming that U.S. military personnel were training the Colombian military to respect human rights.¹²

Times, July 13, 1999.

10. Robert E. White, "The Wrong War: Our Guns and Tanks Won't Bring An End to Colombia's Civil Strife," *Washington Post*, Sept. 12, 1999, p. B1.

11. PBS Newshour, Sept. 22, 1999.

12. This was reminiscent of similar media stories in the 1980s extolling the U.S. formation from scratch of the Atlacatl Battalion in El Salvador, a military unit which it was asserted would have spe-

4. As noted in Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Developments: Colombia," 1998.

5. *Investors Business Daily*, Aug. 25, 1999, p. 1.

6. *Ibid.*

Big business interests, both Colombian and transnational, also have regularly joined forces with paramilitaries to terrorize poor farmers off their land. If the peasants do not leave, they are killed by the death squads. Either way, the corporation can then seize the land or buy it for practically nothing.

Beyond Washington's other concerns, demands put forth by Colombian insurgents for curing the cocaine plague with agricultural subsidies for alternative crops would contradict and endanger New World Order economic policies for Latin America.

President Pastrana is no progressive-minded pacifist, and the Colombian

cial human rights training that would gradually improve the behavior of the rest of the Salvadoran army. Atlacatl turned out to be responsible for the worst atrocities of the Salvador war. Apparently no one was surprised by this, for no serious U.S. media or congressional effort has ever been undertaken to establish how this could have happened.

Years later, even after revelations of the Battalion's involvement in some of the worst atrocities of the war, from the El Mozote massacre at the beginning to the Jesuit murders at the end, the *New York Times* called it "the pride of the United States military team in San Salvador.... [T]rained in antiguerrilla operations, the battalion was intended to turn a losing war around." Clifford Krauss, "How U.S. Actions Helped Hide Salvador Human Rights Abuses," *New York Times*, Mar. 21, 1993, p. A1.

government is suspected by many of using negotiations with Colombia's rebels to buy time while the U.S. increases the military buildup. The U.S. escalation appears to have been what provoked the FARC's offensive in July.

The previous March, U.S. intelligence dramatically increased its collaboration with the Colombian military, particularly through the use of spy planes to aid in attacks on the rebels. The "sharing of intelligence" from the spy planes was lauded by U.S. Southern Command officials as having had devastating effect on the rebels in military engagements. A spy plane crashed in the midst of a rebel offensive in late July, reportedly setting back U.S. efforts considerably.¹³

MULTINATIONAL FORCE

Meanwhile, U.S. officials began pressuring Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela to cooperate with U.S. intelligence and the Colombian military to fight Colombia's insurgency. U.S. officials pushed those countries and Argentina to form a multinational mili-

13. Although the spy plane was supposedly aimed at drug interdiction, it crashed an improbably long distance from where it was supposed to be operating. *Weekly News Update on the Americas*, July 25, 1999.

tary force to intervene in Colombia, according to reports from semi-official media outlets in Peru and elsewhere.

The proposal for a multinational military force to intervene in Colombia was rejected by the governments involved, and Washington hastily denied that anything of the sort had been mentioned.

But only a month before, Washington publicly proposed exactly such a force to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS). U.S. diplomats called for a "group of friendly countries" (linked economically or politically) to intervene in internal conflicts that are judged to threaten "democracy" in any country in Latin America.

That goes far beyond a 1991 OAS provision, also pushed through at U.S. insistence, that would allow intervention in the case of an extreme and immediate threat, such as a coup d'état. Acting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Peter Romero called the new proposal "preventative diplomacy." "This is a way to make sure a potentially manageable brush fire does not burn down the forest," Romero said.

Jamaica called the measure "paternalistic" and the Peruvian foreign min-



Cong. Benjamin Gilman (Rep.-N.Y.), fervent supporter of Colombian military, with Huey helicopter "Big Ben," named after him.



Massive inflows of U.S. military aid and training compound poverty in Colombia.

United Nations / M. Grant

ister declared that "all actions of the OAS should be directed so each country...is responsible for dealing with its own problems, maintaining always its sovereignty."

Objections centered on who would determine if a crisis was serious enough to warrant intervention, as well as the form and degree of intervention necessary.¹⁴

Although the proposal was repudiated by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, it will be returned to committee and U.S. authorities believe they can push it through next year. "We never hoped that the proposal would be approved at this session, we just wanted to put the matter on the table for discussion," U.S. representative to the OAS Victor Marrero remarked.¹⁵

FLOUTING LEAHY AMENDMENT

Meanwhile, as Washington has been engaged in a massive escalation of the war, it has been flouting both the spirit and the letter of the Leahy Amendment (introduced by Sen. Patrick Leahy [Dem.-Vt.]), which forbids aid administered by the State Department to Colombian military units where personnel have engaged in gross human rights abuses. That amounts to the overwhelming majority of the units of the Colombian army.¹⁶

Although the Leahy Amendment specifically includes aid to counter-narcotics efforts, the Pentagon and the CIA feel themselves under no obligation to comply, since their programs are not counter-narcotic but counter-guerrilla.¹⁷

16. *Op. cit.*, n. 4. The report listed the names of Colombian military units that form death squads and/or actively promote, support and take part in paramilitary activities. "These [units] make up over 75 percent of the Colombian army," it concludes.

17. An aide to Sen. Leahy reportedly told Tod Robberson of the *Dallas Morning News* that "previous Pentagon attempts to avoid applying those restrictions prompted Sen. Leahy earlier this month to draft legislation requiring compliance. Although the Defense Department has said it would agree to the proposed law, he said, the CIA rejects such restrictions." ("U.S. launches covert program to aid Colombia Military, mercenaries hired, sources say," *Dallas Morning News*, Aug. 19, 1998.

The small group of Republicans who have led the campaign on Colombia bitterly attacked the Leahy Amendment and tried unsuccessfully to have it removed from the 1998 foreign operations bill, saying that human rights concerns hampered the "drug war."

The group is led by Republican Representatives Dan Burton of Indiana and Benjamin Gilman of New York, whose collaboration with the Colombian military is so extreme that they have practically been made honorary members. (Both have had helicopters named after them. "Big Ben" is still flying; Burton's has crashed.¹⁸) They are the source of the allegation that the guerrillas in Colombia are earning \$600 to \$800 million a year in the drug trade and using the money to buy weapons, figures ridiculed even by U.S. intelligence reports.¹⁹

18. So do many of Burton's enterprises. Burton reportedly hands out copies of the memoirs of deposed Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza to Central American visitors to his office.

19. See *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1999, p. A14. The \$600 to \$800 million figure is flatly contradicted by official U.S. findings, which claim that no more than \$30 to \$100 million reaches guerrilla hands, largely through a war tax on peasants. *Ibid.* But even if the higher figures were true, U.S. officials also claim that at least \$5 billion in drug profits flow into Colombia every year. Who is receiving the rest?

14. Stratfor Global Intelligence Update, June 10, 1999.

15. The effort to push through such a measure harkens back to 1979 when the Carter administration requested OAS backing for an invasion of Nicaragua, one month before the Sandinista triumph over the Somoza dictatorship. In an unprecedented show of independence, the OAS rejected the Carter proposal and accused the U.S. of interference. (Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had presented the proposal as a "peacekeeping force" aimed at preventing an imminent "humanitarian and political disaster" in Nicaragua.)

Gen. McCaffrey's televised House committee appearances are carefully stage-managed affairs, aimed at depicting the Colombian security forces as helpless against unpopular but drug-rich and heavily armed guerrillas. House members plead for more helicopters to interdict the drugs. Following the script, McCaffrey agrees that this is urgently necessary but points out that the Colombians lack enough trained helicopter pilots, implying that the Colombians should use U.S. personnel, either current or "retired" military who would be hired as soldiers of fortune. In fact, as Tod Robberson of the *Dallas Morning News* has reported, large numbers of such "ex-military" mercenaries already have been recruited.²⁰

At present, Colombia is the fourth largest recipient of U.S. aid—after Israel, Egypt, and Jordan—with most of the aid in the form of arms. U.S. officials have ceased even to pretend seriously that the aid is to combat cocaine trafficking.²¹

Washington's orchestrated attack on President Pastrana seems ironic. The Harvard graduate from Colombia's ruling élite was perceived by ordinary Colombians as having been handpicked by U.S. officials.²²

As part of the attack on Pastrana, the media blitz has begun highlighting Colombia's desperate economic straits, including the worst depression in decades, a growing debt burden and a 20 percent unemployment rate. That unemployment rate compares favorably with a number of Latin American governments considered "friendly" to Washington and much-praised in the U.S. corporate media. The fact that the media are showing such unusual concern for Colombia's unemployed adds to the feeling in Bogotá that U.S. authorities are setting Pastrana up for the chopping block.²³

20. *Op. cit.*, n. 17.

21. "While fighting drugs will remain a central goal, the United States is about to make a broader commitment to support Colombia's embattled Government than it has in years." *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1999, p. A1.

22. "Nor do those [U.S.] officials hide their view that Colombia's multiple crises may be beyond Mr. Pastrana's ability to resolve." *New York Times*, Sept. 15, 1999, p. A14.

23. Much of the U.S. administration's treatment of President Pastrana is disquietingly reminiscent of official U.S. reaction to President Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon in 1963. U.S. officials learned in the autumn of that year that Diem was engaged in secret negotiations with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front to make South Vietnam neutral and to ask the Americans to leave. They immediately ordered the overthrow of Diem, whom they had installed as president of the U.S.-created republic, and his replacement with military rulers. Diem and his brother (who had been the go-between in the negotia-

The same news reports credulously pass along intelligence agency claims that Colombia has managed to develop a new super-strain of coca leaf, making it unnecessary for drug dealers to import the material from Peru and Bolivia, as in the past, and asserting that Colombian "narco-guerrillas" are earning fantastic revenues as a result.

No effort is made to explain the obvious discrepancy between Colombia's undoubted economic straits and the fantastic new wealth supposedly pouring into the country because of the "super-strain" of drugs. If the claim that at least \$5 billion in drug profits flow into Colombia annually is accurate, that amounts to \$125 per year for every adult and child in Colombia. (A subsequent AP report on a mass arrest of alleged Colombian drug dealers claimed that the gang was earning \$5 billion a month.²⁴)

Undeterred, the media also continue to cite a CIA report that coca crops increased 28% in Colombia last year. That report was rejected by Colombian National Police Chief Rosso José Serrano, who, the *Colombia Bulletin* reports, showed his own aerial photographs and satellite images obtained from the French space agency to counter the CIA assertions.

"The worldwide chief of the U.N. Drug Control Program, Pino Arlacchi, said CIA methods fall short because the agency relies almost exclusively on satellites, rarely checking on the ground to see if the coca plants are, indeed, dead," the *Bulletin* reported.²⁵

While there may not be an "explosion" of coca leaf cultivation, it is probably true that it has increased as transnational corporations (mostly oil and mining) and landlords use paramilitary death squads. Many of the displaced—who now number between a million and a million and a half people—have gone to the edge of the rain forest where they usually clear between three and five hectares of land and grow coca leaf, the only crop that will allow them to survive.

As Colombia's insurgent groups have pointed out, if the U.S. Empire wants to end the cultivation of coca leaves, the only way is to provide these marginalized peasants with a crop and a market which will enable them to feed their families.

tions) were both murdered. Three weeks later, in a coincidence of timing that continues to interest historians, U.S. President John Kennedy was himself assassinated in Dallas. Diem was followed by a series of revolving-door military governments, many of them overthrown in turn when U.S. officials learned that they were engaged in peace negotiations.

24. AP dispatch, *Hoy* (New York), Oct. 14, 1999.

25. "Congressional Cowboys Shoot for Big, Bad War," *Colombia Bulletin*, Summer 1999, p. 8.

That requires either: (1) agricultural subsidies of the kind that have existed in the United States and Western Europe for decades but which are forbidden to the poorer nations of the world under the New World Order; or (2) the indexation of commodity prices, a demand made by the Non-Aligned Movement for years.

If the claims of economic collapse are greatly exaggerated, at least by current Latin American standards, and the claims of a dramatic increase in coca leaf production are also greatly inflated, if not simply false, that would answer the assertion that a country is sinking into economic destitution at the same time that a principal export crop is off the charts.

But it does not explain why the U.S. media have picked up on this line now. Usually, these stories of economic distress are the standard media fare for countries whose governments the U.S. is seeking to overthrow, such as Cuba, Sandinista Nicaragua, or Popular Unity Chile.

Is the U.S. preparing to overthrow Pastrana or make him, Central American style, into a useless decoration on a military-death squad regime? What is certain is that the insistence by the U.S. government and imperial media on calling the FARC and ELN "narco-guerrillas" and "narco-terrorists" completely invalidates Pastrana's peace initiative.

Pastrana has insisted that the guerrillas are nothing of the sort. The common agenda for peace talks, which he signed with the guerrillas last May, "implicitly recognizes that the revolutionaries took up arms in a just cause and commits both parties to negotiate profound economic and social reforms through political compromise," wrote former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White recently.²⁶ They include land reform, especially through confiscation and redistribution of huge land holdings obtained through drug profits, an end to the cultivation of illicit drugs, and a crackdown by the Colombian army on the paramilitary death squads.

But U.S. officials have been heavily involved with forming the death squads since the beginning. Until Pastrana is able to make good on these last commitments, it is absurd to demand, as Washington has, that the rebels abandon their commitment to the peasants and labor organizers who depend on them, and leave them at the mercy of the paramilitary death squads. ■

26. *Op. cit.*, n. 10.

CROSSROADS OF WAR AND BIODIVERSITY:

CIA, COCAINE, AND DEATH SQUADS

BY THE ECO-SOLIDARITY WORKING GROUP

Forty million people, along with the most biologically diverse, endangered ecosystems in the world, are under attack by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and mercenaries paid by oil companies. This war is fought with bombs and bullets, as well as with herbicides and media misinformation. The cause of the war is as diverse as the region's terrain and its ethnic variety. The rapacious greed of multinationals like

Occidental Petroleum, Shell, BP, Texaco, and their counterparts in the Colombian elite is the main problem, but cocaine use in the U.S. is the fuel that fires this inferno. Drug exports pay for the weapons of the rightwing government-backed death squads and the revolutionary guerrillas.

For years Colombia was banned from receiving U.S. military or drug fighting money due to its poor human rights record and its failure to cooperate in the

drug war. In 1998 they received \$89 million, and this year the total reached \$289 million. Despite continued human rights abuses, Colombia is now the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid after Israel and Egypt. Direct U.S. military intervention looms on the horizon for this region, which exports more oil to the U.S. than the entire Middle East. President Clinton is giving the nod to a death-squad offensive. These squads work closely with Colombian military and together they are responsible for the deaths of 25,000 people this decade—300,000 since 1945. Violence has displaced 1.2 million people in the last three years (mostly women and children).

Death squads guard petroleum facilities and shipments of cocaine. The head of these squads, Carlos Castaño, is a key player in the Cali Drug Cartel, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Castaño took over the direction of the death squads from another CIA asset, Colombian Army General Van Martinez. CIA involvement in Colombia began in the 1950s and grew along with the drug trade. In 1991 the CIA established a Colombian naval intelligence group that became a key part of the death squads' continuing terror campaign against guerrillas and anyone who speaks out for change or peace.¹ Many death squad leaders graduated from the School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia, where thousands of Latin American soldiers have been trained in counterinsurgency and torture. Castaño proudly takes responsibility for his massacres. He has kidnaped Colombian senators and he speaks in radio interviews about the need for more killing. Arrest warrants for Castaño, army officers and other death squad leaders gather dust on the Attorney General's desk. Evidence mounts of collaboration between the military and the death squads.² In July, the largest Colombian guerrilla group, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) launched an attack against the mountain headquarters of Castaño, but




AP / Wide World Photos

Known as "Head Cutters," rightwing paramilitary death squad soldiers on the march.

1. *Z Magazine*, Mar. 1999.

2. *Progressive*, Sept. 1999.



Reuters / Archive Photos

Death squad leader Carlos Castaño in only known photograph.

were driven back by the Colombian army with U.S. intelligence assistance.³

Hundreds of U.S. military personnel are on the ground, training elite units of the Colombian Army. Sophisticated U.S. spy planes, like the U.S. RC-7B, inform and direct combat operations. DynaCorp and East Inc. operate a private air force used to eradicate poppies and coca plants, dousing hundreds of square miles of the countryside with herbicides. Monsanto's Roundup is the toxin of choice, but the U.S. has pressured Colombia to use Dow Chemical's more lethal tebuthiuron. Trade named Spike, it comes in a granular form making it easier to apply. Colombia is the only country in the hemisphere where drug crops are sprayed from the air. Genetically engineered viruses are also being developed for the drug war arsenal. Despite this toxic rain, coca production has risen dramatically. In July, two DynaCorp employees were killed along with five U.S. military personnel when an intelligence-gathering aircraft hit a mountain or a FARC missile in southern Colombia.

The news media have confused the issues and kept secret U.S. culpability in this dirty war. They create an impression that the FARC and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Colombia's other major guerrilla group, have long controlled most of the drug trade, but, in fact, "ELN until now has been a minor

player."⁴ Moreover the guerrillas are presented as unwilling to lay down their arms as part of a peace plan. In the late 1980s, guerrillas put down the gun for the ballot box. They were met with the votes of many people and a hail of bullets from the death squads. Almost 5,000 members of the opposition political party, Patriotic Union, have been killed by the right wing since 1989.

The oil companies and the government must be held responsible for the violence and the pollution that is the byproduct of their oil operations. Oil is Colombia's most important legal export (27 percent of total exports). Coffee is second (15 percent).

The U.S. imports 260,000 barrels of Colombian oil every day. In the U'wa region alone, 1.7 million barrels of

oil have spilled onto the soil and rivers in the last 12 years. Colombia has the worst human rights record in the Americas, and the area around the U'wa has the worst record in Colombia. Robin Kirk, author of "War with Colombia and International Law," supports the contention that the death squads make their massacres as brutal and gruesome as possible to make sure the message is understood. They often carry lists of trade unionists, Catholic priests, human rights observers and guerrilla supporters.

A biological paradise, Colombia has the greatest number of bird species (1,780) of any country in the world. It is second in plants and amphibians and third in reptiles. Only Brazil, which is seven times larger, surpasses Colombia in total number of species. The Macarena region contains Colombia's first biological preserve, established in 1942. Half of the world's orchids bloom here, and a dazzling variety of jaguars, dolphin, primates, giant otters, spectacled bears, agoutis, kinkajous and the FARC live here too. The Macarena has been its headquarters for decades, and it has earned respect from biolo-

gists for establishing some order over the squatters who are a constant threat to the region's biological integrity.

Besides the war, the oil spills, dams and herbicides, there is the usual devastation from cattle, road construction, logging and mining-the social and environmental externalities that come with the U.S. model of economic development. Manatees, tapirs, and macaws are but a tiny fraction of the species that are on the edge of extinction in Colombia. Most species have not even been classified here.

In this threatened ecosystem, the guerrillas are fighting for their lives and the tens of thousands of relatives they have lost to U.S. and narco-death squads. Thousands of young people have joined the guerrilla's bid to end the right wing's forty years of collusion with oil company exploitation and death squad violence. Their goal is to stop this neo-liberal madness that devastates people and the environment in a chase for profits.

Eco-Solidarity seeks an end to the phony drug war that the U.S. wages against the land and the poor people of Colombia. The most biologically diverse ecosystems in the world are at risk here. Almost two million people have been displaced by a brutal civil war that is financed and directed by the U.S. and its covert operations. Refugees, mostly women and children, are crowded into slums or driven further into the rainforests. ■

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WHO RULES COLOMBIA?

Carlos Castaño is a leader of Colombia's 5,000 - man AUC death squad, and, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration, he is also connected to some of the world's richest drug dealers.

Castaño boasts about how well his atrocities fit into the CIA/Colombian government's current program of *quitarle agua al pez*, or draining the sea (killing the innocent) to catch the fish (guerrillas). When asked why he slaughters peasants and children, Castaño replies, "Well, I can't wait for the guerrillas to put on their uniforms before I kill them.... When we take out [a sympathizer] we save many who would've been killed in the future."

— Jason Martin

3. Stratfor Global Intelligence Update, July 29, 1999.

4. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1999.



AP / Wide World Photos

Colombian military conducts "anti-narcotics" operation, using tactics reminiscent of El Salvador and Vietnam wars.

THE "SALVADOR BOYS"

BY MARK COOK

The Colombian weekly *Semana* took note in its August 23, 1999, edition of the remarkable number of U.S. veterans of the war in El Salvador in the 1980s who have turned their attention to Colombia. Among them:

U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, who, as ambassador to El Salvador in 1984, justified the widespread killing of civilians by the Salvadoran army on the grounds that the civilians were *masas* (i.e., part of the mass social base of the insurgent FMLN) and were therefore "somewhat more than innocent civilian bystanders."

Even the establishment human rights organization Americas Watch was flabbergasted, and pointed out that the U.S. State Department had condemned the bombing of civilian populations in the strongest terms only a few months earlier. However, Americas Watch noted, the State Department was speaking of Afghanistan, not El Salvador.

"When it comes to El Salvador, the State Department has an entirely different attitude," the Watch committee noted, and quoted from Pickering's January 25, 1984,

cable, which was widely circulated in Congress and among rightwing columnists.

Pickering went on to jobs as ambassador to Israel, the United Nations and Russia, where he was serving when President Boris Yeltsin's military supporters drew up tanks to open fire on the democratically elected parliament, with parliamentarians and staff inside. Deaths were reported in the hundreds (according to some reports, over 1,000). U.S. authorities and the transnational media applauded the action as another advance for democracy.

Assistant Secretary of State Peter Romero, who worked on the "peace process" in El Salvador. Like Pickering, he believes that the "Salvador solution" can be the model for Colombia.

Romero was most recently in the news for proposing to the Organization of American States the establishment of a "group of friendly countries" linked economically and politically which could intervene in internal conflicts in Latin American countries as they saw fit. Romero called the proposal "preventive diplomacy." The OAS rejected the U.S. bid,

calling it paternalistic and questioning who would decide if a crisis was serious enough to warrant intervention. U.S. diplomats intend to reintroduce the proposal next year.

General Charles Wilhelm, former military attaché in the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, now head of the U.S. military Southern Command, or SouthCom, which has responsibility for the Caribbean and all of Latin America. As Nikolas Kozloff has noted in a report on SouthCom, Wilhelm has acquired a reputation for associating with the most murderous elements of the Colombian army high command. One of them, General Harold Bedoya, was even forced to resign by the Colombian government because of such extreme human rights violations. "We took Bedoya out because of human rights," former Colombian President Ernesto Samper told Human Rights Watch.

As Kozloff reports, General Wilhelm has been leading efforts to "protect" Panama from Colombian guerrillas and drug traffickers. According to the June 24, 1999, *Miami Herald*, the Panamanian government rejected U.S. intervention along

the Panama-Colombia border to guarantee the security of the Panama Canal, qualifying as "inadmissible" a suggestion made to that effect by General Wilhelm. (Canal protection is the only grounds for intervention in Panama by U.S. troops, according to the Canal Treaty.) Panamanian Foreign Minister Jorge Ritter told reporters that his country rejects as "unacceptable" statements made before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which Wilhelm suggested that the threat of drug trafficking and incursions by Colombian guerrillas could warrant U.S. intervention in Panama. It is "inadmissible" to cite the drug trade and problems along Panama's border with Colombia to suggest that the Canal is in danger, Ritter said.

Andrew Messing, former commander of Green Beret Special Forces in El Salvador, is now director of the National Defense Council, an NGO pressing for more military aid and which, according to *Semana*, advises rightwing Republican Congress members Dan Burton and Benjamin Gilman on helicopters for Colombia.

Douglas Farah, *Washington Post* correspondent in Colombia, previously worked in El Salvador and Nicaragua. His work in Nicaragua, after the Sandinistas handed over power to the Chamorro government, concentrated on depicting the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran FMLN as international terrorists. He sought to imply, with deliberate dishonesty, that the Sandinistas were involved in the World Trade Center bombing. He also gave sympathetic treatment to the idea of overthrowing Violeta Chamorro, normally lauded as a savior in the U.S. imperial media, because she was failing to live up to what Washington expected of her.¹

James LeMoyné, former reporter for the *New York Times*, whose record of disinformation was so extreme that it finally discredited him as a journalist. LeMoyné is now a U.N. official advising that organization on the Colombian peace process.

While at the *Times*, LeMoyné attempted to turn an unsuccessful contra attack on the Nicaraguan mining town of Siuna into a spectacular contra victory (thereby depicting the contras as capable of taking a town; their failure to do so had been jeopardizing their funding from Congressmembers unconcerned about the morality of arming the contras but worried that they were throwing money down a rathole).²

LeMoyné also ran a fabricated story of Salvadorans found murdered, with their voter registration cards stuffed in their mouths; this was presented as evidence that the FMLN was terrorizing people to keep them from voting. The story had come from a San Salvador newspaper connected to the Salvadoran army and turned out to be baseless.

Is the U.S. preparing to overthrow Pastrana or make him, Central American style, into a useless decoration on a military death squad regime?

In another murder case, this time a real one, LeMoyné conducted an interview with a prisoner being held incommunicado by the Salvadoran authorities, who "admitted" that he had killed Herbert Anaya, a prominent human rights activist, on orders from the FMLN. The prisoner repudiated his confession, which Anaya's family quickly had declared to be absurd, but which LeMoyné had treated as credible. Anaya's family noted that they had seen a group of National Police 200 meters from the family's house, and that the FMLN would not have attacked so close to the police. In his own defense, LeMoyné later protested that the *Washington Post* had also conducted the incommunicado interview with the prisoner.

Among these civil servants of the Empire, bitter divisions continue over Colombia policy, not over ends but means. Both the White House and the small group of Republicans in the Congress with close ties to the Colombian military are agreed on what they want: a Salvadoran solution.

In that arrangement, the military and its allied death squads would cease their slaughter of people judged to be on the left, but the economic structure would remain the same and the left would be denied any real access to political power, control over economic policy, or any real control over foreign affairs or military matters.

THE "SALVADOR SOLUTION"

But the "Salvador Solution" has already been tried in Colombia. In 1985 the insurgent Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) made an agreement with the government of then-President Romulo Betancur to lay down their arms and form the Patriotic Union Party (UP). UP candidates enjoyed spectacular success in the ensuing elections, winning thousands of local and regional posts with a progressive political platform.

The victorious candidates were systematically hunted down and murdered in the following years by army and paramilitary death squads, to the point where today almost 5,000 have lost their lives. Among those killed are the party's most viable presidential candidates.

The FARC is unlikely to accept such a deal again. In the view of the U.S. right, Colombia may have to go through another ten years of death-squad violence and aerial bombing of civilian populations, as the U.S. did with El Salvador, in order to get the settlement the U.S. wants.

Opponents of that strategy in Washington argue that the current "Salvadoran solution" could have been had at the start of the 1980s, without a decade of murder, and that the ensuing decade will eventually come back to haunt the U.S. empire in Latin America.

Neither side raises the point that the current economic and political arrangement in El Salvador and the rest of Central America is no solution at all, given the staggering levels of unemployment and the IMF-dictated destruction of health and education. Both continue to espouse the view that U.S. business enterprises and South Korean and Taiwanese *maquiladora* starvation-wage assembly plants will eventually show success.

The truth is that the war against the left in Colombia has already taken the form of a war against the Colombian labor movement. *One-third* of all labor organizers killed worldwide over the past few years have been killed in Colombia. The U.S. Embassy has excused this type of behavior by coining the term "narcoguerrilla" and implying that the labor movement is an extension of that "narcoguerrilla," as Thomas Pickering did in El Salvador. ■

1. *Washington Post*, Feb. 8, 1993, p. A1.

2. *New York Times*, Dec. 25, 1986, p. 1; Alexander Cockburn column, *The Nation*, Jan. 30, 1987; letter from LeMoyné to the editor, *The Nation*, and reply by Cockburn, *The Nation*, July 2, 1987.

Cocaine, The Colonel, and Mrs. Hiett

Not long before he hit the front pages because of his wife's arrest on cocaine smuggling charges, Col. J.C. Hiett, head of U.S. military anti-drug operations in Colombia, dashed off the following e-mail to the U.S.-based Colombian Labor Monitor:

I just wish you knew what you were talking about! The points you make about entering into "counter insurgency" are completely off the mark and have no basis in truth. The other problem I have, is while your motives are well intentioned, can you even start to imagine what happens if Colombia falls to the guerrillas? Last time I looked there are five countries that are neighbors of Colombia—and they are all already having problems with the spill over effects of the guerrilla problem in Colombia. Oh, by the way, 40% of the money the U.S. makes in international trade is with Latin America and we get more oil from Venezuela (Colombia border country) than we do from the Middle East now. Better think about U.S. economic interests in the future before you propose we let the guerrillas take over!

Col. J.C. Hiett
Commander,
U.S. Military Group, Colombia¹

Conspicuously, the e-mail made no effort to pretend that U.S. military efforts to suppress Colombia's guerrillas were motivated by anything other than imperial economic interests.

Written in October 1998, the e-mail helps date the launching of the official propaganda campaign depicting Colombia's rebels, not as threats to Colombia's pseudo-democracy and to transnational business interests but as "narco-guerrillas" and "narco-terrorists." In October 1998, Hiett was in command of the growing deployment of U.S. troops purportedly advising the Colombian government in how to combat drug trafficking.

U.S. officials smothered the story of the arrest of his wife Laurie Ann Hiett.² The story only broke when *Village Voice* reporter William Bastone learned of the case through a friend in Brooklyn federal court.³

"Is there any justification for the silence from the Embassy, the Southern Command, the State Department, the Justice Department, and officials in the New York court, so that nobody could learn of the episode?" asked the Colombian week-

ly *Semana*. "If it happened in reverse, if it involved the wife of a Colombian military attaché in the Washington embassy, would it have been handled so discreetly? And would the maximum legal penalty be only 12 years?"⁴

In the end, news of the arrest could not have come at a more embarrassing time for U.S. officials. It broke the day the media were supposed to focus on congressional testimony by U.S. drug czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who was preparing to charge Colombia's guerrilla movements with massive drug smuggling.

Gen. McCaffrey, former head of the U.S. military's Southern Command, had just returned from Colombia and was preparing a high-profile tour of Colombia's neighbors. His testimony was to launch the new line that Colombian guerrilla groups were receiving hundreds of millions of dollars from narcotics trafficking, and that they were using the money to buy highly sophisticated military equipment that left the government's own security forces hopelessly out-gunned.

The truth is that the Colombian insurgents usually use quite primitive and often home-made weapons (guerrillas have used propane gas tanks in their attacks), something that would hardly be necessary if Gen. McCaffrey's charges were true.

McCaffrey, a clumsy practitioner of Newspeak, described his mission as restoring "democratic" control to the drug-producing areas. He did not say what difference it would make whether drug-producing areas were under democratic control or not.

It might make some. If it were put to a vote, the poverty-stricken peasants of the area, who produce and harvest coca leaves because they cannot make a living any other way, would certainly object to chemical-spray destruction of their crops and land and would demand assistance in marketing alternative crops. Colombian guerrilla groups have given voice to that demand for years.

Most of the media treated the Hiett story as a personal tragedy and quickly dropped the matter. U.S. officials stressed that Col. Hiett had nothing to do with the alleged drug smuggling, and suggested that Ms. Hiett was a loose cannon who no longer accompanied her husband to embassy functions because of her erratic behavior.

The media were able to ignore almost completely the news that investigators had widened their inquiries to take in "at least six" military and diplomatic personnel at the embassy.⁵

Acting as if nothing had happened, the U.S. corporate media obediently launched the new "narco-guerrilla," soon renamed "narco-terrorist" line.

—Mark Cook

1. The Colombian Labor Monitor (CLM) is a U.S. organization which campaigns to stop the murder of Colombian labor leaders. The CLM reports that it confirmed Hiett wrote the e-mail; CLM continued to maintain contact with him over ensuing months.

2. Ms. Hiett, charged with sending packages of cocaine through the embassy diplomatic mail, is facing federal charges that could bring 12 years in prison, although she is expected to receive considerably less if convicted. She is currently free on \$150,000 bail. When questioned, she reportedly claimed that she had innocently sent the packages to a variety of New York addresses as a favor to her husband's chauffeur, who did not have access to the embassy's diplomatic mail. Prosecutors contend that she had visited New York to prepare for the shipments, and was fully aware of what was in the packages.

3. *Village Voice* web site, Aug. 5, 1999; the article then appeared in the Aug. 11-17, 1999 issue of the paper.

4. *Semana* (Bogotá), Aug. 9, 1999, edition 901.

5. Ed Vulliamy, "U.S. Hawks Push for War in Colombia: Pentagon and State Department fear new Vietnam as DEA presses deeper into drugs quagmire." *The Observer* (London), Aug. 22, 1999. Ms. Hiett, for her part, reportedly expressed the fear during questioning at the embassy that "they are going to kill me." In the context in which it was spoken, say sources who have studied the questioning, it appears clear that "they" are inside the embassy, not outside.

WALKING AWAY FROM A DEADLY MESS: THE U.S. LEGACY IN PANAMA

BY JOHN LINDSAY-POLAND



John Lindsay-Poland

World War II-era chemical bomb recently found in Panama jungle.

With great fanfare the United States handed over the symbolic keys of Fort Sherman to Panamanian President Ernesto Pérez Balladares on June 30. The Army used Sherman for more than 80 years to train U.S. troops in jungle survival and combat, and “the United States and its allies have a debt of gratitude to those men and women who made such efforts in the name of freedom and democracy,” U.S. Ambassador Simon Ferro told assembled dignitaries.¹

Pérez Balladares gloated upon receiving the base, which with 23,900 acres makes up almost a third of the land on U.S. military bases being transferred to Panama under the terms of the 1977 Canal Treaties. “Sherman’s potential is immense for tourism and eco-tourism, and its use will be of great benefit to the country,” the president said. “Having so much land of all kinds to use, Panama is

in an unbeatable position to take the leap into definitive modernity.” He made reference to the United States’ obligation to finish cleaning up explosives from the base’s artillery range, then accepted the keys.

Five days later, a 17-year-old Panamanian boy named Kelvin Pérez Sánchez went to work as he had for the past five months, planting trees on a deforested former military base outside the Canal area, called Rio Hato. Rio Hato had been a U.S. air base during World War II, was occupied by Panama’s National Guard in the 1970s, and was subjected to bombing by U.S. Stealth attack jets during the 1989 invasion of Panama.

As Pérez hammered a stake into the ground, an explosion threw him and several co-workers into the air. Rushed to the provincial hospital, he lost his right eye and suffered severe burns on his neck, face, hands, and thorax. The youth was not the first Panamanian to be hurt in accidents involving explosives left behind by the military. The Foreign Ministry claims that explosives from U.S. ranges have killed 21 Panamanians and injured many others who

went onto ranges seeking recyclable metal or to plant crops.²

The outgoing government of Pérez Balladares says it will sue the United States for further cleanup. Ambassador Ferro, repeating the United States position of the last four years, says munitions cannot be removed from the ranges using existing technology without destroying the forest.

Attention to the problem of removing conventional explosives from ranges in Panama has diverted attention from an even more sensitive issue, on which U.S. authorities have been especially secretive: the history of chemical weapons tests in Panama, and chemical munitions abandoned on lands over which Panama will now be sovereign. In this small isthmian nation, the United States had an active chemical


weapons program from 1930 until at least 1969, with tests of poison gases including mustard gas, phosgene, sarin, VX agent, and Agent Orange. From 1930 to 1946, the program focused on Canal defense. From 1943 until 1969, the program aimed to test chemical munitions under tropical conditions.

Today, Panama is experiencing rapid urban growth, focused on the Canal area, where half of Panama’s entire population now lives and works. The growth is accompanied by major road projects, housing starts, and projects to reforest denuded lands. The turnover of properties pursuant to the Canal Treaties is accelerating these transitions. Many Panamanians worry that unaware construction workers, farmers, or children will stumble across abandoned chemical munitions and be burned, as has happened in France, Vietnam, and China.

Two agreements govern U.S. obligations to clean up chemical weapons in Panama: the Canal Treaties and the Chemical

2. *El Panamá América*, July 7, 1999; *Crítica*, July 7, 1999.

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1. *El Universal*, July 1, 1999.



Lesion on arm of human test subject from chemical weapon used in Panama, 1945.

Weapons Convention (CWC), ratified by the United States in 1997 and by Panama last year. The Canal Treaties require the United States to remove threats to human health and safety “insofar as may be practicable” from military installations in the Canal area.

The CWC requires participant nations to declare chemical munitions they have abandoned in other countries, and to destroy those weapons once the country where they were abandoned ratifies the Convention. For all its rhetoric about Iraq’s chemical weapons program and Saddam Hussein’s defiance of the international community, by not declaring the chemical weapons that it has abandoned in Panama, the United States is violating the CWC. What’s worse, the United States is flouting international law by telling private land-owners, Congress, and even the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that it is implementing the CWC bilaterally with Panama, when it is doing no such thing, according to Panamanian officials. And the CWC is, after all, the single existing legal instrument for abolishing chemical weapons on the planet.

A LONG HISTORY

Chemical weapons were a component of U.S. Canal defense tactics from the Canal’s early years. The first chemical defense plans were drawn up in 1923 and would be updated every year through at least 1946. “As unusually favorable conditions exist in Panama for the employment of

chemical agents in defense of the Canal, maximum use of chemical and anti-gas equipment is anticipated,” according to the doctrine. The plan involved bombing prospective invaders with mustard gas on inland trails and coastal beaches.

In the 1940s, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada collaborated closely on testing and development of chemical weapons. Anticipating possible defensive or offensive use of chemical weapons against the Japanese, the Allies wanted to understand how chemical weapons could be used during further invasions of the Japanese-occupied Pacific islands.

The first chemical weapons test using live agents known to be carried out in Panama occurred before the United States’ entry into World War II. Jack Cadenhead had enlisted in the Army in South Carolina in 1940 to escape an oppressive job in the local cotton mill. Sent to the Canal Zone, he and other infantrymen were taken to a long narrow building on Fort Clayton one day in July 1941. The officers running the experiment asked for ten volunteers.

“They said they wanted some men who didn’t smoke,” Cadenhead remembered. He raised his hand. “It’s hot, close to a hundred degrees in Panama, with no air conditioning, especially in those chambers. They would drop stuff in a container, and it would fog up.”

The operators had gas masks on, Cadenhead said, but “they didn’t tell us a thing, they just run us through there pretty fast.” The building was long, so long

that the men were forced to breathe in the mustard as they ran. The men quickly developed problems breathing, and were rushed on stretchers to nearby Gorgas Hospital. “The guy with me, Bill Hansard, almost choked to death when we got to Gorgas,” Cadenhead remembered. The doctor attending them said, “It’s that damn mustard gas!”

Mustard gas permanently affected Cadenhead’s speech, blisters would come up on his feet as big as a half-dollar, and the end of his penis turned white. “I thought I had leprosy for awhile,” Cadenhead said. More than fifty years later, he still has problems breathing.

“We were all just kids, we didn’t know what was going on. After I got older and wiser, I felt we were used as guinea pigs.”³

The largest and best documented project to test chemical weapons in Panama occurred on San José Island, in the Pacific not far from Panama City. More than 130 tests were conducted there from 1944 to late 1947, when Panama rejected an agreement to keep U.S. military bases outside the Canal area.⁴ Many of the tests were “drop tests” involving aircraft that dropped chemical munitions into target areas, while others required troops to fire chemical mortars into the test areas. The chemical agents tested included: mustard gas, phosgene, cyanogen chloride, and hydrogen cyanide.⁵

Many of the tests on San José Island used rabbits or goats to observe how lethal various methods of attack or how effective gas masks were. “They brought goats from Ecuador,” said José Alsola, a Peruvian who worked on San José in 1946. “They put those gases on them. The skin fell off the animals, they died, and they ended up cooked. The animal was red, red! Like it was cooked, burnt.”⁶

But several of the San José Project tests involved human subjects. One of the San José tests, carried out in August 1944, sought “to determine if any difference existed in the sensitivity of Puerto Rican and Continental U.S. Troops to H gas [mustard].” The men, who were “unfamiliar with the use of chemical agents,” were “given a stiff course in gas discipline and the significance of H [mustard] lesions to casualty production.” The tests involved applying liquid mustard to the under-surface of the forearms of each subject, then

3. Letter from Jack Cadenhead, Nov. 1997; interview with Jack Cadenhead by author, May 24, 1998.

4. Capt. Jay S. Stockhardt, “San José Project,” *Armed Forces Chemical Journal*, Jan. 1948.

5. San José Project files in National Archives, Washington, D.C.

6. Herasto Reyes, “La siembra de la contaminación,” *La Prensa*, July 29, 1997.

observed for three days. A summary of the test produced by Defense Secretary William Cohen in April 1998 implied that some men were hospitalized after they "sustain[ed] severe body burns or eye lesions." Men with less severe burns were simply returned to their barracks and expected to meet company formations.⁷

The Chemical Corps returned to Panama in 1952, when it conducted tests on mustard gas mines and containers until 1956. Between 1958 and 1962, the Chemical Corps carried out several tests involving small amounts of live chemical agents such as mustard and sarin, which were probably kept in glass vials in laboratories.⁸

With the escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, the U.S. Army Tropic Test Center (TTC) was established in Panama to test military equipment under tropical conditions, eventually growing to a staff of several hundred. In 1964 the TTC began four tests "to determine the effects of environment on the storage" of warheads containing nerve agent. Three of the tests were for VX agent weapons, the same chemical weapon that UNSCOM has scoured Iraq to uncover, including two-gallon M-23 mines, 115-millimeter rockets, and 155-millimeter shells. The fourth test concerned sarin rockets. The weapons were to be stored for approximately two years, "outdoors on pallets under ventilated cover." Test plans for the VX mines showed that the Army was to detonate them in Panama after being stored there.⁹

The M-23 mine holds 10.5 pounds of VX agent; since ten milligrams of VX agent constitutes a lethal dose, each of these VX mines theoretically had enough nerve agent for nearly half a million lethal doses. Shipping records show that the United States sent three tons of VX nerve agent in 1964 for testing in Panama—more than three times what was needed for tests shown in the Tropic Test Center documents.

7. "San José Project Report No. 24 Summary," in letter from Secretary of Defense William Cohen to U.S. Representative José Serrano, Apr. 7, 1998.

8. "Chemical Corps Tropical Test Team, Fort Clayton, Canal Zone," Dugway Proving Ground, Jan. 25, 1956; Dugway Proving Ground, "Environmental Test Branch Test Plan 36," Sept. 25, 1958; U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Dugway Proving Ground, "Environmental Field Test: Food Testing and Screening Kit, Chemical Agents, ABC-M3," Dec. 1962.

9. Dugway Proving Ground Test Plan 704, "Surveillance Test (Environmental) of Mine, Gas Persistent, VX, 2-Gallon, ABC-M23"; Dugway Proving Ground Test Plan 719, "Surveillance Test (Environmental) of Projectile, Gas Persistent, VX, 155-mm, M121A1"; Dugway Proving Ground Test Plan 723, "Surveillance Test (Environmental) of Rocket, Gas Persistent, VX, 155-mm, M-55"; and "Change to Surveillance Test (Environmental) Plan for Rocket, Gas Nonpersistent, GB, 115-mm, M-55." Obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.

The records also show a shipment to Panama on January 29, 1969, of "Chemical Agent Identification Sets" or CAIS kits, that were designed to train soldiers in the detection of chemical agents. According to munitions disposal expert Rick Stauber, "the kits contained 'live' chemical agent and were disposed of at the training site location after use."¹⁰

"Since the movement information does not contain the amount of CAIS kits delivered to Panama, one does not know how many may be buried at the training areas used by U.S. troops," Stauber continued. The information also raises serious questions about how other chemical agents shipped to Panama were disposed of.

MORE CHEMICALS

Pamela Jones, whose husband worked for the Army in Panama from 1970 to 1974, earlier this year won recognition from the Veterans Administration for his exposure there to Agent Orange, which resulted in severe acne and eventually in his death from non-Hodgkins lymphoma in 1996. Jones obtained testimony by Charles Bartlett, who directed the Pentagon's Agent Orange litigation project in the early 1980s, that several hundred drums of Agent Orange were shipped to Panama in the late 1960s. Bartlett testified that after tests were conducted, many drums were left behind "extensively under the control of Fort Clayton ... and were never shipped out of Panama. And available for use by anybody that needed it." The Army's Directorate of Environment and Housing then sprayed the herbicide for years to choke back plants, according to a document Jones obtained.

"My husband told me that they used to spray, and the plants would die," Jones said. "He would ride his dirt bike up in the jungle, and he would end up oily, and Agent Orange is very heavy and oily."¹¹

Another veteran, who has also contracted an Agent Orange-associated disease, saw Agent Orange being sprayed over the jungle in Fort Sherman in Panama in 1969 or 1970. "It was applied by helicopter and I watched the jungle disappear over a matter of days," said the vet, who declined to be identified because he fears it might jeopardize his case for medical benefits. An engineer, he subsequently found high levels of Agent Orange in water samples from Panama's coastal coral reefs.¹²

10. William R. Brankowitz, "Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation (U)," 1987.

11. Interview of Pamela Jones with author, July 1999; testimony by Charles Bartlett, in hearing at San Antonio Veterans Administration office, Nov. 3, 1997.

12. Communication with author, June 1999.

As late as 1971, a Panamanian doctor named Erimsky Sucre was on his way home from a medical visit to a small community by the banks of the Panama Canal, when he and his assistants felt strange. Driving their jeep on a remote road with the windows open to the humid tropical air, they passed the Empire firing range run by the U.S. military and began to have trouble breathing.

It was "a sensation of lack of oxygen," Sucre said, almost like carbon monoxide poisoning. He stopped the jeep, unable to drive, and encountered a U.S. soldier with his gas mask on. The soldier, a Puerto Rican, took off his mask and told the group not to drink water. As their asphyxia passed, Sucre felt "a burning on my face" which lasted another hour. He knew it wasn't tear gas, he said, because he had experienced tear gas in street protests.¹³

DISPOSAL OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS

Less information is available on the disposal of chemical munitions used in Panama than on tests themselves. As one San José Project participant commented, "We didn't worry too much about things like that at that time."¹⁴

All chemical munitions, like conventional munitions, include a certain number of duds—munitions that are fired or dropped but do not detonate. On impact areas, these unexploded ordnance (UXO) are typically what cause accidents to people who unsuspectingly pick up, step on, or play with them. According to one explosives expert, the rule of thumb in the community of explosives disposal professionals is a ten percent dud rate.¹⁵

On San José Island, thousands of chemical mortars and bombs were fired or dropped into target areas. If all tests on San José averaged the same number of munitions as for the 18 tests for which we have obtained records, with a dud rate of ten percent, that would leave more than three thousand chemical UXO on San José Island.


The military's evacuation of the San José Project in early 1948 was carried out with haste.¹⁶ The San José post diary

13. Interview with author, Aug. 1998.

14. Interviews with Eugene Reid by author, Sept. 16, 1997 and June 7, 1998.

15. Interview with Rick Stauber by the author, June 26, 1998. Col. Edmund W. Libby, U.S. Army Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel, says that "bulk high-explosive and chemical-loaded artillery rounds" have a dud rate "of between 5 to 10 percent." Communication from Col. Libby to author, July 23, 1998.

16. Capt. Jay S. Stockhardt and 1st Lt. Stephen D. Noyes, "The San José Project Moves," *Armed Forces*



Hundreds of deadly 115-pound M-70 chemical bombs in open storage, Panama, 1944.

records three barge shipments which dumped chemical munitions at sea in 1947 and early 1948.¹⁷ But chemical munitions which the military still hoped to use were moved into the Canal Zone. Two of the project's officers wrote:

The materiel owned by San José was stored wherever space could be found. Some of it was placed in the basements of barracks, more in an abandoned motor pool, and a toxic yard was established at the mouth of the Chagres River on the Fort Sherman Reservation.¹⁸

They did not elaborate on this alarming declaration. The toxic materials at Fort Sherman were stored there for "rehabilitation," according to a later account, which may have meant leaks from munitions in need of repair.¹⁹ The San José Project shipped usable munitions to its new home on St. Thomas of the Virgin Islands in April 1948.

Based on National Archives documents, bomb expert Rick Stauber asserts that the United States established a chemical burial site in the 1930s at France

Field, an airport that was transferred to Panama in 1979. The documents Stauber found indicated that 30-pound bombs that leaked mustard were involved. According to Stauber, the same documents stated that a storage magazine at France Field had been contaminated by leakage of mustard agent.²⁰ Panamanian officials said that U.S. military officials acknowledged the France Field burial site, but decided when the area was transferred that removing the munitions was not worth their effort.²¹

Another area of concern is Chiva Chiva, a former munitions storage site that Army documents show was a disposal area for chemical munitions in the 1950s. The area was transferred to Panama in 1979, and is now overgrown with vegetation.

LONG-TERM DANGERS

Health hazards of chemical munitions can be long-lasting, as demonstrated by continuing burns of Chinese people by chemical munitions that were abandoned by the Japanese army in China during World War II. As one study of chemical munitions abandoned in China notes, abandoned chemical weapons (ACW):

...pose much greater hazards to civilians than military stockpiles of chemical weapons, such as those stored in depots in the United States and Russia. Military stockpiles are stored in special bunkers under lock and key, so that barring a catastrophe, ordinary citizens face no immediate threat. Since the location of many ACW is not known and civilians lack an understanding of their hazards, they risk being accidentally exposed to these weapons.²²

A chemical agent that has been sprayed or exploded does dissipate, but an agent that is stored or abandoned in canisters or drums can survive for decades, including underwater. According to Col. Edmund W. Libby, the U.S. Army's Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel:

Our experience indicates that chemical warfare agents which remain in storage containers or munitions, or which are otherwise retained in bulk quantities, can retain essentially all of their toxic agent properties for many years. Even unexploded munitions recovered from the World War One era are often found to contain chemical warfare materiel that has been but little degraded in its toxic effects by the passage of time.²³

On San José Island, hazards from unexploded chemical rounds still remained three decades after the Army dropped its mustard bombs. The island's owner in the 1970s, the inventor Earl Tupper, discovered this himself. "An [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] team was contacted by Mr. Tupper's son in 1974 with [a] report that one of the their workmen had been burned and requested assistance," the Pentagon wrote in 1979.

JUST THE FACTS, SAM

Because the military bases have been under U.S. control for more than 90 years, most Panamanians have little or no idea of their history of use. A responsible transfer of these lands must include the transfer by the United States to Panama of all historical documents related to activities that have had impacts on Canal area lands. According to Panamanian officials and records, since January 1997 the Government of Panama has repeatedly and formally requested docu-

22. Hongmei Deng and Peter O'Meara Evans, "Social and Environmental Aspects of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China," *The Nonproliferation Review*, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 102.

23. Communication from Col. Edmund W. Libby to author, July 20, 1998.

Chemical Journal, Jan. 1949, p. 53.

17. San José Project files, National Archives.

18. Stockhardt and Noyes, *op. cit.*, n. 16.

19. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, "Survey and Analysis Report," Draft version, Apr. 1993.

20. Letter from Rick Stauber to author, July 18, 1998.

21. Press release, Autoridad de la Región Interocénica, May 3, 1998.

ments from the United States on chemical weapons tests in Panama.²⁴

But Foreign Ministry officials say that the only documents on chemical weapons programs that the United States has given Panama were the four nerve agent test plans cited above.²⁵ Most of what Panama knows about the history of chemical weapons tests has come from the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and a whistleblower bomb expert named Rick Stauber.

Pentagon officials and publications refer to many records of weapons tests (over 100 conducted by the Tropic Test Center) and the Panama section of a 1993 document that lists suspected chemical munitions burial sites overseas. But despite congressional in-

quiries, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and insistence by the government of Panama, the Pentagon has steadfastly refused to disclose these documents.

The Army General Counsel's Office justified denying the 1993 annex on "suspected overseas burial sites" by stating that "the requested material contains information concerning weapons systems and information of a foreign government, and the information could assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."²⁶ In other words, the Army concedes that the chemical agents abandoned in Panama remain a potential public health threat.

The Army went even further when it refused to disclose reports on the 1964-1968 nerve agent tests in Panama. Citing Panama's ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ar-

my asserted that release of the reports could "alter relations between the U.S. and Panama with regards to implementation of the CWC" and are therefore purportedly exempt under FOIA law. In a formal letter, the Panamanian Foreign Ministry emphatically denied that disclosure would interfere with bilateral relations, and added, "on the contrary, disclosure of these documents would serve as a basis for constructive mutual discussions of how best to implement our countries' respective obligations under the CWC."

Panama, for its part, could do more to locate chemical weapons dumps on its territory. Panama was invited by the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, based in The Hague, to request a technical inspection of suspected sites, but has so far neglected to do so.

Hopefully there will not be more experiences like that of Kelvin Pérez Sánchez before those who with power take effective action. ■

24. Letters from Lic. Ramiro Castrejón, Panamanian Foreign Ministry, to Col. Michael Debow, U.S. Army South, on Jan. 28, 1997 and Aug. 1, 1997.

25. Dr. Rodrigo Noriega, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, note to author, June 8, 1998; and interview with Lic. Ramiro Castrejón, June 1998; communication from Fernando Manfredo, Jr., to author, July 20, 1998.

26. Lawrence M. Baskir, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Army, letter to author, May 20, 1998.


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LA DEMANDA: THE PEOPLE OF CUBA VS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

BY WILLIAM SCHAAP

In Cuba, it is known simply as *la demanda*—the legal complaint.

On May 31, 1999, a lawsuit for \$181 billion in wrongful death and personal injury damages was filed in Havana Provincial Civil Court against the government of the United States. The plaintiffs are eight national organizations, on behalf of their members, representing nearly the entire population of the island.¹

The complaint describes, in considerable detail, forty years of U.S. acts of aggression against Cuba, and specifies, often by name, date, and particular circumstances, each person known to have been killed or grievously wounded as a direct victim of this campaign. In all, 3,478 people were killed and an additional 2,099 seriously injured. (These figures do not include any indirect victims of the economic pressures, the blockade, the difficulties in obtaining medicine and food, all due to deliberate U.S. policy.)

The complaint was served upon the United States through the appropriate diplomatic channels: from the Court, to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the United States Department of State. As expected, the U.S. chose not to respond, and twenty days later was declared by the Court to be in default, in accordance with Cuban law.

Nevertheless, under Cuban law, as in most jurisdictions, a default by the defendant does not, by itself, authorize a judgment in the amount of damages requested. The plaintiff must still prove the two elements of such an action, that the defendant caused the damages and that the damages were in the amount claimed. Consequently, on July 5, 1999, what was ultimately to be a 13-day trial with testimony from 196 witnesses commenced in the large, elegantly marbled chamber where the Supreme Court of Cuba once sat. The trial ended on July

William H. Schaap attended the first week of the trial in Havana as a legal observer. **Michael D. Ratner** provided the material on international law.

1. The Central Trade Union of Cuba, the National Association of Small Farmers, the Federation of Cuban Women, the Federation of University Students, the Federation of Middle-level Education Students, the José Martí Children's Organization, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, and the Association of Combatants of the Cuban Revolution.

21, 1999, and the five-judge court recessed to prepare its judgment. As of this writing, the decision has not yet been announced.

THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES

The case was, in legal terms, very narrowly drawn. It was for the wrongful death of individuals, on behalf of their survivors, and for personal injuries to those who survived extremely serious wounds, on their own behalf. No unsuccessful attacks were deemed relevant, and consequently there was no testimony regarding the many hundreds of unsuccessful assassination attempts against Cuban President Fidel Castro and other high officials,² or even of bombings in which no one was killed or injured. Damages to crops, livestock, or the Cuban economy in general were also excluded, so there was no testimony about the introduction into the island of swine fever or tobacco mold, or about the U.S. embargoes on direct and indirect trade with Cuba.³

The complaint⁴ describes nine discrete aspects of the U.S. campaign against Cuba, roughly chronologically. The first deals with the formal beginnings of the covert war campaign almost immediately after the triumph of the Revolution, relying in large part on declassified U.S. government documents, most significantly, "Program of Covert Actions Against the Castro Regime," approved by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960, and "The Cuba Project," issued by Edward Lansdale on January 18, 1962.

2. The complaint does note that there have been 637 attempts to assassinate President Castro. The U.S. Senate, it points out, has investigated and verified just eight of them. And Cuban diplomats have indeed been assassinated, in Portugal, Argentina, and, in 1980, in New York City, when Félix García Rodríguez of the Cuban U.N. delegation was gunned down in broad daylight on a crowded city street.

3. Damages due to the economic costs of defending against murderous military and paramilitary attacks were, however, relevant. For a general overview, see Jane Franklin, "The War Against Cuba," *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 66 (Fall 1998), p. 28.

4. The text of the complaint was published in Spanish in Cuba, *Demanda del Pueblo de Cuba al Gobierno de Estados Unidos por Daños Humanos* (Havana: Editora Política, 1999), and in English in Australia, *Washington on Trial: The People of Cuba vs. The Government of the United States of America* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 1999).

5. A copy of every document referred to in the complaint and in the trial was presented to the Court.

The vast body of declassified documents⁵ is essential to the crux of the complaint, that the U.S. government is responsible for the damages claimed, because it confirms the ultimate legal responsibility of the U.S., regardless of the status of the individual perpetrators of the murderous acts. Indeed, the evidence of direct, official U.S. involvement in training, paying, supplying, and directing the actual perpetrators of the fatal bombings, shootings, arson, and torture is, in most cases, overwhelming.

The complaint then describes the campaign of air and naval attacks against Cuba that commenced in October 1959, when Eisenhower approved a program that included bombings of sugar mills, machine-gun attacks on Havana and even on passenger trains, and the burning of sugar fields. The campaign was coordinated in detail by the Central Intelligence Agency. In mid-1961, the CIA's Inspector General noted that the CIA station in Miami overseeing the campaign had grown from 40 people in January 1960 to 588 people by April 16, 1961. It was becoming "one of the largest branches of the Clandestine Services."

The third section of the complaint, which was supported by days of testimony and dozens of witnesses—many in their 70s and 80s—described the armed terrorist groups, *los banditos*, who ravaged the island for five years, from 1960 to 1965, when the last group was located and defeated. These bands, most numerous in the central Escambray region but operating throughout Cuba, terrorized small farmers, horribly torturing and killing those considered (often erroneously) active supporters of the Revolution, men, women, and children. Children who saw their fathers or mothers murdered before their eyes testified, as did elderly parents who watched their children tortured and killed. Young volunteer literacy campaign teachers were among the victims.

Although the actual totals were, after so many years, impossible to tally, the plaintiffs' attorneys presented documentation attesting to 549 murders and 200 maimed survivors.

The most notorious and most fully documented U.S. attack on Cuba was the Bay of Pigs invasion, in April 1961. Although the entire incident lasted less than 72 hours, 176

Cubans were killed and 300 more wounded, 50 of them permanently disabled.

The complaint then described the unending campaign of major acts of sabotage and terrorism that included the bombing of ships in Havana harbor and of stores and offices in town, of attacks on ships and planes. Some of the most horrific examples of the brutality of this war were described here, including the 1976 bombing of a Cubana airliner off Barbados in which all 73 people on board were killed, as well as the murder of Cuban diplomats and officials around the world, including one such murder on the streets of New York City in 1980. This campaign has continued to the present, with the murders of Cuban policemen, soldiers, and sailors in 1992 and 1994, and the 1997 hotel bombing campaign.

While the retention and use of Guantanamo Naval Base by the U.S. is well-known, the extent to which it has been used provocatively as part of the campaign against Cuba is less understood. Aside from serving as a safe haven for fugitives from Cuba, in the 1960s several Cuban workers were tortured and murdered there, and a number of Cuban border police were shot by U.S. troops within the base, with eight killed or "disappeared" and 15 maimed for life.

The complaint also describes in detail those aspects of the chemical and biological warfare waged against Cuba that have involved human victims, most significantly the creation of an epidemic of hemorrhagic dengue fever in 1981,⁶ during which, in only a few weeks, some 340,000 people were infected and 116,000 hospitalized—this in a country which had never before experienced a single case of the disease. In the end, 158 people, including 101 children, died.

Finally, the complaint makes reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, and describes the costs to Cuba of defending against all of the previously described warfare, conventional and unconventional.

THE TESTIMONY

It is difficult to convey the poignancy and power of the personal testimony of the hundreds of eyewitnesses who recounted these horrors. In describing the five-year war against the bandits in the countryside, men and women now in their 80s told of seeing their children tortured and killed before their eyes. Likewise, children, now in their 40s or

50s, described the deaths of their parents at the hands of the bandits. Aging veterans of the peasant militia—many of whom had never held a weapon until they took up arms against the bandits—showed the court, and the Cuban television audience, their horrible wounds, their maimed or missing limbs. Some spoke of suffering mental illness for decades, of nightmares and insomnia.

While the terror in the country was aimed primarily at peasants who supported the land reform program of the new revolutionary government, another target was the sweeping literacy campaign, with ultimately nearly 100,000 volunteers throughout the island, many of them teenagers, teaching the people to read and write.⁷ Several of these young teachers, along with a number of their adult pupils, were murdered by the bandits. These martyrs received huge state funerals, and their names have been known ever since to all Cubans. The mother of one such young hero testified, asking for justice against the nation that trained and armed the people who killed her son 38 years before.

The testimony relating to the 1981 dengue fever epidemic was both scientific and personal. On the one hand, a number of doctors and public health officials enumerated all the reasons that the epidemic appeared artificially induced and described the history of secret U.S. research on mosquito-borne diseases. A portion of the transcript of a 1984 federal criminal trial in New York was submitted, in which the head of the anti-Cuba terrorist organization Omega 7 testified under oath that, shortly before the outbreak of the epidemic, the CIA had given members of his group "some germs" to be taken to Cuba.⁸

On the other hand, the parents of young children who died from the fever,

7. Cuba, which, before the revolution, had one of the lowest literacy rates in the hemisphere, has, for many years now, had one of the highest in the world.

8. See relevant portion of the transcript printed at *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, No. 22 (Fall 1984), p. 35.



Prensa Latina

Department store in downtown Havana burns after terrorist bombing.

often in a matter of days, also testified. One mother described how she held her four-year-old daughter in her arms as she looked up and said, "Mommy, I think I'm going to die." The current Minister of Public Health, who was the head of the Havana Pediatrics Group at the time, described the frantic efforts of the government to combat the epidemic which, in areas with poor health care, can be fatal in 40 to 50 percent of the cases. That only 158 people died, out of some 116,000 who were hospitalized, was an eloquent testimony to the remarkable Cuban public health sector.⁹

AN UNENDING WAR

Although many of the incidents described, many of the wrongful deaths alleged, happened in the 1960s and 1970s, the campaign is by no means ancient history, even if the role of the U.S. government is harder to prove the more recent the incident. Cubans, government officials and ordinary

6. See Bill Schaap, "The 1981 Cuba Dengue Fever Epidemic," *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, No. 17 (Summer 1982), p. 28.

9. For details of the dengue testimony in the Havana proceeding, see "Genocide of 101 children through CIA-introduced dengue epidemic," *Granma International*, Special Edition, July 18, 1999, p. 4.

citizens, are still being killed in actions strikingly similar to those of the early years of the struggle.

In the early 1990s, Cuban soldiers, police, and civilians were murdered by would-be, and occasionally successful, hijackers. In 1997, seven bombs were set in Havana hotels, killing one foreigner, in a campaign alleged to have been coordinated by Cuban exile agents of the CIA. Only last year, a group of exiles were charged with plotting to assassinate President Castro, and are facing trial in Puerto Rico.¹⁰

Throughout the decades in question, the formal role of the United States is sometimes clear and sometimes vague, sometimes obvious and sometimes subtly twice or thrice removed. That role, of course, is fundamental to this lawsuit, and some critics, even if they deplore the terrorist acts against Cuba, argue that it is paranoid to assume that every such act has been directed by the powers that be in Washington. The extremist wing of the Cuban exile community, they note, contains a fair share of lunatics capable of acts of terrorism without any prompting from the White House or Langley.

That may well be, but it has been the explicit policy of the U.S. since 1959 to destabilize, hopefully to overthrow, the Cuban government. And part of that policy has been to use the exile community however possible. Every government document that has surfaced, that has been declassified, has confirmed that policy.

None of the claims in *la demanda* are far-fetched. Witnesses described, for example, planes from the U.S. with U.S. pilots airdropping weapons and supplies made in the U.S. to the bandits in the mountains. Intelligence experts read into the record the recently declassified October 1961 report of the then CIA Inspector General, Lyman Kirkpatrick, that described in detail CIA support to the bandits. It noted that, in 12 drops during the six months ending March 1961, known as Operation Silence, "151,000 pounds of arms, am-

munition, and equipment were transported by air."¹²

Does that not suggest that the widow of a peasant murdered by one of the bandits who received his weapon in one of those airdrops has a decent wrongful death claim against the U.S. government? Does the fact that that bandit was not a formal U.S. government employee in any way lessen that claim?

Certainly, no high official at Fort Detrick has yet admitted that they sent mosquitoes infected with type-2 dengue fever virus to Cuba in 1981. And yes, no report has yet been released in which the



Ship burns in Havana harbor after sabotage bombing.

CIA admits it helped Luis Posada Carriles fund the terrorists who bombed the Havana hotels two years ago. Still, the last 40 years of U.S.-Cuban relations suggest that it is almost impossible to be paranoid about Washington's potential for ill intentions toward Cuba.

12. This applied to foreign governments, not foreign individuals, although a sitting head of state has always had immunity. This defense, head of state immunity, was raised by Manuel Noriega, but rejected when the court accepted the U.S. government's argument that he was not a "legitimate" head of state.

WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

No one in Cuba is wasting time planning how to spend the \$181 billion that the lawsuit demands. No one in Cuba thinks they are really going to collect a dime on their default judgment victory. But that hardly makes this case either foolish or irrelevant.

For one thing, it has enormous historical importance for the people of Cuba, the majority of whom were not even born when most of these events took place. The testimony of all the witnesses, many of whom had never before spoken publicly, was transcribed, recorded, and videotaped. Most of it will be published soon.

But beyond the preservation of a nation's history, there is a moral imperative to this detailed demonstration of forty years of an unconscionably murderous and unquestionably illegal war against Cuba. The U.S. (along with most of its western allies) has the audacity to say that Cuba does not respect human rights, that Cuba is "undemocratic" and must have U.S. free-market capitalist democracy imposed upon it.

But it is the U.S. that bombs Cuba, not Cuba that bombs the U.S. It is the U.S. that uses chemical and biological warfare against Cuba, not the reverse. It is the U.S. that prevents food and medicine from reaching Cuba, a blatant violation of the Geneva Conventions. And it is Cuba, not the U.S., that has completely free health care, completely free higher education. It is in Washington, not in Havana, that homeless people die of exposure just blocks from the White House.

If the Cuban people have chosen to demonstrate, by the testimony in this trial, that the United States government is hypocritical, lying, and criminal, that is not just their right, that may well be their obligation.

The trial received almost no media coverage in the U.S., even though the Associated Press and Cable News Network were there and filed material every day. While their reporters in Havana may have seen the significance of the testimony, the editors and publishers back home, mesmerized as always by forty years of propaganda, rejected, almost subconsciously, anything that did not parrot the conventional wisdom.

10. See Franklin, *op. cit.*, n. 3.

11. Quoted in the Complaint, *op. cit.*, n. 4.

The very notion of such a case was rejected as ludicrous by the same people who see nothing strange about a Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal that only charges Serbs. More to the point, it was dismissed by the same media pundits who thought that the case brought in Florida against Cuba by relatives of the Brothers to the Rescue pilots was righteous and self-explanatory. Yet that case, which received saturation coverage in the U.S., is much less defensible in terms of both national and international law.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, nations were absolutely immune from suits, civil or criminal, brought in the courts of other nations.¹² Over the course of time that principle of international law changed, but only to a certain extent, with two exceptions to state immunity generally recognized by international law. Under modern international law and as reflected in the domestic statutes of many countries, foreign states can be sued in the courts of another state for only two categories of wrongs: acts emanating from commercial activities, like breach of contract claims, and tortious acts actually committed by the foreign state within the territory of the other state. Thus, when Orlando Letelier and his co-worker Ronni Moffitt were murdered by agents of the Chilean government in 1976 in Washington, D.C., Chile itself could be sued in the courts of the United States. However, if Letelier, or any U.S. citizen for that matter, had been killed by agents of Chile outside the United States, Chile could not be sued for that act in the courts of the United States.

The case being tried in Cuba meets these standards of international law; the actions carried out by the U.S. against Cuba were carried out within Cuba or were meant to have an effect inside Cuba. The United States does not have sovereign immunity for such acts. The Brothers to the Rescue case does not, however, meet these international standards; the downing of the plane, apart from other defenses the Cuban government has, occurred outside the territory of the United States. Even if one believes the U.S. claim that the plane was in international waters when shot down, that would not establish U.S. court jurisdiction under international law.

So how could that case have been brought in federal court in Florida? Congress passed a special law in April 1996 that purports to give federal courts jurisdiction over certain countries that commit torture, murder, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking outside the United

States.¹³ The law probably does not pass muster under international law, but so far it has been upheld in U.S. courts, under the doctrine, astonishing as it sounds, that an act of Congress overrides inconsistent international law, even preexisting treaties ratified by the United States.¹⁴

Aside from its arrogance and its contempt for generally accepted principles of international law, what is particularly pernicious about this law is that it does not apply to every state that commits one of the prohibited acts; it only applies to those countries that the State Department designates "state sponsors of terrorism." You can guess who is and who is not on the list. There are only seven such countries, and, of course, Cuba is one of them.¹⁵ So we have selective "justice" of the worst kind. A Cuban exile group in Miami can use the federal courts in this fashion, while a group of Kurdish exiles, for example, could not sue the Turkish government in our courts. Whatever the legality under international law of allowing such suits—and it is doubtful—it is certainly illegal to do so with a rule of law that applies to some countries but not to all.

And there is yet another taint to this case. The Brothers to the Rescue plane was shot down in February 1996; the law permitting the suit was passed two months later, in April 1996. Yet the court in Miami upheld its application to conduct that occurred before the law was passed, because Congress stated that the law should be applied retroactively. There is nevertheless a strong presumption¹⁶ in U.S. law that such statutes should not apply to past conduct, but when it comes to Cuba, the laws—both international and domestic—are made to be broken.

THE FUTURE

In September, Cuba again took the moral offensive, charging very publicly that the U.S. campaign against it, in-

13. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).

14. *Whitney v. Robertson*, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).

15. Even though the State Department's Human Rights Reports on Cuba do not even allege that Cuba is sponsoring terrorism.

16. And, for criminal statutes, a constitutional prohibition against such *ex post facto* laws. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10.



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Prisoner taken at Bay of Pigs invasion.

cluding the trade embargo, constituted genocide.¹⁷ This is an escalation in rhetoric fraught with dangers, but there is, in fact, a strong case to be made. U.S. efforts to block the importation by Cuba of food and medicine can only have the primary effect of worsening the health of every Cuban, raising mortality rates in every area. What is this if not attempted genocide?

Whether *la demanda* or these new charges will have a significant effect on Cuban-American relations remains to be seen. The influence, vastly disproportionate to their numbers, that rightwing Cuban exiles have had on American politics is waning, as some of the more virulent leaders die off. Small cracks appear in the wall of the blockade, such as the recent easing of some restrictions on food and medicine, marginally better communications, increased airplane flights, etc. *La demanda* shows not that the blockade is stupid or immoral, but that the war of which it has been a part is inhuman and illegal. ■

17. The National Assembly passed a resolution to this effect, and Cuba's Foreign Minister made this the major theme of his speech to the United Nations General Assembly.

BACKING UP GLOBALIZATION WITH MILITARY MIGHT

BY KAREN TALBOT

The U.S. Senate recently labeled Serbia a "terrorist state,"¹ in an act of obscene hypocrisy—yet another case of blaming the victim for the crimes of the perpetrator. What could be more "terrorist" than the relentless blitzkrieg of 23,000 bombs and missiles rained upon Yugoslavia for 79 days by U.S.-led NATO forces? Is it not terrorism to drop on civilians radioactive depleted uranium weapons and outlawed cluster bombs designed to rip human flesh to shreds, from the sanctuary of thousands of feet in the air, or using terrain-hugging computer-guided missiles? Is it not terrorism to target deliberately the entire infrastructure of a small sovereign nation, including electrical and water filtration systems critical to the survival of civilians? Is it not terrorism to ferociously obliterate 200 factories and destroy the jobs of millions of workers? What of the constant air assault—"fire from the sky"—against cities, villages, schools, hospitals, senior residences, TV towers and studios, oil refineries, chemical plants, electrical power plants, transmission towers, gas stations, homes, farms, schools, marketplaces, buses, trains, railroad lines, bridges, roads, medieval monasteries, churches, historic monuments—destruction amounting to more than \$100 billion? What of eco-terrorism, biological and chemical warfare, the incalculable result of the destruction of the environment, including the deliberate bombardment of chemical plants? Above all, is it not terrorism to kill, maim, traumatize, impoverish, or render homeless tens of thousands of men, women, and children?

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1. Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2000. It passed on June 30, 1999, with only 2 dissenting votes, Bob Smith (N.H.), who subsequently left the Republican party over matters of principle, and Democrat Robert Byrd (W. Va.). This foreign aid bill not only designates Yugoslavia as a terrorist state, a function typically left to the State Department, it also bars U.S. aid to Yugoslavia and permits Kosovars to sue President Slobodan Milosevic for damages in U.S. courts. It includes \$20 million for training and equipping a Kosovo security force that its authors say would include members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The bill includes \$150 million in aid to Kosovo, \$85 million for Albania, \$60 million for Romania, \$55 million for Macedonia, \$45 million for Bulgaria and \$35 million for Montenegro. Tim Weiner, "Aid Bill Listing Yugoslavia as Terrorist Passes," *New York Times*, July 1, 1999.

Not only was NATO's war a reprehensible act of inhumanity, it was in contravention of all norms of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. This was an unprecedented war by the most powerful military force in history involving the 19 wealthiest nations with 95% of the world's armaments against a small sovereign nation that ultimately had little chance of countering such an attack.

WHY THE BALKANS?

Yugoslavia is strategically located. The peoples of this region have had the great mis-

um, as well as tens of millions of dollars in profits annually.² The *New York Times* also revealed that a "number of unofficial partition plans have been drawn up for Kosovo all raising the question of who would control an important northern mining region."³ Trepca was also a glittering prize taken over by Hitler to fuel the Nazi war machine during WWII. "Kosovo also possesses 17 billion tons of coal reserves and Kosovo (like Serbia and Albania) also has oil reserves."⁴

Serbia as a whole is rich in minerals and oil including in Vojvodina, the northern part



Bozidar Djordjevic, struck May 7 by a cluster bomb while shopping in Nis central marketplace at 11:20 a.m., died a slow, agonizing death.

fortune of living on real estate coveted by empire after empire, all of which employed classic divide and conquer tactics by pitting one people against another. Not much has changed.

The determination by the U.S. and NATO to occupy Kosovo and virtually all of Yugoslavia is spurred on by the enticement of abundant natural resources. Kosovo alone has the richest mineral resources in all of Europe west of Russia. The *New York Times* observed that "the sprawling state-owned Trepca mining complex, the most valuable piece of real estate in the Balkans, is worth at least \$5 billion," producing gold, silver, lead, zinc, and cadmi-

um of the Yugoslavia. That coveted area of Vojvodina is also extremely fertile land—a major "breadbasket" for Europe. Then there is the allure of enterprises to be privatized at bargain prices, and the anticipation of exploiting very cheap and highly skilled labor potentially available to work in sweatshop conditions.

Perhaps most significant is the fact that Yugoslavia has strong elements of a

2. Chris Hedges, "Below It All in Kosovo, A War's Glittering Prize," *New York Times*, July 8, 1998.

3. "The Prize: Issue of Who Controls Kosovo's Rich Mines," *New York Times*, June 2, 1999.

4. Barry Lituchy, "American Barbarism and the Big Lie Technique Are the Winners in Kosovo," June 1999, Prime www.prime-l@igc.org. Lituchy teaches European history at Kingsborough Community College of the City University of New York.


socialist economy—the last in Europe, however tattered it may have become by years of economic destabilization by the West and financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank. Sixty-five percent of all firms are either state-owned or self-managed cooperatives.⁵ Most heavy industry is state-owned. The factories bombed during the 79 days of NATO attacks were exclusively state-owned. The banking and financial system is also state-controlled. Only 20 percent of the workforce was in the private sector.⁶

The U.S. had joined Belgrade's other international creditors in imposing a first round of macroeconomic reforms in 1980, shortly before the death of Marshal Tito. "Successive IMF-sponsored programs since then continued the disintegration of the industrial sector and the piecemeal dismantling of the Yugoslav welfare state. Debt restructuring agreements increased

in the Caspian Sea region, especially the oil corporations.

The Balkans are strategic for the transshipment of oil and gas to Europe and beyond. They are critical in the competition between Europe and the U.S. over these riches. Time is of the essence. The first tanker shipment from the port of Supsa in Georgia on the eastern Black Sea coast—the terminus of a pipeline from the Caspian Sea oil fields—took place recently. Another pipeline passing through Russia, in particular Chechnya, and also ending at the eastern shore of the Black Sea at Novorossiysk, will add to the tanker traffic.

The predicament is how to get that oil beyond the Black Sea. The Bosphorus straits, at Istanbul, are narrow and pose considerable hazards, especially for the tremendously heavy tanker traffic expected. And so far plans to build a pipeline through Turkey (Kurdistan) are thwarted by the struggles of



foreign debt and mandated currency devaluation also hit hard at Yugoslavia's standard of living.... [The] IMF prescribed further doses of its bitter economic medicine periodically.... Industrial production declined to a negative 10 percent growth rate in 1990- with all its predictable social consequences."⁷

ABOVE ALL IT'S ABOUT OIL!

Perhaps above all, this U.S.-led onslaught is about oil. It is related to the drive to extend and protect the investments of the transnational corporations

5. *Op. cit.*, n. 3.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Michel Chossudovsky, "Dismantling Yugoslavia, Colonizing Bosnia," *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 56 (Spring 1996), p. 33.

Given the expected 5 percent dud rate of cluster bombs, some 11,100 of the 222,200 cluster bombs NATO dropped on Serbia remain unexploded.

—Center for Defense Information

vored by the Europeans in the competition over the Caspian Sea treasure chest.

PIPELINES ACROSS THE BALKANS

There are also plans to build pipelines across the Balkans. One from Romania—which has considerable oil wealth itself—would extend from Constanza to Trieste on the Adriatic Sea. At Trieste, the oil would be piped northward or shipped westward out of Europe by tanker.⁸ A pipeline through Bulgaria from the port of Bourgas on the Black Sea to the Vlore port on the Adriatic in Albania is a project of the U.S.-owned Albanian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO).

These would be part of a multiple pipeline system in the Balkans, some connecting with existing "Soviet-era" pipelines from Russia that would need upgrading. But these oil and gas pipelines extending through Serbia from Russia to Central Europe, are extremely valuable.⁹ In the competition with European-based companies, the U.S. backs the Caspian Pipeline consortium led by Mobil.¹⁰

As noted, Serbia also has oil reserves. And the port of Bar on the Montenegrin coast is the most valuable, cost-efficient, deep water port in the entire eastern Mediterranean Sea—the cheapest route for the flow of goods in and out of Eastern Europe and beyond.¹¹

Also, Kosovo is in a corridor used for centuries, even by the Crusaders, as a route between Europe and the Middle East. The route follows river valleys connecting with the Danube River Valley near Belgrade. The southern arm of the trans-Balkan railway runs along these valleys. Control of this overland passageway was critical to the German fascist war machine in World War II, and to other conquerors. It remains vital to getting the oil riches into Europe from the Middle East and for other two-way commerce.

Neighboring Albania, whose economy has been completely transformed to the

the Kurds and by competing interests. Hopes for a pipeline through Iran are also on hold. Though preferred for several reasons, those routes would not provide the best access to Europe and the Western Hemisphere. The oil can be shipped by tanker up the Danube River, a waterway crossing Europe from the Black Sea where a short canal connects it to the port of Constanza in Romania. The Danube runs through Belgrade and Novi Sad in Yugoslavia. The recent completion of a grand canal—about the time the turmoil started in the former Yugoslavia—between the Danube and Rhine Rivers now makes it possible to ply those waters through a great inland system of canals and waterways to the industrial Ruhr Valley and clear to the North Sea. Undoubtedly this route is fa-

8. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Dec. 1998.

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 3.

10. Joint U.S.-European Union Statement, 6th Annual Summit.

11. *Op. cit.*, n. 3.



Reuters / Emil Vas / Archive Photos

To "degrade" Serbia's economy, NATO missiles intentionally struck Belgrade residential district power plant on April 3.

"free-market," with domination by western transnational corporations and banks, has vast untapped mineral resources including oil reserves. These are already being gobbled up by transnationals including the major oil companies.¹²

The application of strong structural adjustment policies imposed by the World Bank and IMF "had contributed to wrecking Albania's banking system and precipitating the collapse of the Albanian economy. The resulting chaos enabled American and European transnationals to position themselves carefully. Several western oil companies, including Occidental, Shell, and British Petroleum, had their eyes riveted on Albania's abundant and unexplored oil deposits. Western investors were also gawking at Albania's extensive reserves of chrome, copper, gold, nickel, and platinum. The Adenauer Foundation had been lobbying in the background on behalf of German mining interests."¹³

So this entire region is bubbling with activities over the profits to be had, particularly from oil.

STOKING CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS/CASPIAN SEA REGION

There is a growing contention between Russia and the West over the oil wealth of the Caspian Sea basin. This was manifested not only in the NATO war against Yugoslavia, but also increasingly in the Baltics, the Ukraine, the region of the Caucasus Mountains, and among all the lit-

toral nations of the Caspian Sea. The main pipelines for the Central Asian oil, the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline and the Baku-Supsa pipeline, pass through the Caucasus. In the mounting disputes, Russia allies itself with Armenia and, it is suspected, with the Abkhaz separatists, to counterbalance NATO influence in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Chechnya and Dagestan are also critical in this struggle as the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline passes through its territory.¹⁴ Recently, separatist military actions by Dagestan against Russia have flared up in Dagestan and in Chechnya. Dagestan is located between Chechnya and the Caspian Sea.

"For Russia, Dagestan retains an important strategic value. Dagestan commands 70 percent of Russia's shoreline to the oil-producing Caspian Sea and its only all-weather Caspian port at Makhachkala. It provides the crucial pipeline links from Azerbaijan, where Russia maintains important oil interests...."¹⁵

The recently opened Baku-Supsa route through Georgia, favored by the West, bypasses Russia altogether, undermining Russian influence on the region's oil and Russian revenue from that oil. This route was opened following military maneuvers for training to defend the line by Ukrainian, Georgian, and Azeri troops, as part of the GUUAM alliance.

Intensifying competition between Russia and NATO has escalated after a battle with heavy losses, June 14, between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

Another pipeline route favored by the U.S. is the one between Baku and Ceyhan passing through Turkey. However this is more expensive and transverses the area of intense struggles by the Kurdish people. This is leading the U.S. oil companies to revive their interest in other routes. One of these is through western Afghanistan, the other, south through Iran.

Richard Morningstar, former special adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin energy issues, said it was essential that the two Caspian states—Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan—agree as soon as possible about a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to transport oil from Turkmenistan to Turkey via the Caspian Sea. Washington has urged these governments to ignore Russian and Iranian hostility and move ahead with this pipeline even if it means violating the existing legal status of the Caspian Sea in which all the littoral states are to be consulted about its future. Russia and Iran "feel increasingly irritated by the U.S. activities in Central Asia, aimed at preventing Moscow and Teheran from reasserting their economic and political grip over the former Soviet republics in the Caspian region."¹⁶

Also at stake in this region is the growing competition from China which recently has established significant military and economic ties with Turkmenistan. China's National Petroleum Company has helped rebuild over 100 wells in Turkmenistan resulting in an increase in the nation's export production. It is estimated that Turkmenistan soon will be the third largest gas exporter in the world.¹⁷

China, the second largest energy consumer in the world, is expected to require 40 percent of its oil through imports by 2010 up from less than 20 percent today.¹⁸

According to a report in the *Journal of Commerce*: "A bitter ethnic battle in the Caucasus spilled over into Congress this week as U.S. corporate and oil interests won a key vote on aid to the region in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The panel approved the Silk Road Strategy Act...[which] would 'target assistance to support the economic and political independence of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.' But behind the measure's bland title is a widening

12. Michel Chossudovsky, "Kosovo 'Freedom Fighters' Financed by Organized Crime," *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 67, Spring-Summer 1999, p. 20.

13. *Ibid.*

14. "Conflict Threatens Caucasus Pipelines," *Stratfor Global Intelligence Update*, June 14, 1999.

15. Carlotta Gall, "Dagestan Skirmish is Big Russian Risk," *New York Times*, Aug. 13, 1999.

16. *Op. cit.*, n. 14.

17. *Stratfor Global Intelligence Update*, Sept. 17, 1999.

18. James Kynge, "Beijing anxious to ensure oil supplies are more secure," *Financial Times*, May 6, 1999.

web of international and U.S. business alliances with stakes in the outcome of a 10-year old war...."¹⁹

So once again we can expect that oil interests will lead to interventions predicated on "national liberation" or "human rights concerns."

NEW WORLD ORDER ONSLAUGHT

This information age of high technology communications and transportation is catapulting globalization forward at warp speed. A borderless world is increasingly attractive to profit-driven corporations seeking to extend their tentacles without impediment into every conceivable niche on Planet Earth. Indeed the pundits of the "new world order" speak openly now about the demise of national sovereignty as necessary and inevitable to permit capital to flow anywhere free of restrictions. The U.S./NATO destruction of Yugoslavia established the desired precedent for military attack, cloaked in a democracy and human rights disguise, against any sovereign country that might have the temerity to stand up to the encroachment of the transnational corporations (TNCs).

The U.S. and NATO will thus be vastly emboldened by their latest "success" in the Balkans, continuing to destabilize what's left of the federal structure, while disciplining the breakaway states of Croatia and Slovenia. We can also expect the new declared mission of nuclear-armed NATO—its commitment to override the principle of national sovereignty and intervene in the name of "humanitarian concerns,"—to be implemented elsewhere, possibly in the Caspian Sea/Caucasus areas of the former Soviet Union.

Burgeoning military alliances, with the U.S. at the helm, will similarly target North Korea, China, Congo, Colombia, and elsewhere. Any country refusing to be incorporated into the "New World Order" by allowing its wealth and labor power to be plundered by the transnational corporations will be vulnerable to attack. The assault against Yugoslavia threw open the floodgates for new wars, including wars of competition among the industrial powers, with nuclear weapons part of the equation.

An article by Thomas Friedman in the *New York Times* entitled "What the World Needs Now" tells it all. Illustrated by an American Flag on a fist it said, among other things: "For globalism to work, America can't be afraid to act like the almighty superpower that it is.... The hidden hand of

the market will never work without a hidden fist—McDonald's cannot flourish without McDonnell-Douglas, the designer of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps."²⁰

There could not be a better description of how the U.S. armed forces are seen as the military arm of the globalizing TNCs.

President Clinton, in a speech delivered the day before his televised address to Americans about Kosovo, admitted: "If we're going to have a strong economic relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be a key.... That's what this Kosovo thing is all about."²¹

After the war, Clinton praised NATO for its campaign in Kosovo, saying the alliance could intervene elsewhere in Europe or Africa to fight repression. "We can do it now. We can do it tomorrow, if it is necessary somewhere else," he told U.S. troops at the Skopje, Macedonia, airport.²² However, it soon became clear that, even though we can do it, we would like Europe to bear more of the cost. At the September NATO defense chiefs' meeting, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, with British support, pressed Europe to spend more money on defense, to close the "growing technology gap" between Europe's lagging forces and the state of the art U.S. military. British Minister of Defence Lord George Robertson's pitch was blunt: "Kosovo has shown people for real that this world is going to be more dangerous and that defense is not some luxury that can be cut in times of trouble."²³

Despite this push for more spending by Europe, a clear objective of the Kosovo campaign has also been to add more billions to the already bloated U.S. military budget and to fill the coffers of the military-industrial corporations with super-profits. Congress, with bipartisan fervor, approved a \$20 billion increase for the Pentagon, with a total of \$290 billion for fiscal year 2000, with an extra \$15 billion appropriated for the war against Yugoslavia. At the same time, all other domestic discretionary spending, including education, job training, housing, environment, and health, to-

als \$245 billion, "the biggest disparity in modern times," according to the Center for Defense Information.

AN END TO NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY?

In today's world, TNCs, and governments running interference for them, are pushing for an end to national sovereignty and democracy in order to achieve total unimpeded access for investments, cheap labor, and consumers in every nook and cranny of the globe. This is being accomplished, among other ways, through mechanisms like multilateral agreements on investment, free trade agreements like NAFTA, and the dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO). (See sidebar.)

Globalization fever is running rampant. It is epitomized by the feeding frenzy taking place across the Asia-Pacific region among U.S.-based transnationals and banks as they gobble up assets at bargain basement prices—in Japan facing a prolonged recession and in other nations stricken by the Asian economic crisis. In the early weeks of that economic tsunami, the *New York Times* described U.S. banks and corporations as poised to "snap up some corporate bargains.... Chase Manhattan, General Electric, General Motors, and J.P. Morgan are all said to be looking at ailing companies in the region."²⁴

To achieve maximum profits, these transnationals will stop at nothing. After all, they are non-human institutions that must expand through ever-greater profits, or go out of business. In so doing they have shown willingness to violate human rights—particularly workers' rights—to throw millions out of work, destroy unions, use sweatshops and slave labor, destroy the environment, destabilize governments, and install and bolster tyrants who oppress, repress, torture and kill with impunity.

Is it surprising, then, that wars and military intervention, including attacks on civilians, are waged on behalf of corporations? It has been an integral part of the history of imperialist powers. Why should we believe it is any different today?

THE COSTS, AND THE PROFITS, OF WAR

NATO nations spent an estimated \$65 million daily on the war. The U.S. paid the bulk of this cost, estimated to be \$1.65 bil-

19. Michael S. Lelyveld, "Trade bill embroils Senate in the Caucasus' problems; Measure would authorize funds to all 8 former Soviet republics," *Journal of Commerce*, June 25, 1998.

20. *New York Times*, Mar. 28, 1999.

21. Quoted in Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, "The Case Against Intervention in Kosovo," *The Nation*, Mar. 19, 1999.

22. "Clinton Says Nato Is Ready to Fight Repression in Europe, Africa," *Agence France-Presse*, June 22, 1999.

23. Charles Aldinger, "U.S., Britain Say NATO Defenders Want Modernization," *Reuters*, Sept. 21, 1999.

24. Timothy L. O'Brien, "Jockeying for Position in South Korea," *New York Times*, Dec. 27, 1997.

lion in the first 57 days. The second largest funder was Britain, which spent an estimated \$120-\$180 million.²⁵

Tapping into this lucrative bottomless well of funds, the "Big Three" weapons makers—Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon—now receive among themselves over \$30 billion per year in Pentagon contracts. Companies like Lockheed Martin are actively engaged in shaping U.S. foreign and military policies. Their efforts have yielded among other things: the "payoffs for layoffs" subsidies for defense industry mergers such as the Lockheed/Martin Marietta merger; the elimination of royalty fees that foreign arms customers had been paying to reimburse the U.S. Treasury for the cost of weapons developed

at taxpayer expense (this adds up to a loss for taxpayers of roughly \$500 million per year); and the creation of billions of dollars of new grants and government-guaranteed loans to support the export of U.S. weaponry. Pentagon contractors, conservative think tanks and advocacy groups lobbied heavily and successfully for the "Star Wars" missile defense program.²⁶ (See sidebar.)

The bombing and missile strikes are, more than ever, giant bazaars for selling the wares of the armaments manufacturers. An article in *USA Today* said: "The USA's defense equipment, such as the satellite-guided smart bombs, has stolen the international spotlight as NATO air forces pound Serbian forces. That could mean increased foreign interest in U.S. military equipment...."²⁷ Raytheon spokesperson David Shea was quoted: "We are expecting the Kosovo conflict to result in new orders downstream." Then in early June, just after President Clinton signed the bill appropriating \$12 billion

in emergency military funding, officials at Raytheon announced that replacing munitions used in the Balkans could lead to about \$1 billion in new contracts.²⁸

No wonder stock of the large military

ly" the flight paths of attacking missiles to their intended targets.³⁰

Defense and aerospace companies have either announced or completed mergers and acquisitions amounting to nearly \$60 billion in just the first half of 1999. That amount is already well above the total for all of 1998.³¹

HEIGHTENED ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE

Another factor driving U.S. policies is economic competition with the European Union, which is surfacing increasingly in spite of cooperation and commonality of interests on other levels. This is epitomized by the recent banana trade wars in which the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled in favor of U.S. TNCs, as well as the rivalry over such prizes as the oil riches of the Caspian Sea basin and access to the markets and resources of Eastern Europe.

The U.S. has warned openly that it will not tolerate a purely European military alliance to take the place of NATO. The military might of the U.S. must prevail.

This was clearly spelled out in "The Defense Planning Guide," which said, among other things: "We must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.... We must [deter] potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.... We must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO."³²

Nevertheless, on the very day that Yugoslavia adhered to the G-8 agreement, the leaders of 15 European countries announced the European Union would establish an independent military force.

Commerce up the Danube was completely disrupted by the bombing of bridges in Novi Sad which infuriated Europeans whose economies continue to be adversely affected. It was perceived as a manifestation of the intensifying economic rivalry between the U.S. and Europe.

Indeed, two world wars were fueled by such competition.

At the same time, rivalry is tempered increasingly by the corporate imperative to survive at all costs and to make maximum profits, including through mergers and partnerships. Lockheed Martin, maker of

Richard Wilson, *The Ecologist*



In conclusion, Mr. President, we at Exxon feel that human survival may not be economic.

manufacturers shot up. Since the beginning of the war against Yugoslavia, March 24, 1999, the stock price of Rockwell International (maker of the Lancer, B-1 bomber, etc.) was up 48 percent; Boeing Aircraft (maker of the B-52 Stratofortress, etc.) up 30 percent; Raytheon Systems (maker of the Tomahawk cruise missile, HARM missile, etc.) up 37 percent; Lockheed Martin (maker of the F-117 Nighthawk, F-16 Falcon, etc.), up 18 percent; and Northrop Grumman (maker of the B-2 bomber, etc.) up 16 percent.²⁹

Jaynatha Dhanapala, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, said recently that "television coverage of modern warfare has effectively created an 'advertising dividend' for the manufacturers of high-tech weaponry and the countries and alliances that use such weapons... He observed that during the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf and the recent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, tiny video cameras enabled hundreds of millions of viewers to "experience vicarious-

25. Center for Defense Information and U.S. Department of Defense.

26. William Hartung, "Military Industrial Complex Revisited," *The Progressive Response*, July 2, 1999.

27. *USA Today*, Apr. 15, 1999.

28. Tom Kirchofer, Associated Press, "Balkan War to Bolster Defense Firms' Sales," *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 9, 1999.

29. U.S. Department of Defense, May 26, 1999, and New York Stock Exchange daily data, 1999.

30. "Disarmament: UN Calls for New Partnership with Arms Industry," *Inter Press Service*, July 9, 1999.

31. *Ibid.*

32. Excerpted in the *New York Times*, Mar. 8, 1992.

missiles and high-tech weaponry, has created Lockheed Martin UK Limited, based in London. Its largest U.K. operation is the Royal Navy Merlin helicopter program, among many other military programs. In fact, Lockheed Martin has more than 200 international partnerships around the world.³³

U.S. aerospace companies are determined not to be locked out of the lucrative profits to be had from the establishment of a separate European military alliance. This pressure has led to a shift in policy by the Pentagon. Mergers between U.S. and European defense contractors are being given the go-ahead. "U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Jacques Gansler has admitted being in talks not only with European governments such as the U.K., Germany, France, and Italy, but also with leading defense companies including British Aerospace, France's Aerospatiale Matra SA and Germany's Dasa."³⁴

The New NATO

The giant corporations—especially the military-industrial corporations—have been pushing vigorously for expanding and extending the role of NATO. Their blatant sali-

33. "Lockheed Martin creates new UK company," July 1, 1999, *International Network on Disarmament and Globalization*, 405-825 Granville Street, Vancouver, BC, V6Z 1K9 Canada, ssstaples@canadians.org.

34. "Pentagon sees US-European defense company mergers as inevitable," July 8, 1999, *loc. cit.*, n. 27.

vating over potential profits was indisputable during NATO's 50th Anniversary celebrations which became "the ultimate marketing opportunity," as described in the *Washington Post*.³⁵ The host committee included the chief executives of Ameritech, Daimler/Chrysler, Boeing, Ford Motor, General Motors, Honeywell, Lucent Technologies, Motorola, Nextel, SBC Communications, TRW, and United Technologies. These companies sell weapons but also other products. They have been busy lobbying for the expansion of NATO to avail themselves of the lucrative markets in Eastern European nations which have been pressed to join NATO. In order to be a part of the Alliance, these nations must spend billions to upgrade their military forces.

The Ukraine, part of the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace, held joint naval exercises with the United States in July. Perceiving this as a threat, Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin was quoted by Interfax Ukraine news agency as telling the officers and men of Russia's Black Sea fleet to prepare for a naval exercise to imitate the military action in Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis.³⁶

The Ukraine, along with Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, are members of GUUAM, a bloc of "western-ori-

35. Tim Smart, "Count Corporate America Among NATO's Staunchest Allies," *Washington Post*, Apr. 13, 1999, p. E1.

36. "Ukraine, U.S. To Hold Navy Exercise This Month," *Reuters*, July 18, 1999.

ented" Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members.³⁷ Moldova and Uzbekistan joined during the NATO anniversary summit in April, and a charter was established encompassing military cooperation within the group and with NATO. GUUAM members have opted out of the CIS Collective Security Treaty.³⁸

"The pendulum of Ukrainian foreign policy swung closest to the West on June 12, when Kiev briefly closed Ukrainian airspace to Russian aircraft trying to reinforce Russian troops at Slatina airbase in Kosovo.... Russia's military commanders were furious. It was bad enough that NATO convinced ostensibly neutral Romania and Bulgaria to deny their airspace to Russian aircraft, but Ukraine was a step too far. Ukraine had to clarify its relationship with NATO and with Russia."³⁹

Moreover, NATO has repeatedly deflected protest over its possession of nuclear armaments and its refusal to renounce first use of these weapons.

NATO, then, is projecting its new role as action "out of area" and intervening anywhere on the basis of "humanitarian concerns," regardless of national sovereignty and international law. The purpose is to send a message to nations of the entire world that if they do not do the U.S. bidding, they too could be a victim of the kind of devastation unleashed

37. "Russia Flexes Muscles in Caucasus," *Stratfor Global Intelligence Update*, June 21, 1999.

38. *Conflict Threatens Caucasus Pipelines*, "Stratfor Global Intelligence Update, June 14, 1999.

39. *Ibid.*



U.S. Space Command

CONTROL OF SPACE MEANS CONTROL OF EARTH


The Pentagon is convinced that control of space means control of Earth. It is working non-stop to deploy anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) to enable the U.S. to knock out competitors' "eyes in the sky," according to Bruce Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space.¹

The Persian Gulf War convinced the U.S. military that space dominance and space control are essential. The war in Kosovo was used "to show the world that they have achieved their goal," says Gagnon. In a news release, June 17, 1999, the U.S. Space Command proclaimed that "Any questions about the role or effectiveness of the use of space for military operations have been answered by NATO's operation Allied Force."

The recent go-ahead given by Congress for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is integral to this strategy. Though BMD is touted as being "defensive," Col. Tom Clark, speaking at the 36th Space Congress at Cape Canaveral, Florida, said it is "obvious that dual use is clear," referring to the ability of lasers in space to fire either defensively or offensively.²

Russia and China are deeply concerned over this drive for space dominance and the flouting by the U.S. of the ABM and Outer Space Treaties. They have both called for the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD) to go ahead with an ad-hoc committee to negotiate a treaty for the "prevention of an arms race in outer space." This has been consistently blocked in the CD by the U.S. for two decades. Furthermore, the U.S. has been the only member state of the U.N. to vote time and again against General Assembly resolutions calling for preventing an arms race in outer space while all other nations vote "yes."³

—Karen Talbot



U.S. Space Command

1. Global Network Space Update Newsletter #6, July 17, 1999, posted on Abolition 2000 network: abolition.caucasus@igc.org.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Grenada also voted "no" one year.

upon Yugoslavia and Iraq. They too could be divided up, balkanized, turned into banana republics or emirates. Especially vulnerable are those countries involved over the oil riches of the Caspian Sea basin—Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—and where there are already related conflicts including over Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Dagestan, and Abkhazia.

U.S.-LED GLOBAL MILITARY ALLIANCES

NATO expansion pertains to what Washington calls a “new strategic concept,” an expensive new program to have NATO, under U.S. leadership, become the key player globally. This new blueprint for NATO not only sees it extending throughout Eastern and Baltic Europe, possibly taking in Russia itself, it goes considerably beyond this, as indicated by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his new book, *The Grand Chessboard*. He defines the alliance as part of an “integrated, comprehensive and long-term geostrategy for all of Eurasia,” in which NATO would eventually reach Asia, where another U.S.-led military alliance would connect Pacific and Southeast Asian states.

The unfolding events in Indonesia and East Timor appear to be closely related to plans for establishing a U.S.-controlled NATO-type military alliance in that region to counter a purely Asian military association.

Steps are well under way for new relations with Southeast Asia in which the U.S. is acquiring access to military bases in Asian countries in exchange for financial help to buy U.S. arms. The Pentagon's East Asian Strategy Report defines this program as offering the United States “a credible power projection capability in the region and beyond.”

Dr. Joseph Gerson succinctly describes the developing situation in Asia and the Pacific:

In the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. is enforcing its 21st century “Open Door” policy by means of the IMF, the World Bank, APEC, bases and forward deployments, the Seventh Fleet and its nuclear arsenal; as it seeks to simultaneously contain and engage China, to dominate the sea lanes and straits through which the region's trade and supplies of oil must travel (the “jugular vein” of Asia Pacific economies), and to “cap” Japanese militarism and nationalism.

Since 1951, the hub of this strategic architecture has been the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan

(MST). During the Clinton years, the MST has been “redefined” to re-consolidate U.S., and to a lesser extent, Japanese power.⁴⁰

A “U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century” proclaimed at the April 1996 Summit between President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, cited “the alliances, new enemies and public rationales: tensions and instability on the Korean Peninsula, China's nuclear arsenal, and territorial disputes with China.”

The regular gigantic war games conducted in the Korean region by the U.S. and South Korea have been stepped up substantially in the recent period.

Echoing the Gulf of Tonkin provocation used to justify U.S. intervention in Vietnam, South Korean warships sank a North Korean boat and badly damaged another allegedly over a dispute about a crab-fishing area of the Yellow Sea.⁴¹

Plans for U.S. deployment of Theater Missile Defenses (TMDs) around China, sensationalized and unproven allegations of Chinese nuclear spying, claims of Chinese nuclear parity with the U.S., the blocking of China's entry to the WTO, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and recent independence moves by Taiwan encouraged by U.S. Congress members, place the world on the brink of a U.S.-orchestrated confrontation with China. Taiwan is “the most likely trigger for U.S.-Chinese nuclear confrontation and war,” according to Gerson.

With the bombing of Yugoslavia barely over and with continuing and escalating air strikes against Iraq, the U.S. appears to be moving rapidly toward such a confrontation with China over Taiwan. In mid-July, Taiwan's President, Lee Teng-hui, announced the island wants “special state-to-state relations” with China, meaning a rejection of the “one China” policy that has kept the peace for many years. This led Chinese President Jiang Zemin to tell President Clinton, July 18, that China would not rule out using force regarding Taiwan.⁴²

Washington is regaining even greater access to ports and bases throughout the Philippines under the “Visiting Forces Agreement.” Considerable attention is also being focused on Indonesia, to prevent the U.S. loss of access to its natural resources and

markets, and its control of the strategically important shipping lanes.⁴³ Recent events in Indonesia and East Timor will undoubtedly be used as strong leverage for the establishment of a NATO-type military alliance in that region with the U.S. in control.

Nothing could describe U.S. military goals better than the British American Security Information Council's recently published partially declassified text of the U.S. Strategic Command's 1995 “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence”:

[T]he United States should have available the full range of responses, conventional weapons, special operations, and nuclear weapons. Unlike chemical or biological weapons, the extreme destruction from a nuclear explosion is immediate, with few if any palliatives to reduce its effect. Although we are not likely to use nuclear weapons in less than matters of the greatest national importance.... Nuclear weapons always cast a shadow over any crisis or conflict in which the U.S. is engaged. Thus, deterrence through the threat of use of nuclear weapons will continue to be our top military strategy.... That the U.S. may become irrational and vindictive if its vital interests are attacked should be a part of the national persona we project to all adversaries....

The Americas are not to escape this buildup of U.S.-controlled military alliances. The U.S. Army War College has urged a “NAFTA for the military,” with joint command between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.⁴⁴

CALL TO RESIST

Resistance to war, to the corporate globalization offensive, and to their manifestations at home, is needed today, more than ever in history, as events move at astounding speed. Such a movement is bound to grow every day.

Multitudes of the world's poor and working people are resisting in rapidly growing numbers. In the process they are coming to understand the commonality of interests they share with all those victimized by the corporations and the policies of the U.S. and other governments—the U.S. sword and dollar marching hand in glove—in the brutal, relentless drive for ever-higher profits. Nothing is more important than to quicken the pace and strengthen the unity to resist this imperialist onslaught toward global corporate rule. ■

43. *Op. cit.*, n. 34.

44. Linda Diebel, “NAFTA for the Military Proposed,” *Toronto Star*, July 23, 1999.

40. “U.S. Asia-Pacific Hegemony and Possibilities of Popular Solidarity,” delivered at Fresh Look: Re-examining the role and impact of US bases in Asia-Pacific, a conference in Seoul, South Korea, June 26-27, 1999, by Dr. Joseph Gerson, Director of Programs at the New England Region of the American Friends Service Committee, 1651 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02140.

41. Paul Shin, “South Korea Sinks North's Torpedo Boat,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, June 15, 1999, p. 1.

42. John Pomfret, “Chinese Leader Talks Tough on Taiwan,” *Washington Post*, July 19, 1999.

ALPHABET SOUP: MAI, WTO, TEP, AND MRAs

It is highly likely that the economic globalization onslaught will be propelled forward exponentially at the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle at the end of November. "Europe, the U.S., and the WTO are devising agreements that will remove the final obstacles to the free play of 'market forces' and require countries to submit to the unfettered expansion of the multinationals. Learning from the failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), big business and technocrats are trying to force through a decision before the end of 1999," according to Christian de Brie in *Le Monde Diplomatique*.¹ The MAI had been "stopped" in the OECD. Again, as with the MAI, secret talks have been taking place—this time by the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) and the Millennium Round of the WTO. The first of these meetings, which opened on September 16, 1998, dealt with "the favorite project of the British and Americans—seeing the European Union dissolved in a free trade area with the United States," says de Brie. He points out:

On the pretext of removing "technical barriers to trade," which include health, social and environmental protection regulations, the ultimate aim is to "reach a general commitment to unconditional access to the market in all sectors and for all methods of supply" of products and services, including health, education, and public contracts....

[T]alks proceed behind closed doors, using ... tactics to avoid alerting public opinion, so everything can be sewn up by December 1999. Industrial goods, services, public contracts, intellectual property, etc.—in a dozen fields, slice by slice, "mutual recognition agreements (MRAs)" ... seek to reduce standards and regulations to the lowest common denominator. The outcome is that the safeguards that Europe has built up, in food, the environment, and health in particular are being dismantled.

Once agreement has been reached, governments will be

obliged to abolish any laws that conflict with the MRAs.... [T]he TEP follows the same aims as the MAI—to hand over all human activities to capital, without let or hindrance, thereby stripping the EU, member governments, and local authorities of their ability to pursue their own policies....

But the document ... has another aim: to establish a US-EU condominium capable of imposing its will on the rest of the world, and in particular the countries of the South in the [WTO] talks....

[T]here seems to be nothing to prevent the transnational corporations taking possession of the planet and subjecting humanity to the dictatorship of capital....

In order to crush any thought of organized resistance to the supporters of the new world order, tremendous police and military forces are being used to establish a doctrine of repression....

This assault on sovereignty and the democratic rights of the people will also impact people in the U.S. itself. The provisions of the MAI are finding their way into many agreements, such as the "African Growth and Opportunity Act"—the NAFTA for Africa bill recently passed by Congress. Even NAFTA, though purporting to deal only with trade issues, has a section on investments which is now being evoked in a suit by Canada, on behalf of a corporation challenging recently adopted California environmental legislation banning the gasoline additive MTBE. If the suit prevails, California will have to abolish the law or pay large penalties.

The original draft of the MAI and its clones are written to have a dual effect: threatening social programs, while protecting and enhancing military spending and arms trade.² The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) also exempts military spending from its proscriptions against government subsidies. This gives U.S. corporations a great advantage over other countries because of the trillions already being lavished on the Pentagon. In fact, the high-tech industry got its start and continues to benefit from the research conducted

by the military with taxpayer dollars.

The purpose of MAI-type agreements is to remove virtually all barriers to investment by corporations. Foreign investors would be required to be treated the same as domestic investors. Governments would be denied much of their power to intervene in the economy to promote social goals.³ Thus national sovereignty and the democratic rights of the people would also be usurped.

So while the MAI—and now its clones—would threaten nearly every public sector of national economies such as health care, education, and culture, government spending for the military, weapons development and production, and direct support for weapons corporations are excluded from the liberalizing demands of such an agreement.⁴

NAFTA mechanisms, as well as the WTO, IMF, and World Bank are totally undemocratic, with no access by the people. They are run by the nations with the greatest wealth, the U.S. in the first place—with the corporations and banks pulling the strings.

Even the United Nations is increasingly coming under the sway of the TNCs and being privatized. This development is indicated in a joint statement issued by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the President of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Adnan Kassar, entitled: "Partnership between United Nations and Private Sector Would Do Much to Spread Benefits of Globalization." The statement said, among other things: "The aim should be to enable the benefits of globalization increasingly to spread to all people by building an effective framework of multilateral rules for a world economy that is being transformed by the globalization of markets."⁵

So it is clear that the new world order of the free market promises further erosion of the U.N., more wars, destruction of sovereignty, elimination of social programs for the people, increasing poverty and joblessness, and the demise of democracy.

Already, United Nations bodies dealing with economic issues have been emasculated or eliminated through U.S.-sponsored "reforms." Their functions are being fully usurped by the international financial institutions and the WTO.⁶

—Karen Talbot

1. Christian de Brie, "Transatlantic Wheeling and Dealing—Watch out for MAI Mark Two," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), May 1999.

2. Steven Staples, "Protecting War, Militarism and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment," Vancouver, B.C., Canada; Staples is the former Coordinator of End the Arms Race.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. United Nations Press Release, July 1999.

6. See several articles in the *South Letter*, South Centre, Geneva, Switzerland.

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
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COLLECTIVE GUILT AND COLLECTIVE INNOCENCE

BY DIANA JOHNSTONE

As the Serbian people began to be bombed by NATO, the Serbian people began to deserve it. The more they were bombed, the more they deserved it.

This hadn't been the case at first. The target, NATO leaders stressed, was one man: Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. "We must stand hard against this vile dictator," declared British Prime Minister Tony Blair on March 25, at the start of his two-and-a-half-month impersonation of Winston Churchill keeping up morale during the Battle of Britain, with the important difference that this time Britain was not heroically resisting being bombed but was bombing the country that was heroically resisting.

During a "Meet the Press" broadcast on April 25, Senator Joe Lieberman (Dem.-Conn.) declared: "I hope the air campaign, even if it does not convince Milosevic to order his troops out of Kosovo, will so devastate his economy, which it's doing now, so ruin the lives of his people, that they will rise up and throw him out."

Now, it is well known that being bombed does not cause people to "rise up" and "throw out" the leader of their country. Indeed, quite the opposite effect has been observed time and again. Bombing unites a people against whoever is doing the bombing. The U.S. government is in possession of a vast archive of studies proving this fact. No informed person could seriously expect bombing Serbia to cause the Serbian people to "throw out" Milosevic.

IDEALISTIC VS CYNICAL OBJECTIVES

It is always reasonable to consider the hypothesis that what a great power actually does is precisely what it wants to do. There is a prevailing liberal attitude toward the United States as great power that systematically excludes this hypothesis, thus centering criticism of U.S. actions on their allegedly blundering failure to achieve their stated goals. Yes, but what if the stated goals were only a diversion intended precisely to distract the public,

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and especially the liberal critics, from what is really going on?

Thus a contradiction, due to blundering, is perceived between (1) the stated aim of preventing "ethnic cleansing," and the massive flow of refugees from Kosovo after the bombing started; and (2) the stated aim of turning the Serbian people against Milosevic, and the observed result that his power seemed to be enforced by the bombing.

This seems plausible to well-intentioned people who can relate to such aims, as the sort of motives they might have themselves. The opposite hypothesis, that the bombing *deliberately* both provoked the refugee flow and tightened Milosevic's grip on power is too cynical for such good people to contemplate. At least, it is too cynical for them to contemplate on the part of *their* side. Ascribing equally or even more cynical purposes to the *other* side, for example to Milosevic, credited with wanting to wipe out ethnic Albanians for the sheer pleasure of it, is not beyond their imaginations.

- The perfectly predictable—and predicted¹—refugee exodus after the bombing started provided the *ex post facto* moral justification for the NATO air strikes that provoked it. Television focus on images of human misery in chaotic refugee camps along the Kosovo borders distracted from NATO's ongoing destruction of Yugoslavia.

- Since the presence of Milosevic is established as the best operational pretext for continuing to carve Yugoslavia into NATO-occupied protectorates, and the job is not yet finished—after Bosnia and Kosovo come Montenegro, Vojvodina, and eventually Serbia itself—it may be best to keep him at the helm until the ship is definitively sunk.

And the final goal? For the cynical hypothesis to be entertained, some motive

1. Clinton was warned by the U.S. intelligence community and by Italian prime minister Massimo D'Alema (who feared the consequences for Italy) that bombing would produce an explosion of refugees, and NATO commander Wesley Clark himself acknowledged that the military authorities fully anticipated the Serb response to the bombing, while insisting that the NATO operation was not designed to stop ethnic cleansing. See Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 1999), pp. 20, 21, 36.

must reasonably be suggested. The liberal critics of the "blundering giant" school cannot imagine any, and tend to insist on the absence of any selfish U.S. economic or strategic goals in the Balkans. There is, however, ample published material to show that the U.S. does indeed have strategic interests in and especially beyond the Balkans, and that securing NATO bases in a fragmented Yugoslavia can be considered a step toward securing these interests.²

WHAT WAS REALLY WRONG WITH MILOSEVIC

What was *really* wrong with Milosevic is indeed closely related to what was *really* wrong with the Serbian people as Yugoslavia began to come apart at the seams in the 1980s. What was really wrong with the Serbian people is that they were extremely divided. They were, of course, geographically divided between Serbs in Serbia and Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia. They were divided between two identities, Yugoslav and Serb. They were divided, historically, in several ways, and most painfully between World War II Partisans and Chetniks (respectively, the Communist and Royalist guerrilla movements opposing Nazi occupation—and each other). They were sociologically divided between rural and urban inhabitants. And finally, in the wake of Titoism, they were politically divided between left projects to reform socialism and "centrist" projects to revive the parties and political traditions of the pre-Communist past.

When a nation is deeply divided, the leader who can succeed is the one whose ambiguity can create a semblance of unity. The ability to be "all things to all men" is often the key to political success. What was *really* wrong with Milosevic was what was also his biggest political asset: his ambiguity. He appeared, when he rose to prominence, won the power struggle in the Serbian communist party, turned it into the Serbian Socialist Party and won the first pluralist elections in Serbia in 1990, to be able to square all the circles. He was the po-

2. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); see also Tariq Ali, ed., *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade* (London: Verso, 1999).

litical magician who could get rid of communist "bureaucracy" but maintain a reassuring continuity, defend both Serbian interests and Yugoslavism, and combine reformed socialism with economic privatization.

Because Serbs lived not only in Serbia, but also in Croatia and Bosnia, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was bound to cause a crisis of Serb unity and disunity. The Yugoslav Army wanted to preserve Yugoslavia; Milosevic, at the time Slovenia declared its independence, was ready to let Slovenia go and settle for less. That "less" might, perhaps, be called "Greater Serbia," but Milosevic himself did not proclaim "Greater Serbia" as his goal. Rather, this was the desire of a large part of the Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia who feared being cut off from Serbia by the secession of those two Republics. In 1991, Serbs in Croatia were being attacked by Croatian nationalist militia openly proclaiming their allegiance to the tradition of the fascist *Ustashe*, thus provoking both the Yugoslav National Army, with its Partisan tradition, and Serbian fears of a revival of the genocide of which they had been victims in the *Ustashe*-run "Independent Croatian State" set up by the Axis powers during World War II. For a short time, in 1991 and 1992, when events moved faster than people's understanding, it was unclear where defending Yugoslavia left off, and creating a hypothetical Greater Serbia began.

The slogan "all Serbs in one State" applied to Yugoslavia, and implied a security which many feared losing if they became minorities in hostile Croatian or Muslim states. Serbs in Serbia were theoretically sympathetic to Serb brethren in Croatia and Bosnia, but far from united as to what, if anything, to do about the problem. Milosevic gave the impression that he might work out a solution with Tudjman. In the crucial years 1990 to 1992, he managed to give the impression either that he was doing everything possible to preserve Yugoslavia, or else that he was ready to give up Yugoslavia and salvage a Serbia comprising Serb-inhabited lands from the wreckage. The Yugoslav National Army was ready only to defend the former project; for the latter, rival paramilitary groups were formed, in utmost confusion, as some 200,000 young men left Serbia to avoid fighting in a fratricidal civil war. This was a nation in disarray, not a people united in an "eliminationist project" fired up by "burning hatred."

By mid-1993, when the Yugoslav National Army formally pulled out of Bosnia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed comprising only Serbia and Montenegro, but excluding the

two "Serb Republics" in the Croatian Krajina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was clear that "Greater Serbia" was not on Belgrade's agenda, however much Serbs in the Croatian Krajina or in Bosnia-Herzegovina might want to stay attached to Serbia. This became even clearer in 1994, when Belgrade went so far as to proclaim an embargo against the Bosnian Serbs for failing to accept a western peace plan.

During the period of Yugoslav breakup, Milosevic did succeed in co-opting Serbian nationalism, without ever himself espousing an extreme nationalist ideology. What made Milosevic's "Serbian nationalism" so unbearable to so many critics (foreign and domestic) is not that it was more "extreme" than any other—it definitely was not—but that he played the nationalist card not to get rid of socialism, but to hang onto it, or at least scraps of it, not the least being the party apparatus, its patronage system, and its control of key institutions such as the police and state media.

Serbian nationalism had been such a total taboo in Tito's Yugoslavia that it took very minor references to "Serbian interests" on the part of a communist party apparatchik like Milosevic to thrill some and scandalize others. Yugoslavs still respecting that taboo have done a lot to denounce Milosevic to the world as an "extreme nationalist," a term that has quite different connotations in other countries.

Through all this, as can easily be verified by reading his published speeches, Milosevic continued to preach a mixture of Yugoslav multinationalism and reformist economic optimism.³ After Milosevic abandoned entirely the Bosnian Serb leadership in order to reach the Dayton settlement, the official ideology was increasingly influenced by the avant-garde "Yugoslav United Left (JUL)" party sponsored by his wife, Mirjana Markovic, whose doctrine is a compendium of modern leftist "politically correct" progressive thought and praise of the virtues of multi-ethnic society. There is no trace of the "dehumanizing beliefs" attributed to Milosevic and the Serbs.

Milosevic's ambiguity enabled him to win elections, but not to unite the Serbs, who through everything have remained so divided that a strong and not implausible argument for retaining the existing government has been simply that the alternative could be civil war. Some fear that the fall of Milosevic would profit the real extreme nationalist, Vojislav Seselj, while the United States' ostentatious declaration of political

and financial support to unidentified opposition leaders only confirms the widespread impression that such a favorite of western media as Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic is a NATOland puppet—a role to which he unabashedly aspires.

Many Serbs, notably clergy of the Serbian Orthodox Church, strongly condemned the brutality of the police operations against the KLA. The division of opinion within Yugoslav society on this question was largely similar to the division of opinion one would find in any modern society; some considered the police operations foolishly exaggerated and almost certainly doomed to failure, others thought the police had to do what was necessary to restore order, and many simply worried about the outcome of a seemingly hopeless and endless conflict. But there was no preaching of "racial hatred" or campaign to drive all ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. Milosevic and his Serbian Socialist Party consistently stressed the virtues of "multi-national" society in Serbia. This hardly merits comparison with Hitler, who spent his entire career ranting against Jews and proclaiming the racial superiority of Germans.

The Kosovo policy of Milosevic was "nationalist" insofar as it aimed at keeping Kosovo within Serbia and preventing the Albanian majority from driving out the Serbian minority. There is no evidence of any plan to drive out the Albanian majority, a project that would never have been approved by a majority of Yugoslav voters. Milosevic's great fault was to pretend to know how to solve the Kosovo problem when in fact he didn't, a fault now being committed by NATO.

So there were two possibilities. Either Milosevic was a "dictator," and the Serbian people had to be liberated from him by bombing. Or else, as it turns out, he was not a dictator, and the Serbian people had to be given a "taste of suffering" for having elected him. Either way, Serbia must be bombed. The possibility that, if the dictator was not a dictator, some of the other accusations leveled against Serbia were equally distorted, was not to be considered.

Much more could no doubt be said about what is wrong with Milosevic. If using criminals for dirty tasks makes him a criminal, then he is no doubt a criminal—as are President Tudjman of Croatia and President Izetbegovic of Bosnia. But then, so are a whole line of U.S. Presidents. Milosevic is one of a world full of unsavory leaders. But he has never preached an "eliminationist project" of "racial hatred" and the Serbs who voted for him could not have thought that that was what they were voting for. Like other voters elsewhere, whatever they

3. See Robert Thomas, *Serbia under Milosevic: Politics in the 1990s* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), for an unusually fair and detailed account of the conflicting currents in Serbian politics.

thought they were voting for, that is probably not what they got.

A PARIAH NATION

As NATO was stepping up its bombing of Yugoslavia, *Newsweek* published an article by Rod Nordland entitled "Vengeance of a Victim Race" that reached a summit of anti-Serb racism not easily surpassed. "The Serbs are Europe's outsiders, seasoned haters raised on self-pity," this writer proclaimed.⁴ "Serbs are expert haters," the article informed readers, citing as evidence a "torrent of gutter invective about Bill Clinton's sex life" on commercial TV in Serbia (without benefit of Jay Leno). No evidence is needed when it comes to slandering a whole nation.

As great clouds of toxic smoke settled over northern Serbia from the bombing of the country's petrochemical and other industries, moral indignation rose among the chorus of editorialists, columnists, and NATO officials justifying the bombing. Causing discomfort to civilians was no longer

the suffering he has inflicted on their neighbors."⁵

Among the propaganda techniques used for years to destroy any public sympathy in the West for the Serbian people is the persistent negative characterization of Serbian culture, national myth and mentality as uniquely peculiar, marked by a strange delusion of being "victims." This technique of pre-emptive denigration prepares the public to dismiss such facts as Serbia's extraordinary loss of population in World War I, the authentic genocide practiced against the Serbs by the fascist Croatian *Ustashe* during World War II, and periodic Albanian efforts to push Serbs out of Kosovo as mere manifestations of a national mental illness. If a person or group is earmarked for victimization, what better way to head off foreseeable sympathy than by proclaiming loud and long that the individual or group always complains of being "victimized." In this way, ears will be deafened to their cries and hearts hardened to their fate. Anti-Semitic propaganda por-

and to believe they had ... no right to live."

Meanwhile, the work went on of making people look down on Serbs and even to question whether Serbs had the right to live.

DEHUMANIZATION BY ACADEMICS

As the bombing intensified, and the more gung-ho of the NATO warriors (notably the British) pressed for a ground invasion, Harvard professor Daniel Jonah Goldhagen came along with the ultimate justification not only for a "taste of suffering," but also for conquest and occupation of Serbia, by likening the displacement of Kosovo's civilians to the Holocaust, Milosevic to Hitler, and the Serbian people to "Hitler's willing executioners," to use the title of the book that gained him his notoriety as "genocide expert." Goldhagen's premise is that, like Germany and Japan in the early 1940s, Serbia in the 1990s "has been waging brutal imperial war, seeking to conquer area after area, expelling unwanted populations, and perpetrating mass murder."⁶



Reuters

Who are the Nazis? Serbian prisoners-of-war forced by Croatian commander to give Nazi/Ustashe Salute while imprisoned in Bosnian town of Capljina, 1992.

merely to get them to overthrow Milosevic, but to punish them for not having done so.

"Much has been made, unwisely in my view," wrote columnist William Pfaff, "of NATO's being in conflict only with Serbia's leaders. Serbia's leaders have been elected by the Serbian people.... Serbian voters have kept Slobodan Milosevic in power during the past decade. It is not clear why they should be spared a taste of

trayed Jews as self-pitying whiners as the Nazis rounded them up for the gas chambers.

The NATO line was to justify destroying Yugoslavia by comparing it to Nazi Germany and Milosevic to Hitler. In a Memorial Day address, Clinton claimed that Milosevic's government "like that of Nazi Germany rose to power in part by getting people to look down on people of a given race and ethnicity,

This Harvard scholar builds a structure of assumptions on nothing more solid than erroneous impressions gleaned from years of distorted media coverage of the Balkans. The house of cards goes like this: Milosevic was an "extreme nationalist" and a "genocidal killer." He and the Serbian people were " beholden to an ideology which called for the conquest of Lebensraum," they were in the grip of "dehumanizing beliefs." In pursuit of "an eliminationist project" they set

4. "Vengeance of a Victim Race," *Newsweek*, Apr. 12, 1999.

5. *International Herald Tribune*, May 31, 1999.

6. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, "If you rebuild it... A New Serbia," *The New Republic*, May 17, 1999.

out to eliminate the Albanian population of Kosovo, in an action reminiscent of the Holocaust. Therefore, the only remedy is the same remedy as that applied to Nazi Germany: Serbia must be conquered, de-Nazified and reeducated by the West.

These assumptions are all false. Of course, innocence is always harder to prove than guilt. The Inquisitor knows that everyone is guilty of something. The Serbian people cannot all be blameless for everything, as they would probably be the first to confess. But neither are they, or even Milosevic, guilty of everything that has gone wrong in the Balkans for the past decade. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is a complex event with multiple causes which can reasonably be debated for some time by honest scholars. Other leaders who share responsibility for the disaster have had an interest in putting all the blame on their Serbian adversary. Blaming Milosevic has distracted attention from the responsibility of all the others.

NATO's Willing Executioners

The Goldhagen thesis about Serbia is not merely academic. This Harvard professor has deliberately attempted to motivate an aggressive war of conquest. His grave and unsubstantiated accusations are incitement to hatred of an entire nation.

Goldhagen claims that, like the Germans and Japanese in the early 1940s, the "majority of the country's populace" in Serbia "believed fanatically" in the rightness of criminal actions. This is simply and wholly untrue. The majority of Serbs do not agree on much of anything; many, perhaps most, Serbs readily and willingly acknowledge with regret that Serbs have committed crimes during the civil wars and believe such crimes should be punished. However, they also believe, indeed they know (because it happens to be true), that similar crimes have been committed by others and that the United States and other NATO countries have adopted double standards.

Goldhagen declares that there will be no peace in the Balkans "as long as the Serbs continue to harbor the burning hatred of ethnic nationalism." The Serbs, he claims, are "now caught in the grip of delusions, hatreds, an ever-more-belligerent society and culture, war, and death."

But why can this not be turned around to claim that, for instance, Harvard professors are "now caught in the grip of delusions and hatreds"? The evidence would be what Harvard professors, or at least one of them, says about the Serbs—and the others are not denying it, or removing him from his position. The case here is probably

stronger against Harvard professors than against the Serbs, since one will look for a long time to find such a vicious tirade by a Serb against Albanians or anybody else, and the proportion of Serbs who would subscribe to such a blanket condemnation of a people is certainly less than the proportion of Harvard professors, even if Goldhagen is the only one.



JD Sloan

Goldhagen advocates all-out war against Serbians.

The outlandish conclusion of this Goldhagen tract is that the Serbian people "consists of individuals with damaged faculties of moral judgment and has sunk into a moral abyss from which it is unlikely, anytime soon, to emerge unaided." By "supporting or condoning Milosevic's eliminationist policies" (which, incidentally, never existed except in the imaginations of *New Republic* writers), the Serbian people "have rendered themselves both legally and morally incompetent to conduct their own affairs" and "their country must be placed in receivership."

This should be done by a NATO invasion, in order to give Serbia the benefit of the same treatment that de-Nazified Germany. The "criminals' supporters, composing a large percentage of the Serbian people, need to be made to comprehend their errors and rehabilitated." Since there never was an "eliminationist ideology" of "virulent nationalism," it will be a hard task indeed to make the Serbian people give it up. But proof of success is already at hand: "if people accept that it was both morally correct and wise to occupy and transform Germany and Japan in 1945, it follows that they must endorse, in principle, the desirability of pur-

suing a similar course in the Serbia of 1999."

So Goldhagen has a schema. In his schema, neither Hitler's Germany nor the Holocaust were unique events, but models, patterns, that are reproducing themselves and will probably continue to do so. A bad country in the grip of a bad ideology attacks everybody around; it commits genocide; the populace sees nothing wrong with that and even applauds, since it is filled with "the burning hatred of ethnic nationalism"; moreover, this errant country is prey to "delusions" that it itself is the victim. But there is a solution to this problem: the "international community," a/k/a the United States and its military allies, must conquer the errant country, punish its leaders and "rehabilitate" its inhabitants by teaching them all how to be politically correct.

As those who really remember World War II, Hitler, and Nazi genocide grow old and die off, we are seeing a sad but no doubt inevitable and oft-repeated process: the transformation of history into myth. And not just any myth, good for story books: the sort of active myth that is used for assertion of power. The mythical event is ritualistically repeated to cement the community and reassert the legitimacy of its identity. World War II has become the source not of wisdom but of self-justifying myth.

For a long time, an extraordinary quantity of lies about Yugoslavia have been sent into circulation, taken up, and fervently believed. The original motives for lying are not sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. Why people in power tell lies is the easy part. The hard part is why other people believe them. The lies about Yugoslavia quite evidently fill a gap and meet a need that goes beyond strategic bases on the way to Caspian oil or other purely rational reasons—which exist but are not adequate to explain an illusion of such proportions.

THE FOUNDING MYTH

From Fukayama's "end of history" to Huntington's "conflict of civilizations" and now to "humanitarian warfare," the United States establishment has been groping recklessly for Big Ideas to accompany the New World Order. A constant characteristic of these big ideas is a total cynicism cloaked in a ruthless self-righteousness. There is never any critical self-examination (the basis of what used to be moral conscience), the motives of the power with which the ideologues identify being above any possible reproach. "Our" system, "our" civilization, "our" values have been certifiably proven

the best by "our" defeat of communism. The only moral question that remains is what we need to do to bring the others in line. Is it easy (Fukayama), difficult (Huntington), or a welcome challenge to NATO? Goldhagen is contributing to development of the third possibility, the one known as "humanitarian warfare."

Yugoslavia has been the "common enemy" needed to bring Europe and the United States together in a new missionary NATO. This new moralizing Atlantic union obviously corresponds to U.S. strategic interests. But European NATO leaders and media have bought into the demonizing of the Serbs with equal enthusiasm, nowhere more than in France. The French response, because the most surprising, may be the most significant. During the bombing, there was greater protest, more critical analysis, in Italy and even in Germany, than in France, which historically was Serbia's closest ally in Western Europe. Moreover, while the United States and Germany can be seen to have strategic or economic interests to advance in the Balkans, it is difficult to see how France will get enough of the pickings to make up for what the Kosovo adventure is costing her. Does this mean that the French have been more genuinely idealistic? That they believe in the "humanitarian war"? To an extent, perhaps, all the more in that the French media have on the whole been singularly biased for years, and that the French are particularly ill-informed about recent events in former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, in the higher spheres of official circles in France, the war is widely viewed as an American power play, and not at all as a humanitarian venture. Yet public criticism is practically inaudible.

The French élite that runs the government, the economy, and the media has for years now been totally dedicated to a single project: European union built around a close partnership with Germany and sealed with a common currency as the only way for France to survive in the competitive world of U.S.-led "globalization." There is widespread ennui, if not yet exactly disillusion, with this monetary Europe. This "Europe" is made up of too many technocrats, too many obscure regulations, too much hype about the euro, too many lobbies, and not enough jobs, too much competition and too little common purpose.

THE SEARCH FOR EURO-IDENTITY

The European Union is in need of a common identity more spiritual than a common currency. These days it can't be religion; Christianity is not only out of style, despite the Pope as Superstar, it is politically incor-

rect to identify Europe with Christendom, since this would risk implying exclusion of other religions. Both anti-communism and anti-fascism are out of date. What is left? Human rights.

Europe needs a moral identity. The perfect formula, especially for France which is proud of having invented the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme*, is human rights—especially human rights as a creed that transcends national boundaries and justifies the abandonment of long-cherished national sovereignty required by the European Union's treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam.

In 1994, a number of European intellectuals, mostly French, organized meetings and even an ephemeral electoral list around the slogan, "Europe lives or dies at Sarajevo." This was in fact extravagant hyperbole. But it caught the need to associate "Europe" with a dramatic cause, equal to the Spanish Civil War, and the intellectuals feeling this need grasped onto a totally idealized "Bosnia" as the symbol of this "Europe" that, rather than an economic powerhouse technocratically organized to take its place alongside the United States in world domination, was actually a tender bud of multi-ethnic civilization in danger of being trampled to death by a new Hitler.

A constant characteristic of these big ideas [the New World Order] is a total cynicism cloaked in a ruthless self-righteousness... "Our" system, "our" civilization, "our" values have been certifiably proven the best by "our" defeat of communism.

Yugoslavia was the first crisis to be poured whole into the mold of the ideological myth of World War II. Milosevic became "Hitler," the Serbs became the new "Nazis," and their adversaries were all victims of a potential new "Holocaust." The eagerness with which European intellectuals believed the "unbelievable," exclaiming "we thought it couldn't happen here" without taking the trouble to find out whether in fact "it" was, or

perhaps *wasn't*, happening here, perhaps merits the term *Schadenfreude*. There was a sort of pleasure in the damage, and the pleasure was that of discovering *our* collective identity as "the West."

If *they* are guilty, *we* are innocent.

They, of course, are the terrible Serbs, guilty of everything the Germans used to be guilty of under Hitler. But now, the Germans are innocent and on the side of the angels, as well as the common currency. Nazism has been replaced as the evil that Europe, and Germany, must eliminate.

We, on the other hand, we are (on the West end of the Atlantic) America, the New World Order, the one last best hope of mankind and so on; or, on the East side of the Atlantic, the new Europe of the European Union, the exact opposite of the Old Europe of wars between nation-states, that wicked Europe whose surviving (but not for long) remnant is Serbian Yugoslavia.

This is a ritual for anthropologists to describe. Myth is built on history and transformed into a ceremony whose roles must be assumed by succeeding players on the stage of history. Finally, the scapegoat. Yugoslavia bears all the sins of Europe's past, it represents everything Europe is not, or

does not want to be. It must be destroyed. After the bombs, an embargo. Ostracism, further destruction, until nothing is left.

In Serbia, thoughtful people are struggling with the question: What can we do?

Even if Milosevic miraculously resigned tomorrow, there could be no certainty that his successor might not quickly be hailed by western media as Hitler's latest clone. The job would be made easier by establishment career moralists such as Goldhagen ready to expound on the "moral abyss" into which the Serbian people are plunged, unable to

extricate themselves without being "placed in receivership," that is, under a NATO protectorate. And the destruction could go on until conditions are ripe for the required national lobotomy of the miscreant people.

Caught in such a death trap, how responsible, now, are the Serbian people for what is happening to them? And how responsible are we? ■

HIGHER JUSTICE OR HIRED JUSTICE?

Few doubt that the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia initiated on March 24, 1999, were in flagrant violation of international law on numerous counts. The real question is: Can any semblance of a neutral, independent, impartial international law be salvaged from the United States' drive to impose its own "law of the strongest" on the entire world under cover of lofty moral imperatives?

The Yugoslav government itself tried on April 29 to institute proceedings at the International Court of Justice in The Hague against NATO governments for a broad range of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Western media, in brief reports, let it be known that such an initiative was "not serious." It was finally thrown out of court because the Genocide Convention, the legal basis for Belgrade's suit, has never been recognized by the United States as applying to itself, although Washington is willing to let it apply to others.¹

On May 7, a team of lawyers from Canada and Europe submitted a brief to the Canadian Louise Arbour, then the chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICT),² accusing U.S. and other NATO officials of war crimes including "wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity, attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings." One of the lawyers, Professor Michael Mandel of Osgoode Hall Law School of York University in Toronto, where Ms. Arbour

herself once taught, argued that "charging the war's victors, and not only the losers, would be a watershed in international criminal law, showing the world that no one is above the law."

In July, the Connecticut-based International Ethical Alliance filed charges against President Clinton and Defense Secretary William Cohen for "non-defensive aggressive military attacks on former Yugoslavia." At the same time, IEA general counsel Jerome Zeifman called for the dismissal of prosecutor Arbour, charging her with "selective prosecution by intentional-

"Chance that a NATO member country faces its own ongoing secessionist movement: 1 in 3.

Chance that the leader of a NATO member country was once an antiwar or antinuclear activist: 1 in 3."

**"Harper's Index,"
Harper's Magazine
July 1999**

of Yugoslavia held the first of a series of hearings to charge NATO, and especially the United States, with instigating the war and committing numerous war crimes. The complaint, prepared by former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, included admissions by NATO commanders that they purposely chose civilian targets in Serbia to bring pressure on the government in Belgrade.

These and a number of other initiatives by international jurists pointing to the illegality of the NATO actions were widely ignored by mainstream media. Instead, considerable space was given to pundits developing the notion of "humanitarian intervention" which henceforth, it was said, superseded the outworn notion of "national sovereignty."

In fact, there is absolutely nothing new about appeals to a "higher justice" to excuse violating the law. Nineteenth century imperialist conquests were usually undertaken "to defend" some group or other, and Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia and invaded Poland, setting off World War II, in order to rescue allegedly abused German ethnic minorities. Respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity were incorporated into international law after World War II precisely in order to protect weaker nations from humanitarian crusades of this sort. Apparently Clinton administration policy-makers feel that U.S. monopoly of fearsome power is now so unchallenged that any such rules can only get in the way.

The big news was, of course, the indictment of Milosevic by the ICT. On May 27, Ms. Arbour, who had failed to act on the May 7 complaint against NATO leaders, initiated proceedings against Milosevic and other senior officials in the Yugoslav and Serbian governments for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in Kosovo. Some of the charges were substantially identical to those filed earlier against the officials responsible for the NATO bombing, to wit: "the widespread shelling of towns and villages; the burning of homes, farms and businesses, and the destruction of personal property."

Arbour's case against Milosevic is based on the presumption that by virtue of his position as "superior authority" over Federal Yugoslav and Serbian forces and agencies, he is "individually responsible" for war crimes committed in Kosovo during the war started by NATO

ly failing to consider and act on evidence which incriminates defendants Clinton and Cohen, ... conflicts of interest, or the appearance thereof, in receiving compensation from funds contributed in whole or in part by governments of NATO; and bias in favor of the attacks by NATO on former Yugoslavia." Zeifman called for replacement of the prosecutor and recusal of five judges, including McDonald, and selection of a truly independent prosecutor as well as new judges and staff from non-NATO countries who would not be compensated directly or indirectly by funds from NATO countries. Such a truly neutral tribunal, suggested the IEA, could then go on to weigh the charges against leaders on both sides, including Milosevic, Clinton and the rest.

And in August, the Independent Commission of Inquiry to Investigate U.S./NATO War Crimes Against the People

1. See Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (Monroe, Me.: Common Courage Press, 1999), pp. 152-153. A few liberals timidly criticized the NATO bombing on the imaginary grounds that it might provoke Serbian "terrorism." In reality, throughout the air strikes there was never the slightest hint of any propensity on the part of Serbs to take up terrorism. On the contrary, Serbs were notably shocked by the flagrant violations of the legal order constructed primarily by the very western powers who were now violating it, and a number of Yugoslavs both in Serbia and in the diaspora, have tried to seek legal redress.

2. Arbour was replaced on Sept. 15, 1999, by Carla Del Ponte of Switzerland.

bombing. Such a rigorous standard would be perfectly acceptable if applied universally.³ However, coming when and as it did, Ms Arbour's accusation could scarcely be distinguished from the flow of wild accusations kept up by NATO spokesmen against the Serbs, and which later, when public attention had turned elsewhere, turned out to be grossly exaggerated or untrue.

Serbian opposition leader Vuk Draskovic has pointed to the fact that the ICT indictment serves to tighten Milosevic's grip on power. With his popularity plummeting to new lows, the chances of persuading Milosevic to resign for the sake of his country are seriously reduced by the prospect of being turned over to the U.S.-dominated war crimes tribunal. The ICT has further complicated the task of easing Milosevic out of office by also indicting his most likely successor, Serbia's elected President, Milan Milutinovic. This indictment, based solely on the notion of "command responsibility," without any evidence of having desired or ordered the crimes cited, only confirms the widespread impression that the tribunal is a political instrument manipulated by Washington.

The indictment of Milosevic and the others was hardly the act of an impartial body, rising above the conflict between mighty NATO and little Yugoslavia. Ms. Arbour signed warrants for the arrest of

Milosevic and the Serbian leaders on the basis of material turned over to her the day before by a party to the conflict, the United States government. The information leading to the indictment of Yugoslav leaders was provided by a special U.S. intelligence unit called the



Louise Arbour, former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals, and friend of Madeleine Albright.

Part of Arbour's job as chief prosecutor was fund-raising in the "international community," notably among the governments of NATO member states. She and chief Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (a former federal judge in Texas) frequently appear in public with Madeleine Albright⁵ ("the mother of the Tribunal," in the words of Judge McDonald, who before the war had already judiciously branded Yugoslavia "a rogue state") and praise the U.S. for its financial and other support to the Tribunal.⁶ When asked on May 17 what would happen if NATO itself were brought before the Tribunal, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea retorted that without NATO countries there would be no such tribunal, since it was the NATO countries which had been in the forefront of getting it set up and which funded and supported its activity on a daily basis. The International Criminal Tribunal gets material as well as political support from the United States government, other NATO governments, financial tycoon George Soros, and even private corporations. If the Clinton administration cannot count on "higher justice," it may get a helping hand from hired justice.

—Diana Johnstone

3. By the same token, quite a number of U.S. Presidents and other leaders of democratic countries could find themselves in the dock, most recently, President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair, who command the NATO-run forces that expelled police from Kosovo and then looked the other way while gunmen of NATO's ethnic Albanian "paramilitary" ally massacred 14 Serb farmers during hay harvest, among others.

"Interagency Balkan Task Force," housed at the CIA with input from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the State Department.⁴

4. William Branigin, "The Shadow of Intelligence... U.S. Gave Tribunal Classified Data," *Washington Post/International Herald Tribune*, May 29, 1999, p. 1.

5. The person probably most responsible for starting the war in the first place, Albright even beamed a broadcast in Serbo-Croatian to the Serbian people to declare her affection for them, singing a little Serbian lullaby her father had taught her when her family took refuge in Belgrade from the Stalinist takeover of her native Czechoslovakia half a century ago.

6. See Diana Johnstone, "Making the Crime Fit the Punishment," in Tariq Ali, ed., *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade* (London: Verso, 1999).

Corrections and Clarifications

Regarding the alert on **Leonard Peltier's** health in our last issue (Number 67, p. 35), we have been asked by the Leonard Peltier Defense Committee to make clear that his present condition, while extremely serious, is not currently life-threatening, although it could become so were his jaw to be infected or other medical complications to arise. The Committee, and Leonard Peltier, are concerned that information and publicity regarding his case be scrupulously accurate.

In addition, the shootout for which Peltier was charged took place at the Jumping Bull property on the Oglala reservation, not at Wounded Knee.

Finally, there was a typographical error in the Defense Committee's telephone number; it is: 785-842-5774.

In the articles on **Mumia Abu-Jamal**, we inadvertently failed to give two important addresses. With Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Ridge's October 13 signing of Mumia's death warrant, his legal-defense team urgently needs money to pursue his appeal. Please make tax-deductible contributions payable to National

Black United Fund-Mumia Abu-Jamal, earmarked either "Legal" or "Organizing," and send to: National Black United Fund-Mumia Abu-Jamal, 40 Clinton St., 5th Floor, Newark, NJ 07102.

To contact the MOVE organization in Philadelphia, write or call: MOVE, P.O. Box 19709, Philadelphia, PA 19143/215-476-8812.

The cover photo of Mumia Abu-Jamal on our previous issue is copyright © 1996 by Nolen Edmonston / Prison Radio. All rights reserved. Contact: Prison Radio, P.O. Box 411074, San Francisco, CA 94141. Tel: 415-648-4505; fax: 415-647-5949; e-mail: radioqc@sirius.com.

Finally, we received a note from a reader who works at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (who clearly knows his arithmetic). He pointed out that when Frank Morales described an increase in police killings from 62 in 1990 to 205 in 1998 (p. 46), this is a "total" increase of about 230 percent, not an "annual" increase of about 230 percent.



AP / Wide World Photos

Dozens were killed and wounded by laser-guided bombs at Belgrade maternity hospital. NATO first denied it hit any hospital, then admitted a bomb had "gone astray."

"Even in Kosovo, I couldn't escape the sound of Mr. Shea's voice...denying things I knew to be true, insisting on others that I had seen were false."

**Paul Watson,
*Los Angeles Times***

What had actually been going on in Kosovo during the bombing was reported by the few western journalists who were there on the spot. Steven Erlanger reported in the *New York Times* in early May that the province was far from empty, and that contrary to NATO reports, there were plenty of military-age ethnic Albanian men at liberty. He also reported from Prizren that panic would sometimes inexplicably seize a neighborhood, and everybody would start to leave, without being forcibly expelled. Contradicting the statement of a UNHCR spokesman in Albania interpreting the latest influx of refugees as "the final cleansing of Prizren," Erlanger reported that: "The city is hardly empty and many Albanians, however fearful, remain here but rarely go outside."¹

Paul Watson of the *Los Angeles Times*, who stayed in Kosovo all through the bombing, wrote later of NATO spokesman Jamie Shea: "Even in Kosovo, I couldn't escape the sound of Mr. Shea's voice on satellite TV. It haunted me at the strangest times, denying things I knew to be true, insisting on others that I had seen were false." This makes an important point: For all the justified complaints of media distortion, the usual source of the distortions is not the

journalist on the spot—who, if left alone to write freely, might well prefer to tell the true story—but the editors who dictate what the "story" must be, the big-name commentators who twist things to fit their agenda, and above all the official spokesmen, infamous like Shea or "unidentified," who manipulate mainstream journalists dependent on good relations with such "sources" to please their editors and keep their coveted jobs.

Watson described the helpless feeling of people being bombed. "Bombing can create rage, and when you cannot reach the people doing it from 15,000 feet, you must find other ways to deal with it. My way was to bury myself in my work.... But others, perhaps with hate already in their hearts, chose the revenge of setting fires, raping, or murdering. Once NATO added its air war to Kosovo's civil war, the Serbs retaliated against the closest, and most defenseless, target: the ethnic Albanians NATO had come to save."²

By late June, the editor of an independent NATO military journal acknowledged that: "Increasingly, however, evidence is accumulating that it was the NATO action that unleashed the major ejection of the refugees and most of the massacres."³

In reality, there was never anything so surprising or even unusual about the massive exodus of civilians from what had suddenly become a very dangerous war zone.⁴ Especially during a civil war, when danger is coming from all sides, families may decide the prudent course is to pack up and leave. The incentive was all the greater for ethnic Albanians in that they knew they could find shelter among fellow ethnic Albanians, some of them relatives, only a short distance away in Albania or in Macedonia (where local authorities and aid agencies kept them in camps instead of allowing them to swell the local Albanian population, as they no doubt would have preferred to do). The terrifying noise of missiles, the explosions nearby, add to the impulse.

During the bombing, NATO put the figure of Albanians killed at around 100,000. Afterwards, the NATO figure dropped to 10,000. Certainly, many died. But this was no "holocaust."

—Diana Johnstone

4. For comparison, after the German blitzkrieg through the Ardennes in southern Belgium on May 10, 1940, 1.2 million Belgians became refugees in a three week period. The population of Belgium was about 8.5 million at the time.

1. *International Herald Tribune*, May 8, 1999.

2. *Ibid.*, June 23, 1999.

3. Frederick Bonnard, editorial director of *NATO's Nations*, in a guest column in the *International Herald Tribune*, June 28, 1999.

NATO'S REIGN OF TERROR IN KOSOVO

BY MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY

In occupied Kosovo, the massacres directed against Serbs, ethnic Albanians, Roma and other ethnic groups have been conducted on the instructions of the military command of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Yet because NATO ostensibly denies KLA involvement, these so-called "unmotivated acts of violence and retaliation" are not categorized as "war crimes" and are therefore not included in the mandate of the numerous FBI and Interpol police investigators dispatched to Kosovo under the auspices of the Hague War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY). Moreover, whereas NATO has tacitly endorsed the self-proclaimed KLA provisional government, KFOR—the international security force in Kosovo—has provided protection to the KLA military commanders responsible for the atrocities. In so doing, both NATO and the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) have acquiesced to the massacres of civilians.

In turn, public opinion has been blatantly misled. In portraying the massacres, the western media have casually overlooked the role of the KLA, not to mention its pervasive links to organized crime. In the words of National Security Adviser Samuel Berger, "these people [ethnic Albanians] come back ... with broken hearts and with some of those hearts filled with anger."¹ While the massacres are seldom presented as the result of "deliberate decisions" by the KLA military command, the evidence (and history of the KLA) amply confirm that these atrocities are part of a policy of "ethnic cleansing" directed mainly against the Serb population, but also against the Roma, Montenegrins, Goranis, and Turks.

ASSASSINATIONS: NATO COMPLICITY

Under NATO's reGENCY, the KLA has also ordered assassinations of political opponents, including "loyalist" ethnic Albanians and sup-

porters of the Kosovo Democratic League (KDL), headed by Ibrahim Rugova. The KLA has also abducted and killed numerous professionals and intellectuals. These acts—ordered by the self-proclaimed Provisional Government of Kosovo (PGK)—are being carried out in a totally permissive environment. The leaders of the KLA, rather than being arrested for war crimes, have been granted KFOR protection.

In May, Fehmi Agani, one of Rugova's closest collaborators in the KDL, was killed. The Serbs were blamed by NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea for having assassinated Agani. But according to the Skopje, Macedonia, paper *Makedonija Danas*, Agani had been executed on the orders of the KLA's self-appointed Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci.² "If Thaci actually considered Rugova a threat, he would not hesitate to have Rugova removed from the Kosovo political landscape."³

Both NATO and the U.N. prefer to turn a blind eye. U.N. Interim Administrator Bernard Kouchner (a former French Minister of Health) and KFOR Commander Sir Mike Jackson have established a routine working relationship with Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and KLA Chief of Staff Brigadier General Agim Ceku.

As western leaders trumpet their support for democracy, state terrorism in Kosovo has become an integral part of NATO's post-war design. The KLA's political role for the post-conflict period had been carefully mapped out well in advance. Prior to the Rambouillet Conference last February, the KLA had been promised a central role in the formation of a post-conflict government. The "hidden agenda" consisted of converting the KLA paramilitary into a legitimate and accomplished civilian administration. "We want to develop a good relationship with them [the KLA] as they transform themselves into a politically oriented organization, ...[W]e can provide [help] to them if they become precisely the kind of political actor we would like to see them become."⁴

In other words, Washington had already slated the KLA "provisional government" (PGK) to run civilian state institutions. Under NATO's "Indirect Rule," the KLA has taken over including municipal governments and public services including schools and hospitals. Rame Buja, the KLA "Minister for Local Administration," has appointed local prefects in 23 out of 25 municipalities.⁵

The self-proclaimed KLA administration has largely been upheld by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) entrusted by UNMIK with the post-war task of "democracy-building" and "good governance." In turn, OSCE officials have already established a working rapport with their KLA counterparts.⁶ The PGK is made up of the KLA's political wing together with the Democratic Union Movement (LBD), a coalition of five opposition parties opposed to Rugova's Democratic League (LDK). In addition to the position of prime minister, the KLA controls the ministries of finance, public order, and defense. The KLA has a controlling voice on the U.N.-sponsored Kosovo Transitional Council set up by Bernard Kouchner. The PGK has also established links with a number of western governments.

PARAMILITARY GOVERNMENT

Under NATO occupation, the rule of law has visibly been turned upside down. Criminals and terrorists are to become law-enforcement officers. KLA troops—which have already taken over police stations—will eventually form a 4,000-strong "civilian" police force (to be trained by foreign police officers under the authority of the U.N.) with a mandate to "protect civilians." Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien has already pledged Canadian support to the formation of a civilian police force.⁷ This force—which has been entrusted to the OSCE—will eventually operate under the jurisdiction of the KLA-controlled Ministry of Public Order.

Despite NATO's commitment to disarming the KLA, the Kosovar paramilitary organization is slated to be transformed into a modern military force. So-called "security assistance" has already been granted to the KLA by the U.S. Congress under the Kosovar Independence and Justice Act of 1999. Start-up funds of \$20 million will largely be "used for training and support for their [KLA] established self-defense forces" modeled on the U.S. National Guard.⁸

While the KLA maintains its links to the Balkan narcotics trade that financed many of its terrorist activities, the paramilitary organization has now been granted an official seal of approval as well as "legitimate" sources of funding. The pattern is similar to that followed in Croatia and in the Bosnian Muslim-Croatian Federation where so-called "equip and train" programs

Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and author of *The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms* (Penang/London: Third World Network/Zed Books, 1997) reviewed on p. 63. A version of this text was presented to the Independent Commission of Inquiry to Investigate U.S./NATO War Crimes Against The People of Yugoslavia, International Action Center, New York, July 31, 1999. Copyright © September 1999 by Michel Chossudovsky. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to post this text on "community internet sites" provided the essay remains intact and the copyright notice is displayed. For community postings, kindly send a short message to chossudovsky@videotron.ca. To publish this text on commercial internet sites, in printed and/or other forms (including excerpts), contact the author at chossudovsky@sprint.ca, or fax: 514-425-6224.

1. PBS, Jim Lehrer Newsmaker Interview, July 26, 1999.

2. Tanjug Press Dispatch, May 14, 1999.

3. "Rugova Faced with a Choice of Two Losses," *Stratfor*, July 29, 1999.

4. *New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1999.

5. *Financial Times* (London), Aug. 4, 1999.

6. See OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Decision 305, Permanent Council, 237th Plenary Meeting, PC Journal No. 237, Agenda item 2, Vienna, July 1, 1999.

7. Statement at Sarajevo Summit, July 31, 1999.

8. House Resolution 1425, Apr. 15, 1999.



Kosovo "Peacekeepers." Four War Criminals and Nobel Peace Prize Recipient Clasp Hands Over the Future of Kosovo.

Left to right: **Hashim Thaci**, "the Snake," self-proclaimed Prime Minister of Kosovo, linked to Albanian Mafia and Balkan drug trade, responsible for ordering the assassination of political opponents, chief negotiator at Rambouillet, protégé of Madeleine Albright; **Bernard Kouchner**, head of U.N. Kosovo Mission, co-founder of Doctors Without Borders, recipient of 1999 Nobel Peace Prize, mingling with known war criminals; **Lt. Gen. Michael Jackson**, former KFOR commander in Kosovo, second in command during 1972 "Bloody Sunday" massacre in Northern Ireland, stalled the resettlement of Krajina Serbs to promote Croatian ethnic cleansing; **Brig. Gen. Agim Ceku**, commander of KLA, key planner of "Operation Storm," leading to massacres of Krajina Serbs, for which he is under investigation by war crimes tribunal and likely to be indicted, responsible for ethnic cleansing and massacres in Kosovo, promoted to head of Kosovo Protection Force (KPF), financed by U.S. military aid; **Gen. Wesley Clark**, former NATO supreme commander responsible for bombing of Yugoslavia, commander of the cavalry division that assisted the FBI and the ATF in the 1993 Waco, Texas, Branch Davidian killings.

were put together by the Pentagon. In turn, Washington's military aid package to the KLA has been entrusted to Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), of Alexandria, Virginia, a private mercenary outfit run by high-ranking former U.S. military officers.⁹

MPRI's training concepts—which had already been tested in Croatia and Bosnia—are based on imparting "offensive tactics ... as the best form of defense." In the Kosovar context, this so-called "defensive doctrine" transforms the KLA paramilitary into a modern army without, however, eliminating its terrorist make-up.¹⁰ The ultimate objective is to transform an insurgent army into a modern military and police force which serves the Alliance's future strategic objectives in the Balkans. MPRI has currently "ninety-one highly experienced, former military professionals working in Bosnia &

Herzegovina."¹¹ The number of military officers working on contract with the KLA has not been disclosed.

CROATIAN GENERAL HEADS KLA

The massacres of civilians in Kosovo are not disconnected acts of revenge by civilians or by so-called "rogue elements" within the KLA, as claimed by NATO and the United Nations. They are part of a consistent and coherent pattern. The intent (and result) of the KLA-sponsored atrocities has been to trigger the ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma, and other minorities in Kosovo.

KLA Commander Agim Ceku, referring to the killings of 14 villagers at Gracko on July 24, claimed that: "We [the KLA] do not know who did it, but I sincerely believe these people have nothing to do with the

KLA."¹² In turn, KFOR Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson has commended his KLA counterpart, Commander Ceku, for "efforts undertaken" to disarm the KLA. In fact, very few KLA weapons have been handed in. Moreover, the deadline for turning in KLA weaponry has been extended. "I do not regard this as noncompliance" said Jackson in a press conference, "but rather as an indication of the seriousness with which General Ceku is taking this important issue."¹³

Yet what Jackson failed to mention was that Commander Ceku (though never indicted as a war criminal) was, according to *Jane's Defence Weekly* (June 10, 1999), "one of the key planners of the successful 'Operation Storm,'" led by the Croatian Armed Forces against Krajina Serbs in 1995. General Jackson—who had served in Croatia and Bosnia under the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)—was fully cognizant of the activities of the Croatian High Command during that period, including the responsibilities imparted to General Ceku. In February 1999, barely a month prior to the NATO bombings, Ceku left his position as Brigadier General with the Croatian Armed Forces to join the KLA as Commander-in-Chief.

An internal report of the Hague War Crimes Tribunal (leaked to the *New York Times*) confirmed that the Croatian Army had been responsible for carrying out "summary executions, indiscriminate shelling of civilian populations, and 'ethnic cleansing' in the Krajina region of Croatia.... Operation Storm resulted in the massacre of several hundred civilians in the course of a three day operation (August 4 to 7, 1995)."¹⁴ The massacres set the stage for the ethnic cleansing of more than 200,000 Krajina Serbs.

In a section of the controversial leaked ICTY document, *The Indictment: Operation Storm, A Prima Facie Case*, the Tribunal inquiry confirms that:

During the course of the military offensive, the Croatian armed forces and special police committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law, including but not limited to, shelling of Knin and other cities.... During, and in the 100 days following the military offensive, at least 150 Serb civilians were summarily executed, and many hundreds disappeared.... In a widespread and systematic manner, Croatian troops committed murder and other inhumane acts upon and against Croatian Serbs.¹⁵

12. Associated Press (AP).

13. *Ibid.*

14. Quoted in Raymond Bonner, "War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops Cleansed the Serbs," *New York Times*, Mar. 21, 1999. The actual number of civilians killed or missing was much larger.

15. *Ibid.*

9. Phillip Sherwell, "SAS teams move in to help KLA 'rise from the ashes,'" *Sunday Telegraph* (London), Apr. 18, 1999.

10. See Tammy Arbucki, "Building a Bosnian

Army," *Jane's International Defence Review*, Aug. 1997.

11. Military Professional Resources, Inc., "Personnel Needs," <http://www.mpri.com/current/personnel.htm>.

MPRI: WASHINGTON'S NEW PRIVATE ARMY

"Growth potential in national security issues—both in the U.S. and abroad—is virtually limitless ... the only game in town for quality military outsourcing services on all levels. The time for contractors on the battlefield is here. MPRI is leading the charge."¹

Founded in late 1987, Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), "provides military training, education, professional, analytic, and business management services to the U.S. government as well as carefully selected U.S. government-sanctioned international and commercial customers."

The company offers expertise in military education, training, force design and management, concepts, doctrine, simulation training, humanitarian assistance, and rapid military contractual support. It boasts that "the company can assist the United States in shaping a peaceful and prosperous world, while expanding the market for its services in a highly profitable manner."²

In its first full year, 1988, MPRI had revenues of only \$300,000; it now has what it calls a "corporate bottom line" of \$52 million, with \$7 million in working capital. Its stock is now worth \$64 a share, up \$10 from last year. In July 1999, it made a special \$1 million profit distribution to shareholders. MPRI has 425 full-time employees and a database roster of more than 8,000 military and civilian experts on call.

SHOPPING THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE

MPRI is currently working in at least seven countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Taiwan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria. Its role in the Military Stabilization Program in Bosnia, with some 200 personnel in country, accounted for 54 percent of its 1998 revenues.³ Its training programs in Croatia, including armed forces readiness, democracy transition, and long range management, brought in another 11 percent.

1. See the MPRI web site, www.mpri.com. The company's aggressive, profit-oriented, self-promotion has been largely conceived by the vice-president of its strategic division, Dr. Christopher Shoemaker. His Army experience included service at the National Security Council (1979-81), as senior speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff (1989-91), and as Commander of the 8th Infantry Division in Germany (1991-93).

2. *Ibid.*

3. In Bosnia, MPRI conducts seminars on defense and military leadership in a democracy, security readiness, and military intelligence and security.

It runs training exercises for U.S. troops in Kuwait, for Taiwan's army, and for the Royal Saudi Armed Forces. It also is working on a new program to "redesign" the Nigerian Ministry of Defense and the roles and missions of the armed forces.

MPRI has planned operations scheduled for Ukraine, South Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Madagascar, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Ghana, and Norway. The \$2 million program in Angola, for which they are actively recruiting, is to commence in February 2000, if approved by the State Department. The program will provide mil-



Agim Ceku, alumnus of MPRI tutelage in Operation Storm, now KLA chief of staff.

itary training and armed forces consolidation. Its relationship to the ongoing civil war and to former UNITA forces is unclear. MPRI has proposed a joint project with Lockheed-Martin for combat training in Norway.⁴

TILLING NEW GROUND

In addition to this long and growing list of active, imminent, or potential MPRI programs, a new priority, for both the company and Washington, involves Africa. MPRI has a \$400,000 contract with the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, an interagency program set up at the urging of the State Department. The initiative has current or planned rapid deployment training programs in six African countries.

4. MPRI also has potential projects in various stages involving operations in Albania, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Egypt, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Georgia, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Namibia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Argentina.

Another key to the Africa program is the Pentagon-sponsored Africa Center for Strategic Studies, which seeks to promote inter-African and U.S.-Africa dialogue on issues such as national military policies, civilian-military relationships, and defense resource management. With Pentagon support, MPRI plans to establish a training facility in Africa and expects to provide instructional and training personnel. It is likely this facility will be in either Nigeria or Ghana.

The growth potential is not just "virtually limitless" outside U.S. borders, but at home as well. In 1998, 31 percent of MPRI's profits were generated at home. With 13 retired generals and one retired admiral on its board, the company has working relations with a substantial and growing number of Pentagon elements.⁵ MPRI's Harry Soyster boasts: "They've entrusted their future leaders to us."⁶

In addition, MPRI has similar contracts with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Department of State, the Commerce Department, and the Defense Department.

Some of these contracts include: co-operation with the Special Operations Command in the area of psychological operations, including "peacekeeping" and "humanitarian" deployments; training overseas defense attaches for the Defense Intelligence Agency; designing world-wide management and staffing for the Army Materiel Command; rewriting Army field manuals; promoting the sales of U.S. weapons; and designing drug interdiction programs for the border with Mexico.

Given its rapid expansion and its already deep and far-reaching presence, MPRI is a major new force to be reckoned with. It has influence in the most sensitive reaches of the U.S. government, and in many foreign governments as well.

—Louis Wolf

5. These include the U.S. Special Operations Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Army War College, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Force Management School, the U.S. Atlantic Command, the Army Materiel Command, the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

6. Interview, Sept. 20, 1999. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Harry Soyster was in the U.S. Army from 1957 to 1991. Now MPRI vice-president for international operations, he headed the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, and was director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1988 to 1991.

U.S. GENERALS FOR HIRE

The internal 150-page document concluded that the ICTY has "sufficient material to establish that the three [Croatian] generals who commanded the military operation" could be held accountable under international law.¹⁶ The individuals named had been directly involved in the military operation "in theater." Those involved in "the planning of Operation Storm" were not mentioned:

The identity of the "American general" referred to by Fenrick [a Tribunal staff member] is not known. The tribunal would not allow Williamson or Fenrick to be interviewed. But Ms. Arbour, the tribunal's chief prosecutor, suggested in a telephone interview last week that Fenrick's comment had been 'a joking observation.' Ms. Arbour had not been present during the meeting, and that is not how it was viewed by some who were there. Several people who were at the meeting assumed that Fenrick was referring to one of the retired U.S. generals who worked for Military Professional Resources Inc.... Questions remain about the full extent of U.S. involvement. In the course of the three-year investigation into the assault, the United States has failed to provide critical evidence requested by the tribunal, according to tribunal documents and officials, adding to suspicion among some there that Washington is uneasy about the investigation.... The Pentagon, however, has argued through U.S. lawyers at the tribunal that the shelling was a legitimate military activity, according to tribunal documents and officials.¹⁷

The Tribunal was attempting to hide what had already been disclosed in several press reports published in the wake of Operation Storm. According to a U.S. State Department spokesman, MPRI had been helping the Croats "avoid excesses or atrocities in military operations."¹⁸ Fifteen senior U.S. military advisers headed by retired two-star General Richard Griffiths had been dispatched to Croatia barely seven months before Operation Storm.¹⁹ According to one report, MPRI executive director General Carl E. Vuono "held a secret top-level meeting at Brioni Island, off the coast

of Croatia, with Gen. Varimar Cervenko, the architect of the Krajina campaign. In the five days preceding the attack, at least ten meetings were held between General Vuono and officers involved in the campaign...."²⁰

According to Ed Soyster, a senior MPRI executive and former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (interviewed by *Time* in early 1996):

MPRI's role in Croatia is limited to classroom instruction on military-civil relations and doesn't involve training in tactics or weapons. Other U.S. military men say whatever MPRI did for the Croats—and many suspect more than classroom instruction was involved—it was worth every penny. "Carl Vuono and Butch [Crosbie] Saint are hired guns and in it for the money," says Charles Boyd, a recently retired four-star Air Force general who was the Pentagon's No. 2 man in Europe until July [1995]. "They did a very good job for the Croats, and I have no doubt they'll do a good job in Bosnia."²¹

THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL'S COVER-UP

The untimely leaking of the ICTY's internal report on the Krajina massacres barely a few days before the onslaught of NATO's air raids on Yugoslavia was the source of some embarrassment to the Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor, Louise Arbour. The Tribunal attempted to cover up the matter and trivialize the report's findings (including the alleged role of the U.S. military officers on contract with the Croatian Armed Forces). Several Tribunal officials including American lawyer Clint Williamson sought to discredit the testimony of Canadian peacekeeping officers' who witnessed the Krajina massacres in 1995.

Williamson, who described the shelling of Knin as a "minor incident," said that the Pentagon had told him that Knin was a legitimate military target.... The [Tribunal's] review concluded by voting not to include the shelling of Knin in any indictment, a conclusion that stunned and angered many at the tribunal.²²

The findings of the Tribunal contained in the leaked ICTY documents were downplayed, their relevance was casually dismissed as "expressions of opinion, arguments, and hypotheses from various staff members of the OTP during the investigative process." According to the Tribunal's spokesperson "the documents do not represent in any way the concluded decisions of the Prosecutor."²³

The report has not been released. The staff member who had leaked the documents is (according to a Croatian TV report) no longer working for the Tribunal. During the press conference, the Tribunal's spokesman was asked "about the consequences for the person who leaked the information. Blewitt [the ICTY spokesman] replied that he did not want to go into that. He said that the OTP would strengthen the existing procedures to prevent this from happening again; however he added that you could not stop people from talking."²⁴

Prior to the onslaught, Croatian radio had broadcast a message by president Franjo Tudjman calling upon "Croatian citizens of Serbian ethnicity ... to remain in their homes and not to fear the Croatian authorities, which will respect their minority rights."²⁵ While U.S. military officers were on hand advising the Croatian High Command, Canadian peacekeepers of the Royal 22nd Regiment witnessed in theatre the atrocities committed by Croatian troops in the Krajina offensive of September 1995: "Any Serbs who had failed to evacuate their property were systematically 'cleansed' by roving death squads. Every abandoned animal was slaughtered and any Serb household was ransacked and torched."²⁶

THE 1993 MEDAK MASSACRE

According to *Jane's Defence Weekly* (June 10, 1999), Brigadier General Agim Ceku (now in charge of the KLA) had also "masterminded the successful HV [Croatian Army] offensive at Medak" in September 1993. In Medak, the combat operation was entitled "Scorched Earth," resulting in the total destruction of the Serbian villages of Divoselo, Pocitelj, and Citluk, and the massacre of over 100 civilians.²⁷

These massacres were also witnessed by Canadian peacekeepers under U.N. mandate:

As the sun rose over the horizon, it revealed a Medak Valley engulfed in smoke and flames. As the frustrated soldiers of 2PPCLI waited for the order to move forward into the pocket, shots and screams still rang out as the ethnic cleansing continued.... About 20 members of the international press had tagged along, anxious to see the Medak battleground. Calvin [a Canadian officer] called an informal press conference at the head of the column and loud-

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Slobodna Dalmacija*, Split, Croatia, Aug. 5, 1996.

26. Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *The Sunday Sun* (Toronto), Nov. 2, 1998.

27. See Memorandum on the Violation of the Human and Civil Rights of the Serbian People in the Republic of Croatia, <http://serbianlinks.freehosting.net/memorandum.htm>.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Bonner, *op. cit.*, n. 14.

18. Ken Silverstein, "Privatizing War," *The Nation*, July 27, 1997.

19. See Mark Thompson, *et al.*, "Generals for Hire," *Time*, Jan. 15, 1996, p. 34.

20. Quoted in Silverstein, *op. cit.*, n. 18.

21. *Op. cit.*, n. 19.

22. Bonner, *op. cit.*, n. 14.

23. ICTY Weekly Press Briefing, Mar. 24, 1999.



Mark H. Milstein

Ethnic Albanian graffiti pay tribute to heroes in Washington.

ly accused the Croats of trying to hide war crimes against the Serb inhabitants. The Croats started withdrawing back to their old lines, taking with them whatever loot they hadn't destroyed.... French reconnaissance troops and the Canadian command element pushed up the valley and soon began to find bodies of Serb civilians, some already decomposing, others freshly slaughtered.... Finally, on the drizzly morning of Sept. 17, teams of U.N. civilian police arrived to probe the smoldering ruins for murder victims. Rotting corpses lying out in the open were catalogued, then turned over to the peacekeepers for burial.²⁸

The massacres were reported to the Canadian Minister of Defense and to the United Nations:

Senior defense bureaucrats back in Ottawa had no way of predicting the outcome of the engagement in terms of political fallout. To them, there was no point in calling media attention to a situation that might easily backfire.... So Medak was relegated to the memory hole—no publicity, no re-creations, no official record. Except for those soldiers involved, Canada's most lively military action since the Korean War simply never happened.²⁹

NATO's "POST-CONFLICT AGENDA"

Both the Medak Pocket massacre and Operation Storm bear a direct relationship to the ongoing situation in Kosovo and the massacres and ethnic cleansing committed by KLA troops. While the circumstances are markedly different, several of today's key actors in Kosovo were involved (under the auspices of the Croatian Armed Forces) in

the planning of both these operations. Moreover, the U.S. mercenary outfit MPRI, which collaborated with the Croatian Armed Forces in 1995, is currently on contract with the KLA. NATO's casual response to the appointment of Brigadier General Agim Ceku as KLA Chief of Staff was communicated by Mr. Jamie Shea in a press briefing in May: "I have always made it clear, and you have heard me say this, that NATO has no direct contacts with the KLA. Who they appoint as their leaders, that is entirely their own affair. I don't have any comment on that whatever."³⁰

While NATO says it "has no direct contacts with the KLA," the evidence confirms the opposite. Amply documented, KLA terrorism has been installed with NATO's tacit approval. The KLA had (according to several reports) been receiving "covert support" and training from the CIA and Germany's *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) since the mid-nineties. Moreover, MPRI collaboration with the KLA predates the onslaught of the bombing campaign.³¹

The building up of KLA forces was part of NATO planning. By mid-1998, "covert support" had been replaced by official ("overt") support by the military alliance, in violation of several U.N. Security Council resolutions. NATO officials, western heads of State and heads of government, and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, not to mention ICTY chief prosecutor Louise Arbour, were fully cognizant of General Ceku's involvement in the planning of Operation Storm and Operation Scorched Earth. Canadian Major General Lewis McKenzie, who served under the U.N., confirmed that "the same officer who masterminded the 1993 Medak offensive in Croatia that saw Canadian soldiers using

deadly force to stop horrendous atrocities against Serb civilians [had also] ordered the overrunning of lightly armed U.N. outposts, in blatant contravention of international law. His influence within the KLA does not augur well for its trustworthiness during Kosovo's political evolution."³² Surely, some questions should have been asked.

Yet what is shaping up visibly in the wake of the bombings in Kosovo is the continuity of NATO's operation in the Balkans. Alongside the transfer of General Ceku to Kosovo, NATO military personnel and U.N. bureaucrats previously stationed in Croatia and Bosnia have also been routinely reassigned to Kosovo.

KFOR Commander Mike Jackson had been routinely assigned to Kosovo following his stint in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. His experience in "ethnic warfare," however, predates the Balkans. From his earlier posting in Northern Ireland as a young Captain, Jackson was second in command in the "Bloody Sunday" massacre of civilians in Derry in 1972. Under the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Derek Wilford, Captain Jackson and 13 other soldiers of his parachute regiment opened fire "on a peaceful protest by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association opposing discrimination against Catholics. In just 30 minutes, 13 people were shot dead and a further 13 injured. Those who died were killed by a single bullet to the head or body, indicating that they had been deliberately targeted. No weapons were found on any of the deceased."³³

Jackson's ignominious role in Bloody Sunday did not hinder his military career. From Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s, he was reassigned to the theater of ethnic warfare in the Balkans. In the imme-

28. Excerpts from a book by Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan published in the *Toronto Sun*, Nov. 1, 1998.
29. *Ibid.*

30. NATO Press Briefing, May 14, 1999.

31. For further details, see Michel Chossudovsky, "Kosovo 'Freedom Fighters' Financed by Organized Crime," *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 67 (Spring-Summer 1999), pp. 20-25.

32. Lewis McKenzie, "Soldier's View: Nato Should Disarm the KLA 'Before It's Too Late,'" *Vancouver Sun*, June 12, 1999.

33. Julie Hyland, "Head of NATO force in Kosovo was second-in-command at 'Bloody Sunday' massacre in Ireland," *World Socialist Web Site*, June 19, 1999.

diate wake of Operation Storm and the ethnic massacres in Krajina, Jackson was put in charge as IFOR Commander for organizing the return of Serbs "to lands taken by Croatian HVO forces in the 1995 Krajina offensive."³⁴ And in this capacity General Jackson had "urged that the resettlement [of Krajina Serbs] not [be] rushed to avoid tension [with the Croats]," while also warning returning Serbs "of the extent of the [land] mine threat."³⁵ In retrospect, recalling the events of early 1996, very few Krajina Serbs were allowed to return to their homes under the protection of the United Nations. According to Veritas, a Belgrade-based organization of Serbian refugees from Croatia, some ten to fifteen thousand Serbs were able to resettle in Croatia.

And a similar process is unfolding in Kosovo. The conduct of senior military officers (including Jackson and Ceku) conforms to a consistent pattern; the same key individuals and the same U.S. mercenary outfit are now involved in Kosovo. While token efforts are displayed to protect Serb and Roma civilians, those who have fled Kosovo are not encouraged to return under U.N. protection. In post-war Kosovo, ethnic cleansing implemented by the KLA has largely been accepted by the international community as a *fait accompli*.

Moreover, while calling for democracy and "good governance" in the Balkans, the U.S. and its allies have installed in Kosovo a paramilitary government with links to organized crime. The foreseeable outcome is the outright criminalization of civilian state institutions and the establishment of what is best described as a Mafia State. The complicity of NATO and the alliance governments (namely their relentless support to the KLA) points to the de facto criminalization of KFOR and of the U.N. peacekeeping apparatus in Kosovo. The donor agencies and governments providing financial support to the KLA (including funds approved by the U.S. Congress in violation of several U.N. Security Council resolutions) are, in this regard, also accessories to the de facto criminalization of state institutions. Through the intermediation of a paramilitary group (created and financed by Washington and Bonn), NATO ultimately bears the burden of responsibility for the massacres and ethnic cleansing of civilians in Kosovo.

TERROR AND THE MARKET

State terror and the free market seem to go hand in hand. The concurrent criminaliza-

tion of state institutions in Kosovo is not incompatible with the West's economic and strategic objectives in the Balkans. Notwithstanding the massacres of civilians, the self-proclaimed KLA administration has committed itself to establishing a "secure and stable environment" for foreign investors and international financial institutions. The Minister of Finance Adem Grobozci and other representatives of the provisional government invited to various donor conferences are all KLA appointees. In contrast, members of the KDL of Ibrahim Rugova (duly elected in parliamentary elections) were not even invited to attend the Stabilization Summit in Sarajevo in late July.

"Free market reforms" are envisaged for Kosovo under the supervision of the Bretton Woods institutions largely replicating the structures of the Rambouillet Agreement. Article I (Chapter 4a) of the Rambouillet Agreement stipulated that: "The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market principles." The KLA government will largely be responsible for implementing these reforms and ensuring that loan conditionalities are met.

In close liaison with NATO, the Bretton Woods institutions had already analyzed the consequences of an eventual military intervention leading to the military occupation of Kosovo: Almost a year prior to the beginning of the war, the World Bank conducted "simulations" which "anticipated the possibility of an emergency scenario arising out of the tensions in Kosovo."³⁶

The eventual "reconstruction" of Kosovo financed by international debt largely purports to transfer Kosovo's extensive wealth in mineral resources and coal to multinational capital. In this regard, the KLA has already occupied (pending their privatization) the largest coal mine at Belacevac in Dobro Selo, northwest of Pristina. In turn, foreign capital has its eyes riveted on the massive Trepca mining complex which constitutes "the most valuable piece of real estate in the Balkans, worth at least \$5 billion."³⁷ The Trepca complex not only includes copper and large reserves of zinc, but also cadmium, gold, and silver. It has several smelting plants, 17 metal treatment sites, a power plant and Yugoslavia's largest battery plant. Northern Kosovo also has estimated reserves of 17 billion tons of coal and lignite.

In the wake of the bombings, the management of many of the state-owned enterprises and public utilities were taken over by KLA appointees. In turn, the leaders of

the Provisional Government of Kosovo (PGK) have become the brokers of multinational capital, committed to handing over the Kosovar economy at bargain prices to foreign investors. The IMF's lethal economic therapy will be imposed, the provincial economy will be dismantled, agriculture will be deregulated, local industrial enterprises which have not been totally destroyed will be driven into bankruptcy.

The most profitable state assets will eventually be transferred into the hands of foreign capital under the World Bank-sponsored privatization program. "Strong economic medicine" imposed by external creditors will contribute to further boosting a criminal economy (already firmly implanted in Albania) which feeds on poverty and economic dislocation.

Moreover, the so-called reconstruction of the Balkans by foreign capital will signify multi-billion dollar contracts to foreign firms to rebuild Kosovo's infrastructure. More generally, the proposed Marshall Plan for the Balkans financed by the World Bank and the European Development Bank (EBRD) as well as private creditors will largely benefit western mining, petroleum and construction companies while fueling the region's external debt well into the third millennium.

And Kosovo is slated to reimburse this debt through the laundering of dirty money. Yugoslav banks in Kosovo will be closed down, the banking system will be deregulated under the supervision of western financial institutions. Narco-dollars from the multi-billion dollar Balkans drug trade will be recycled toward servicing the external debt as well as financing the costs of reconstruction. The lucrative flow of narco-dollars thus ensures that foreign investors involved in the reconstruction program will be able to reap substantial returns. In turn, the existence of a Kosovar *narco-State* ensures the orderly reimbursement of international donors and creditors. The latter are prepared to turn a blind eye. They have a tacit vested interest in installing a government which facilitates the laundering of drug money.

The pattern in Kosovo is, in this regard, similar to that observed in neighboring Albania. Since the early 1990s (culminating with the collapse of the financial pyramids in 1996-97), the IMF's reforms have impoverished the Albanian population while spearheading the national economy into bankruptcy. The IMF's deadly economic therapy transforms countries into open territories. In Albania, and to a lesser extent Macedonia, it has also contributed to fostering the growth of illicit trade and the criminalization of state institutions. ■

34. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 25, No. 7, Feb. 14, 1996.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *World Bank Development News*, Washington, D.C., Apr. 27, 1999.

37. Chris Hedges, "Below It All in Kosovo, A War's Glittering Prize," *New York Times*, July 8, 1998.

OPERATION STORM: NATO AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS

What was never revealed to public opinion was that Canadians, Americans, and Germans were fighting on opposite sides.

While senior U.S. officers advised the Croatian High Command through a private mercenary outfit based in Arlington, Virginia, German mercenaries were in theater alongside Croatian military and paramilitary units during the onslaught of Operation Storm and the 1995 massacres of Krajina Serbs. The Royal Canadian regiment was "on the other side of the fence" with the mandate of protecting civilians and "keeping the peace."

In response to the advancing Croatian troops, the Canadian peacekeepers had radioed back to their commanding officer, Major Rochette, informing him "that these 'Croats' were, in fact, well-armed German mercenaries.... Additional 'Croats' [German mercenaries] had quietly surrounded the citadels and then forced their way inside..." (Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *The Sunday Sun*, Toronto, Nov. 2, 1998). In later developments, the U.N. observation posts in the Canadian sector were overrun by Croatian troops (integrated by their German counterparts), and two-thirds of the Canadian command were taken into captivity. (*Ibid.*)

According to the Canadians, the Croatian paramilitary were immediately behind the front-line Croatian combat troops and German mercenaries: "A large number of hard-line extremists had pushed into Krajina.... Many of these atrocities were carried out within the Canadian Sector, but as the peacekeepers were soon informed by the Croat authorities, the U.N. no longer had any formal authority in the region." (*Ibid.*)

How the German mercenaries—who participated in the massacres—had been recruited was never officially revealed. An investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) published a year before Operation Storm confirmed that foreign mercenaries in Croatia had in some cases "been paid [and presumably recruited] outside Croatia and by third parties" (United Nations Human Rights Commission, Fifty-first session, Item 9 of the provisional agenda, Geneva, Dec. 21, 1994).

—Michel Chossudovsky

Canadian Mounties' Investigation:

Chemical Weapons Used Against Civilians in Croatia?

A recent enquiry by the Canadian Minister of Defense (launched in July 1999) points to the possibility of toxic poisoning of Canadian peacekeepers while on service in Croatia between 1993 and 1995. Canadian peacekeepers had allegedly been exposed to PCBs and bauxite "and may be suffering illness from toxins in dirt used to fill sandbags" ("Ailment baffles officer," *Toronto Star*, July 30, 1999). The official release of the Department of National Defense (DND) refers to the possibility of toxic "soil contamination" in Medak Pocket in 1993 coinciding chronologically with the massacre of Croatian Serbs under Operation Scorched Earth.

Was it "soil contamination" or something far more serious? The subsequent criminal investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) refers to the shredding of medical files of former Canadian peacekeepers by the Canadian Department of Defense: "The military letter attesting to chemical exposure ... had been removed from ... former peacekeepers' medical files" (*National Post*, Aug. 19, 1999).

There was a smell of blood in the air during the past week [late July 1999] as the media sensed they had a major scandal unfolding within the Department of National Defense over the medical files of those Canadians who served in Croatia in 1993. Allegations of destroyed documents, a coverup, and a defensive minister and senior officers.... (Lewis MacKenzie, "Giving our soldiers the benefit of the doubt," *National Post*, Aug. 2, 1999).

The Mounties' investigation has revealed that a much larger number of Canadian soldiers has been affected by unexplained symptoms. Did the DND have something to hide? The issue remains as to what types of shells and ammunition were used by the Croatian Armed Forces in the Canadian sector.

The use of prohibited toxic shells, grenades, and ammunition in the former Yugoslavia has been documented in several press reports. (See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11:13 GMT, June 20, 1994; see also "Bosnians Said To Be Using Chemical Grenades In War," Reuters, Oct. 21, 1993). Were chemical weapons used against Serb civilians and Canadian peacekeepers in Krajina and the Medak Pocket?

—Michel Chossudovsky

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THE BALKAN ROUTE AND THE CONTRAS OF KOSOVO

BY HEATHER COTTIN

It was perfectly clear to the West that the Kosovo Liberation Army, which was neither for liberation, nor an army, was financed by the drug trade. "It's not as though they're the military wing of a democratic resistance movement," said Senator Mitch McConnell (Rep.-Ky.) in 1998.¹ The Kosovo Albanians are tied to Albanians whom the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) identified, as early as 1985, as key to the "Balkan Connection," supplying from 25 to 40 per-

cent of the heroin in the U.S.² It was already clear then that the Albanian drug traffickers were "fighting to achieve annexation to Albania, ...funding the anti-Serb movement [and] fa-

voring independence for Kosovo."³ By November 1994, the London *Guardian* called the Kosovo Albanian drug cartel "the Medellin of the Balkans."⁴ When, in 1997, Albania "erupted into nationwide riots over failed pyramid schemes ... citizens stormed police stations and looted over one million guns," many of which fell into the hands of Albania's criminal gangs.⁵ The activities of crime clans were protected by Albanian President Sali Berisha and promoted by Kosovo Albanian crime

over the Calabrians in strength and influence."⁷ The DEA noted that 75 percent of Western European heroin comes from Turkey. The *Ankara Daily News*, investigating DEA reports, found that four to six metric tons of heroin left Turkey every month for distribution in Western Europe.⁸ "Turkish [drug] trafficking groups are using Albanians, Yugoslavs, and elements of criminal groups from Kosovo, to sell and distribute their heroin," the DEA in Rome reported, noting, "These Kosovars are financing their war through drug trafficking activities."⁹

The German Federal Criminal Agency called ethnic Albanians, "the most powerful group in the distribution of heroin in western countries."¹⁰ Eighty to ninety percent of the heroin seized in Sweden has been linked to Kosovo drug rings. With low prices and low demand for profits, Kosovo Albanians have "pushed other groups out of competition."¹¹

How did the Kosovo Albanians gain control of this lucrative business? *Corriere Della Sera* reported in late 1998 on an ongoing investigation conducted by the Special Operations Section (ROS) of the Carabinieri, the Italian national police: "The Turks passed the torch of heroin trafficking to the Albanians without any bloodshed."¹² The ROS asserted, "Albanians from Kosovo, [are] ... dangerous traffickers in drugs and arms. They are determined, violent men."¹³ The Milan daily quoted Kosovo Albanian drug lord Agim Gashi, whose telephone conversation was wiretapped by the ROS: "We have discovered that drugs are not only a source of wealth but a tool in the struggle to weaken Christendom."¹⁴ These were the people "fighting to achieve annexation to



March 1999: KLA soldiers at ceremony on first anniversary of the war.

cent of the heroin in the U.S.² It was already clear then that the Albanian drug traffickers were "fighting to achieve annexation to Albania, ...funding the anti-Serb movement [and] fa-

lord Agim Gashi.⁶ In 1997, the London *Guardian* commented on the role of Albanian Kosovars in the drug and prostitution business. They "have become so powerful they have even taken

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1. *New York Times*, Mar. 25, 1998.

2. *Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 9, 1985.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *The Guardian* (London), Nov. 1, 1994.

5. Jeffrey Fleishman, "Italy Battling a New Wave of Criminals: Albanians," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Mar. 15, 1999.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *The Guardian* (London), Mar. 25, 1997.

8. *Ankara Daily News*, Mar. 5, 1997.

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 5.

10. Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, "Drug Money Linked to Kosovo Rebels," *The Times* (London), Mar. 24, 1999.

11. Elizabet Andresson, "Heroin Seized from the East," *Svenska Dagbladet* (Stockholm), June 22, 1998.

12. Roberto Ruscica, "Albanian Mafia: This is how it helps Kosovo Guerrilla Fighters. Drug traffickers in Germany, Spain, France, and Norway: Kosovo Albanians," *Corriere Della Sera* (Milan), Oct. 15, 1998.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

Albania, and who ... favor independence for Kosovo.”¹⁵ The paper reported in early 1999 on a police wiretap of Gashi urging Turkish heroin suppliers to move their drugs in violation of the rules of Ramadan in order to “submerge Christian infidels in drugs.”¹⁶

Jane's Intelligence Review this year has pointed out that Kosovo Albanians hold the largest share of the heroin market in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Norway, and Sweden.¹⁷ On March 24, the very day that NATO began bombing Yugoslavia, the *Times* of London reported on a Europol document prepared for European interior and drug ministers on the connection between the KLA and Albanian drug rings.¹⁸

The drug trade in the Balkans generates hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Although American media reports coming out of Kosovo before and during the NATO war worried about the penury of Kosovo Albanian “freedom fighters,” the KLA did not have to conduct bake sales to raise money for their arms. “Kosovo Albanians used drug money to buy weapons in Italy [and] sent them to Kosovo,” Agence France-Presse reported in June 1999.¹⁹

Western sources knew that the drugs-for-arms trade was flourishing. The European Union in Brussels in 1994 published a report saying that traffickers from Macedonia and Kosovo paid for weapons with heroin.²⁰ *Jane's Intelligence Review* noted the link between Albanian criminal gangs, who distribute heroin, and Central Asians, who supply heroin and get weapons by raiding the armories of the former U.S.S.R., “a multi-billion dollar enterprise.”²¹ In June, State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin said with a straight face that the U.S. government “never identified credible evidence of drug running charges.”²² But the London *Daily Telegraph* wrote in April that Christopher Hill, U.S. chief negotiator and architect of the Rambouillet Agreement, was a “strong

critic of the KLA for its alleged dealings in drugs.”²³

Many in the U.S. press in 1999 worried that the KLA could not get sufficient arms to pursue their “liberation struggle,” despite the fact that *New York Times* Balkan bureau chief, Chris Hedges, in 1998 had reported that the KLA had an “inexhaustible supply line.”²⁴ As the number of heroin addicts in the West increased, thanks to greater availability and lower prices, it is no wonder that the Kosovo Liberation Army had an inexhaustible supply of arms and cash. By turning a blind eye to the Kosovo Albanian drug trade, the U.S. enabled the KLA to prevail in Kosovo.

Though the KLA won no significant battles against the Yugoslav Army,²⁵ when the war was over, Madeleine Albright forced a provision in the peace agreement allowing the KLA to become, in effect, the army of Kosovo.²⁶ Albright's frantic lobbying on behalf of this KLA demand belied Pentagon insistence that the U.S. was not trying to rebuild the KLA. The goal, according to Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon, is “not to rebuild the KLA family ... with ties to the Mafia.”²⁷

Now, a newer, stronger KLA rules Kosovo. Heroin trafficking on the Balkan Route was interrupted for that brief period when the Yugoslav Federal Army swept into Kosovo to remove KLA strongholds, during the ground war. Thanks to NATO bombs, the drug supply routes are now reopened. “We are negotiating with NATO, and negotiations are going very smoothly because the alliance does not have any intention of disarming us,” said Jakup Krasniqi, Kosovo government spokesman. “We are proceeding ... to turn into something different from a broad guerrilla movement. Our plan is to turn into a police force designed to exercise oversight over all of Kosovo.... A part of our movement could turn into a republican guard, and also we hope to become the regular army in Kosovo.”²⁸

Washington attempted to cover up the criminal activities of Kosovo Albanians who are now in power in Kosovo. The administration “turned a blind eye to the influx of mercenaries and financing from Islamic fundamentalist organizations.”²⁹ In May, *Foreign Affairs* noted that the KLA was “led by the sons and daughters of rightist Albanian fighters, ... heirs of those who fought in World War II fascist militias,”³⁰ and the notorious Skanderbeg Division, which slaughtered Jews, Serbs, and Roma people between 1941 and 1945. Even Richard Gelbard, U.S. special envoy to Bosnia, described the KLA as “without any question, a terrorist group.”³¹ KLA terror, which has been well documented since NATO bombing ended, forced 200,000 Serbs and Roma out of the province. The West publicly denounces the murders and mayhem KLA forces now in control in Kosovo are wreaking. But U.S. and NATO spokesmen justify this ethnic cleansing as understandable revenge. Kosovo is now nearly ethnically pure Albanian, with a virtually non-existent border with Albania.

The KLA is the United States' new best friend in the Balkans. They have taken over all civil institutions, ministries, public utilities, schools, hospitals, and government buildings, as well as federally owned mines, factories, and Serb private property. Drug runners, pimps, terrorists, reactionary Islamic fundamentalists, neo-fascists: These are the heroes of the KLA.

With a boost from the CIA,³² and a climactic NATO military intervention, the KLA went from a “terrorist” organization to the reigning power in Kosovo. That the CIA may also be involved in the Balkan Route drug trafficking is not unlikely. Its complicity in trafficking by Afghanistan's *mujahedin*, Haiti's Frappe, Nicaragua's contras, and the bands operating in Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle has already been established. The *modus operandi* is the same. The Kosovo Albanian Mafia's drugs-for-arms trade and reliance on terrorism proved to be reliable tools of American foreign policy, creating another United States criminal protectorate in the Balkans. ■

29. *Daily Telegraph*, Dec. 29, 1993.

30. Chris Hedges, “Kosovo's Next Masters,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999.

31. Agence France-Presse, Feb. 23, 1998.

32. Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (Dem.-Ohio), “What I Learned From the War,” *The Progressive*, Aug. 1999.

15. *Ibid.*

16. “Crimes Committed in Italy Provide Funds for Kosovo Guerrillas,” *Corriere Della Sera*, Jan. 19, 1999.

17. George Szamuely, “A World Made Safe for Kleptocracy,” *New York Press*, July 13, 1999, quoting *Jane's Intelligence Review*.

18. *Op. cit.*, n. 10.

19. John David Powell, Morrock News Service, quoting Agence France-Presse, June 29, 1999.

20. Vladimire Alexe, “Albanian Terrorists of KLA Pay for Weapons in Heroin,” *Romania Libre*, July 30, 1998.

21. *Op. cit.*, n. 17.

22. *Op. cit.*, n. 19.

23. Philip Smucker and Tim Butcher, “Shifting Stance over KLA has Betrayed Albanians,” *Daily Telegraph* (London), Apr. 18, 1999.

24. Chris Hedges, *New York Times*, July 11, 1998.

25. Matthew Kaminski and John Reed, “NATO Link to KLA Rebels may have helped seal Victory,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 6, 1999.

26. Steven Meyers, “NATO to Consider letting Kosovars set up New Armies as Rebels Agree to Disarm,” *New York Times*, June 22, 1999.

27. Paul Watson, “A Dispatch from Kosovo,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 31, 1999.

28. Fabrizio Roncone, “We Will be the New Kosovar Army,” *Corriere Della Sera*, June 19, 1999.



MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERRAIN

BY FRANK MORALES

“You know, you never hear of suburban war,” said Zulene Mayfield of the Chester (Pennsylvania) Residents Concerned for Quality Living (CRCQL), “always urban war. Why is that?”¹ She and scores of other American citizens are up in arms (so to speak) over the recent series of urban war games executed by the Marines and Special Forces in some 20 cities across the U.S., code-named “Operation Urban Warrior.” On May 13, 1999, “acting under the cloak of darkness, 100 Army Special Operations troops descended on two vacant public housing complexes in three training exercises and terrified nearby residents and surprised even the housing director.... Residents of the areas around the two projects, some of whom were notified hours beforehand of a law enforcement training exercise, said they found the experience startling and intimidating.”² Defining the exercise as a law enforcement training exercise was appropriate, since most of the troops were dressed as police.

“This is beyond reasoning, people are traumatized and terrified, Vietnam vets are experiencing flashbacks,” said Mayfield. Many in the Chester community are angry “with the arrogance of all parties involved,” and are determined to “deal with the local government, which has been totally unresponsive.” On June 1, the citizens of Chester marched to the home of Mayor Dominic Pileggi, who refused, or was unable, to answer ques-

tions about the military invasion. Targeting their local Congressman, Bob Brady, the public housing residents of Chester are trying to get some answers as to why their community was subjected to “no-notice” exercises using real ammunition and explosives. And despite the military’s disclaimer that they are using “less than lethal” bombs and bullets, this is little consolation to the terrified residents of Chester. As Mayfield sees it, “if they are using disintegrating bullets, why are the windows blown out?”

In some earlier cases involving similar exercises the Army had been asked to leave town. In March 1997, after public outcry, Charlotte, North Carolina, officials canceled the exercises after the first night of a would-be three-night stand. Likewise, the Army cut short its stay in Houston and Pittsburgh when the exercises—with fatigue-clad soldiers bearing arms and setting off minor charges—prompted fears among the citizenry.³

Angered by “the misrepresentation of the proposed training exercise,” Charlotte Mayor Patrick McCrory, wrote President Clinton, stating that “on the night of March 4 [1997], residents of the uptown neighborhoods were stunned by the sudden appearance of 12 low-flying helicopters without lights, in possible violation of FAA regulations. There were snipers on rooftops shooting live ammunition at fake targets. Explosive devices were set off, creating a tremendous amount of noise. Given these conditions and the large number of military personnel in the area, neighborhood residents were in fear. Many of them called 911 to get what scant information was available, and many of them called me at

home. I could hardly hear some of them because of the noise.” As a result of pressure generated by outraged citizens of Charlotte, “we insisted the DOD cancel the exercise scheduled for later that week, and it is unlikely we would be willing to host any future activities of this type.”⁴ It might have also been related to the fact that some residents began “carrying weapons in case the troops arrived.”⁵ Army Special Operations spokesman Walter Sokalski offered the lame excuse that “this Army saves lives. We want to thank the communities for being a part of saving lives in the future.”⁶

The Army was also rebuffed in San Francisco in February when protests shut down a portion of the exercise which was to involve “five ships, 6,000 sailors and Marines, and four days of simulated combat using helicopters and F-18 bombers, tens of thousands of blank rounds of small arms fire, and simulated explosions.”⁷ Other cities that have experienced the little-or-no-notice drills include Jacksonville, Florida; Chicago; the Corpus Christi area of Texas; New York; Charleston, South Carolina; and Oakland, California, which, unlike its neighbor across the bay, welcomed the military. “If San Francisco didn’t want it, we’re happy to accommodate,” said Stacey Wells, press secretary to Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown.⁸

4. Mayor Patrick McCrory’s Letter to President Clinton Protesting Army Urban Combat Exercises, Charlotte, N.C., Mar. 1997.

5. *Corpus Christi Caller Times*, “Army Trains Spurs Conspiracy Fears,” Feb. 16, 1999.

6. *Op. cit.*, n. 2.

7. Nando Media, “Marines Get Cold Shoulder in San Francisco, Welcomed in Oakland,” Reuters News Service, June 1999.

8. *Ibid.*

Frank Morales is an Episcopal priest and independent researcher and pamphleteer who is active on Manhattan’s Lower East Side.

1. Interview with author, May 1999.

2. *Philadelphia Inquirer*, “Army Uses Chester Public Housing For Training Exercises,” May 18, 1999.

3. *Ibid.*

Cities that were targeted for the war games had a few things in common. One was the near total lack of information or warning passed on to the residents, including city officials, prior to the onslaught. Except for the occasional police chief, almost no one was let in on the planned "exercises," and when they were, they were sworn to secrecy.

Another characteristic was "the satchel full of cash" the military used to bribe officials into compliance and pay for damages. For example, even though the Army wasn't asked to pay for damages to an old police building in Kingsville, Texas, because it was going to be torn down anyway, the fire marshal and the other officials said the Army promptly paid the police and fire departments for their time. "They paid cash money. They had a satchel ready to go."⁹ In another instance, in early 1998 Army officials approached San Antonio, Texas, Mayor Howard Peak, about training in San Antonio, but he refused to give his consent because the Army would not divulge the details of the operation. At that point, he said, "they tried to go around us and offer money to people for their support, which was very unfortunate."¹⁰

Since 1994, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, in Fayetteville, North Carolina, has conducted (or attempted to conduct) the series of "Operation Urban Warrior" training exercises. The stated rationale for the Marine exercises is "the expectation that future wars are increasingly likely to be waged on city streets."¹¹ Part of the operation's mission and goals include the enhancement of "domestic national security," with the goal of conducting combat operations "in an urban environment against a backdrop of civil unrest, and restore order."¹²

Col. Mark Thiffault, Director, Joint Information Bureau, Operation Urban Warrior, stresses that "potential foes view cities as a way to limit the technological advantages of our military. They know that cities, and their narrow streets, confusing layout and large number of civilian non-combatants, place limits on our technological superiority and especially our use of firepower. We

have to develop technologies that allow us to win while minimizing collateral damage."¹³

"WARFIGHTING"

The "Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment" in March examined "new concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures, and technologies to meet the challenges of conflict" in urban areas, where "by 2020, approximately seventy percent of the world's population will live." Operation Urban Warrior's internet home page recently ended public access to its website sector on "marines prepared for protesters."¹⁴

The theory and tactics of urban warfare, currently under vigorous scrutiny by numerous sectors of the military, fall under the subject of Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). The primary U.S. Army publication on the subject, Field Manual 90-10, published in August 1979, recently updated as FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas*. Despite this reformulation, George J. Mordica II, an analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), feels it needs reworking. He states that "U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areas is outdated." His recommendation is that "tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) need to be developed as an interim measure until doctrine can be written that supports armed combat." Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*, published in 1998 by the Marine Corps, was praised by Mordica as the most realistic; he likes "the Marine Corps' current Urban Warrior experiment," believing it offers "a different approach and fresh review of many of the questions the Army needs to address."

One of these questions concerns weaponry: "Develop weapons based on the need to defeat the threat, not on political considerations concerning whether such a weapon would be used in a given situation." In addition, "a high-level review of the ammunition necessary in urban combat must be conducted. The use of high-explosive plastic, white phosphorus, and flechette rounds need to be evaluated and considered for re-introduction into the inventory in sufficient quantities for effective training. Satchel charges, explosives, and

bangalore torpedoes should also be re-evaluated for use in urban conditions." White phosphorus, used in flares, as an incendiary and for smoke screens, comes in every size from hand grenades to howitzer shells and is, according to the EPA, extremely toxic to humans.¹⁵

Finally, Mordica and the Army Center believe that, "the training we are using to prepare our soldiers for urban combat is not realistic enough to present the full spectrum of command and control, along with the psychological impact, close combat, and logistical problems associated with this kind of combat." Firearms Training Systems, Inc., the experts in "virtual killing," recently consummated a "cooperative research and development agreement" with the Office of Naval Research to "commercialize" an "advanced training systems product line," in the hopes of "enhancing military and law enforcement training."¹⁶ They, like the Army's Mordica, know that "the sugar-coated version of urban combat will not reflect the truth. Battles in a city are savage, and many times do not allow for the precautions normally taken in the field concerning refugees, civilian casualties, evacuation of friendly and enemy wounded and dead, and prisoners of war (POWs)...." "Does this mean the Army cannot hold itself to a high moral code?" asks Mordica. Well, "No," but "the political realities of urban combat have created a terminology that tends to place limitations on how to conduct these operations ... these terms bring civility to urban combat operations."¹⁷

U.S. Marine Corps Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) "X-Files"

9. "Invasion, South Texas," *Austin American Statesman*, Apr. 4, 1999.

10. *Ibid.*

11. "100 Marines in Jackson, Florida, Urban Control Exercises," *Jacksonville Times Union*, July 24, 1998.

12. Operation Urban Warrior Homepage: www.defenselink.mil/specials/urbanwarrior.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment, www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwl-uw.html; see also, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab: Capable Warrior, www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil.

15. "President's Panel Not Satisfied with Navy's 'Safety' Reports," *Vieques Times*, Aug. 1999; see www.viequestimes.com. The people of Vieques, Puerto Rico, have a lot of experience dealing with U.S. military weaponry.

16. United States Office of Naval Research, Technology Transfer, Industrial Outreach Division, Naval Air Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, www.onr.navy.mil/sci_tech/industrial-wtlet.htm. See Frank Morales, "The Militarization of the Police," *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 67 (Spring-Summer 1999), p. 45.

17. George J. Mordica II, Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned, "It's a Dirty War, but Somebody has to do it" (n.d.). See also on the subject of MOUT, Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine*, Jan. 1999; Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of 2025," *Parameters Magazine*, Summer 1999; interview with Lt. Gen. John Rhodes, head of U.S. Marines Combat Development Command, on the subject of "future warfighting," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 29, No. 5; James Kitfield, untitled article dealing with "urban warfare as the inevitable wave of the future," *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 81, No. 12 (Dec. 1998).



2nd Marine Division / D.R. Storms

Marine Corps "Urban Warfare Limited Object Experiment."

contain "tactics, techniques and procedures" which deal with "urban attacks" (3-35.1), "urban defense" (3-35.2), "urban patrolling" (3-35.6), and "urban sustainability" (3-35.12). Unfortunately, "these files are accessible from the MILNET only," a classified computer network. According to the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, "the X-files are pocket-sized, useful, clear information" that "convey a synthesis of learning from experiments with MOUT tactics, techniques, and procedures, and some enabling technologies—that can help us fight and win battles on urbanized terrain."¹⁸

The Rand Corporation recently published a book by R.W. Glenn entitled, *Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat*. In it, the author examines the state of "U.S. Military preparedness to undertake military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)." Glenn recom-

18. U.S. Marine Corps X-Files "are an evolving body of knowledge that will be refined and inserted into the Marine Corps Combat Development System when the Urban Warrior experiments are concluded." www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwl/home/xfiles/xfiles.html. See also USMC "Urban Warfare Joint Cultural Intelligence Seminar, Summary Report" Apr. 13, 1999, www.ooww.quantico.usmc.mil/cultural_seminar_urban_warfare.htm.

mends that "the four services should adopt Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3 as the initial foundation...."¹⁹

"URBANIZED" TERRAIN

The 1998, MCWP 3-35.3, "Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain," is written "with emphasis on the ground combat element," attempting to provide a "level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain." The 367-page publication covers a range of subjects, including modern urban warfare, offensive and defensive operations, logistics and combat support, organization, combat skills, and weaponry, with a series of appendices on attacking and clearing buildings, fighting positions, subterranean operations (subways and basements), mines and demolitions. The publication makes clear that urbanized areas are "an incredibly complicated and fluid environment," which "may be significant sources of future conflict." Noting that "cities historically are where

19. R.W. Glenn, *Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat*, Rand, 1998 (quotes from RAND Abstract, DOCNO:MR-1007-A).

radical ideas ferment, dissenters find allies, mixtures of people cause ethnic friction, and discontented groups receive media attention," the author(s) of MCWP 3-35.3 want it to be known that into this milieu, the Marines "are deployed as part of naval expeditionary forces (NEFs) that maintain a global forward presence for rapid crisis response," during which "urban intervention operations must often be planned and executed in a matter of hours or days (rather than weeks or months) to take advantage of the internal turmoil surrounding a developing crisis."

Under the heading "Military Operations Other Than War," the "Warfighting Publication" states in Chapter 7 that "one of the most likely missions that U.S. Marines will undertake abroad will be military operations other than war (MOOTW). These missions typically will take place in the Third World." During MOOTW, "it is important to remember that political considerations permeate at all levels."²⁰ ■

20. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-35.3, *Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain*, Dept. of the Navy, HQ, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., Apr. 16, 1998. "Point of contact": Major Mark Sumner DSN 278-6228; www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwp/htm/mcwp3353.htm.

HOMELAND DEFENSE 1999

BY FRANK MORALES

"Terrorism is multifaceted and differs from group to group and incident to incident. Yet the single common denominator is that it is a psychological weapon, intended to erode trust and undermine confidence in our government, its elected officials, institutions or policies. What makes a WMD [weapons of mass destruction] terrorist incident unique is that it can be a transforming event."

Frank J. Cilluffo,
Center for Strategic and
International Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations,
Roundtable on Terrorism

"I personally believe that the next decade is a decade of homeland defense...."

John Hamre
Deputy Secretary of Defense

This past January the *New York Times* stated in an editorial that "there have been discussions in the Pentagon, but no decision, about creating a new domestic military command to combat terrorism. That would erode the long-established legal principle that America's armed forces should not be involved in domestic law enforcement."¹ While the military has "no intention of usurping civilian control," under the euphemistic banner of "homeland defense" the Pentagon "decided to ask President Clinton for the power to appoint a military leader for the continental United States."² Recent testimony before a congressional committee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice stressed that "in order to institute a more systematic and integrative approach to protecting the Continental United States from threats such as WMD terrorism, critical infrastructure protection and missile defense, it may be worthwhile to create a new Commander-in-Chief (CINC) USA. The CIN-CUSA would be responsible for all Department of Defense-related strategies and activities related to homeland defense issues and would serve as a focal point and facilitate coordination within the Department of Defense and between the many federal, state

and local law enforcement, intelligence and medical communities with related responsibilities."³

White House officials "reacted favorably, characterizing the proposed step as a relatively minor adjustment of the lines of military authority and organization." President Clinton, whose approval was required in order to move ahead with the appointment of the domestic military chief, commenced to "weighing the issue carefully," promising a response. His objectivity in the matter was doubtful all along, given his authorship of various directives on the matter, including in particular, Presidential Decision Directive 62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Overseas," dated May 1998, and Presidential Decision Directive 39, a June 1995 presidential "counter-terrorism" edict which provides guidance in distinguishing "crisis management" from "consequence management." Gregory Nojeim, legislative counsel on national security for the American Civil Liberties Union, concerned about the Pentagon proposal and its impact on law enforcement, said "it's hard to believe that a soldier with a suspect in the sights of his M-1 tank is well positioned to protect that person's civil liberties."

Nonetheless, for at least the past three years the Pentagon has organized and planned for "homeland defense." During that time, Defense Secretary William Cohen signed off "on a plan to create a Joint Task Force for Civil Support," in which military forces would be involved in various types of "anti-terrorist" law-enforcement operations, reporting "to the Department of Justice, which has the lead not only in law enforcement but in coordinating the domestic response to terrorism."⁴ Actually, Cohen stated that "the joint task force to coordinate military actions would be ready to respond in the event of an attack on American soil, but under the direction of a civilian agency like the Federal Emergency Management Agency."⁵

3. "Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, and U.S. Preparedness," statement of Frank J. Cilluffo, Deputy Director, Global Organized Crime Project, Co-Director, Terrorism Task Force, Center for Strategic and International Studies, to the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the U.S. House Committee on Governmental Reform and Oversight, Oct. 2, 1998.

4. *Op. cit.*, n. 2.

5. *New York Times*, Oct. 8, 1999, p. A16.

On October 8, 1999, Pentagon foresight was rewarded when Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), was put in charge of defending the homeland. According to script, President Clinton "approved these new changes made by the Pentagon's top officials as part of a routine revision of the responsibilities and roles of its nine commands scattered across the globe." According to this "routine revision," Admiral Gehman's new job "is to coordinate military actions should an enemy target this country...." Again, "the idea has been criticized by civil libertarians who argue that any homeland defense plan might open the door for the military to assume the role of domestic police, which is prohibited by law." In reference to the appointment of a domestic military chief, the ACLU's Nojeim stated that "our concern is that there be a bright line drawn between law enforcement and the military. This not only blurs that bright line," warned Nojeim, "but virtually guarantees further involvement of the military in civilian law enforcement activity."⁶

As for legal considerations, "by law, the military cannot make arrests or act in civil law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act, passed after the Civil War to rein in the military, bars federal troops from doing police work within United States borders."⁷ Comforting words from the *New York Times*. Unfortunately, not true. Strictly speaking, the Act refers only to the Army and the Air Force. In fact, militarism is increasingly imbedded within domestic law enforcement. Incredibly, the paper of record also declared that "the division of powers that bars the military from domestic law enforcement is similar to that between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. The former does surveillance work at home and the latter abroad." Apparently, this division of powers did not prevent an innocent Redford, Texas teenager, 18-year-old Esequiel Hernandez Jr., not far from home, from being shot dead by Marines on a "drug interdiction" mission along the border. As for the FBI, the bureau in the 1990s has nearly doubled its overseas presence, having opened offices in more than 20 foreign countries. In addition, FBI Director Freeh recently stated that "the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency have taken several steps to improve

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Op. cit.*, n. 2.

1. *New York Times*, Editorial, Jan. 23, 1999.

2. *New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1999, p. A21.



Officer gives urban warfare intelligence briefing, Operation Panther Prowl.

cooperation between agencies, including the exchange of deputies, exchange of personnel assigned to each agency's counter-terrorism center, joint meetings, and joint operational and analytical initiatives. At the field operational level, the FBI sponsors 18 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in major cities to maximize interagency cooperation and coordination among Federal, State, and local law enforcement.⁸

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, (18 U.S.C. § 1385), often cited as a barrier to domestic military activity, reads as follows: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both." Under the so-called "drug war," "exceptions" to the Posse Comitatus Act have proliferated. "Former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who specializes in National Security issues, said another exception became law in the Reagan Administration when Congress permitted Posse Comitatus to be waived in the event of nuclear terrorism." Congress later widened the exception in a "little

known provision" sponsored by then Senator Nunn. Known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Bill, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 gave "the Pentagon power to step in domestically in the event of chemical and germ attacks."⁹ The military, for its part, is making the very same arguments.

U.S. Army Colonel Sean J. Berne argues in a recent article for *Military Review* entitled, "Defending Sovereignty: Domestic Operations and Legal Precedents," that although "there continues to be considerable concern over the legal authority and limits of using the Armed Forces in domestic actions," and that some would even "argue against virtually any involvement by the military in domestic operations, that involvement is key to safeguarding national security and guaranteeing the continued freedom of our citizens." Berne asserts that "under specific circumstances, use of military forces in domestic operations, while controversial, is not only appropriate, but legal and warranted." The Colonel has little patience for "preconceived notions concerning civil-military relations based on incomplete information." While those who object to the military becoming the police usually cite, among other things, the Posse Comitatus Act, it is not, according to Colonel Berne, "the final word on the subject." He states that "based on emergency situations and emerging threats to national security, Congress passed a number of exceptions clearing the way for significantly

9. *Op. cit.*, n. 2.

increased involvement by the Armed Forces in domestic activities."

These "exceptions" to Posse Comitatus, or to put it in more precise language, these new missions for the military inside America, include Title 10, U.S.C. §§331-35, dealing with civil disturbances and insurrection. These sections, and other "exceptions," according to Berne, "also provide the Executive and Legislative branches with a standing force involved with domestic law enforcement on a day-to-day basis." Now, "while at first blush it would appear these changes could be in conflict with the intent of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Posse Comitatus Act, by placing a potentially unchecked military in a position to infringe on Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights," we should have no fear, taking comfort in the notion that our "Congress went to great lengths to ensure that ... civil-military relationships would not be subverted." And don't forget, we are reminded, that "no case has been found involving criminal prosecution of anyone for Posse Comitatus violations."¹⁰ So, let's get our heads screwed on right, because after all, as Col. Thomas R. Lujan, staff judge advocate for the U.S. Special Operations Command, said back in 1997, "our nation can ill afford to have the effectiveness of its military assets artificially constrained by a misunderstanding of the law."¹¹

Along those same lines, the Air Force's Air University offered a 1998 course entitled "The Posse Comitatus Act: Consideration of Its Contemporary Value/Appropriateness." An abstract of the course states that "this project will review the history of the Posse Comitatus Act, the rationale for its existence, contemporary exceptions, and explore the logic for its continued existence and enforcement. If it is determined the Act is no longer necessary, consideration will be given to making a recommendation for modification or elimination of the Act."¹² Finally, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute summed it up this way, in a slide entitled: "The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. §1385)." It's simple: "Exceptions: Military Purpose Doctrine, Sovereign Authority, Civil Disturbances."¹³

This past year, President Clinton appointed Richard A. Clarke his national counter-terrorism coordinator, his point man

8. "The Threat to the United States Posed by Terrorists," statement of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Feb. 4, 1999. See also, Louis Wolf, "Law Enforcement Intelligence: The New National Security Merger," *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 60 (Spring 1997).

10. Colonel Sean J. Berne, U.S. Army, "Defending Sovereignty: Domestic Operations and Legal Precedents," *Military Review*, Mar.-Apr. 1999.

11. Thomas R. Lujan, "Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army," *Parameters*, Autumn 1997.

12. United States Air Force, Air University, course title: "The Posse Comitatus Act: Consideration of Its Contemporary Value/Appropriateness," Summer 1998.

13. U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, slide, Posse Comitatus Act, 1999.

on domestic counterinsurgency. Earlier this summer, Clarke wrote a piece for the journal *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, entitled, "The Intelligence Threat Assessment Function and the New Threats."¹⁴ During the Bush Administration, he was a staff member of the National Security Council and has remained there ever since. Sitting in Oliver North's old office at the NSC, Clarke is trying mightily to "coordinate everything from the Pentagon and its evolving plans to defend the United States against terrorists down to local police and fire departments."¹⁵ At a recent National Governors Association conference attended by "emergency planners" from 45 states, Clarke said that, "in the future, they will look for our Achilles' heel, and it's here—here in the homeland."¹⁶ At the conference, Clarke and Attorney General Janet Reno outlined various ways in which that "defense" is coming together, including congressional approval for President Clinton to recall (involuntarily) 200,000 reservists for up to 270 days. The National Guard and Reserve Units have been designated as among the "first responders" in the event of an "incident."

On May 22, 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced "the stationing plan for 10 recently announced rapid assessment elements using National Guard personnel." According to Cohen, the Guard teams, at a cost of some \$50 million, "are part of Department of Defense's overall effort to support local, state, and federal civil authorities in the event of an incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on U.S. soil." The teams, placed in the regions designated by FEMA, are stationed in California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. The plan is that within four hours' time they "will be able to deploy rapidly ... and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow-on federal response assets." According to Cohen, they "will act as the tip of the national military spear." In support of this plan, Cohen called for the "total force" "integration" of the National Guard and "other Reserve components" into "a national WMD preparedness strategy."¹⁷ New York's Governor George Pataki, enamored over the new role of the New York National Guard, which had been "developing the doctrine of homeland defense over the past year and a half," stated on

July 20, 1998, that "with the Guard stronger than ever, the creation of this unit is a right step at the right time."¹⁸ New York is part of FEMA Region II, which consists of New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

Some months earlier, the DOD released *Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction*, spelling out the particulars on the subject of National Guard/Reserve "integration." Among its numerous chapters, a section entitled "Response Elements: Civil Disturbances" states that "the potential for lawlessness and disorder will exist following any WMD incident. Units designated with on-street civil disturbance missions need to have awareness level training on WMD incidents."¹⁹ In this regard, the report references not only the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act (Title 10 U.S.C. §§331-35), but also DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. Lt. General Edward Baca, chief of the National Guard Bureau, stated in 1998 that the Guard was ready to implement homeland defense initiatives. "We are now in the process of determining what the threats are so that doctrine can be developed to meet those threats."²⁰ While the "threats" may require determination, the process of militarizing law enforcement to meet the "threats" is clear.

On March 3, 1998, Army Brig. Gen. Roger Schultz, deputy for the Director of Military Support, the DOD agency that coordinates "assistance" to local law enforcement, stated that "we don't know when and we don't know the place, but we will be attacked." Gen. Schultz "sees a nation and citizenry not fully prepared for attacks," and the new Guard program "will help educate the public about its vulnerability." But even more, Schultz wants to make the point that "the task we're going to be training Guard and Reserve soldiers and airmen on is related to our war fighting. We're not just investing in a domestic response, we're investing in a commander in chief's requirement to go to war."²¹

This past April 27-29, 1999, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) held its Modeling and Simulation [M&S] Advisory Council and

Distributed Simulation Working Group Meeting at the Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia. The session took up the issue of "homeland defense" in a series of briefings (slide shows). One such briefing, entitled, "Army Force XXI - New Analysis Requirement," explicitly lists elements of "homeland defense" including "domestic preparedness, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, civil disorder, evacuations, natural disasters." Stating that "examples of M&S in Support of Domestic Preparedness" include "Operation Test Visualization (OTV)," the briefing explains that OTV "provides real time and playback capability for live or simulated exercises" which "law enforcement agencies agree is needed." Currently, they are busy at work "with the San Bernardino [California] Sheriff's Department and Boeing to provide training and analysis for Shoot House exercises." These "Soldier Station" scenarios include "MOUT, non-lethal weapons and Land Warrior/Force XXI" elements, as well as "complete search and capture scenarios for the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department." Hands-on "incident command operations" with the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department completed in February 1999 consisted of a "single jurisdiction, multi-agency response to civil disorder."²²

In January 1999, the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a study entitled "Defending the U.S. Homeland," which calls for the Pentagon to "develop, deploy, and operate a wide range of defensive measures for the protection of the U.S. homeland." The Center, founded in 1962, is a conservative public policy research institution that maintains resident experts on all the world's major geographical regions. It also covers key functional areas, such as international finance, U.S. domestic and economic policy, and U.S. foreign policy and national security issues. On January 1, 1999, none other than former Senator Sam Nunn assumed the position of chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees. At that time the Center made known its differences with President Clinton's proposals to defend the homeland, stating that "the President's program is useful to cope with isolated terrorist attacks involving biological or nuclear weapons. However, it fails to address the need for the Pentagon to be prepared for taking the lead should a rogue state smuggle such weapons into the United States." The study's author, Fred C. Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, pointed out other

14. Richard A. Clarke, "The Intelligence Threat Assessment Function and the New Threats," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1999).

15. *New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1999, p. A3.

16. *Dallas Morning News*, Feb. 9, 1999.

17. News Release, "Regional Rapid Assessment Element Stationing Plans Announced," Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., May 22, 1998.

18. Major Paul Fanning, "New York Selected for Anti-Terrorist Unit," *Guard Times*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (May-June 1998).

19. DoD Tiger Team, "Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jan. 1998.

20. Lt. Gen. Edward Baca, Commander, National Guard Bureau, interview with *National Guard Review*, Winter 1998.

21. Paul Stone, "Guard, Reserve To Take On New Role," *American Forces Press Service*, March 1998.

22. TRADOC, M&S Advisory Council Meeting, Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia, "Army Force XXI—New Analysis Requirements," Apr. 27-29, 1999.

shortcomings, such as "inadequate or insufficiently understood legal authorities for a military role in homeland defense," although Ikke believes that "legislation can overcome this deficiency." Towards that end, a future CSIS study intends to "address the legal aspects of the military's role in homeland defense." Dr. Ikke, a CSIS "distinguished scholar," is currently also a director of the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Center's Global Organized Crime Project is chaired by William Webster, former Director of the CIA and FBI. CSIS "Senior Adviser" Arnaud de Borchgrave serves as Project Director. The Project membership lists numerous former intelligence and defense chiefs including former directors Woolsey, Soyster, Schlesinger, Brown, Gates, Deutch, Rumsfeld, and Cohen (prior to his current appointment), as well as CSIS "scholar," Walter Laqueur, co-chair, International Research Council, and holder of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy. Although the Project believes that "the rise of transnational organized crime is an unfortunate

by-product of globalization," its Terrorism Task Force believes that "zealots are arriving on the scene not with traditional political objectives but with more unique idiosyncratic, religious, or personally psychotic purposes." Its members include former FEMA head Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, U.S. Army (ret), and Joshua Lederberg of Rockefeller University.²³

Stating that "rogue nations or transnational actors may be able to threaten our homeland," a 1997 report by the National Defense Panel, entitled "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century," advises that "the terrorist threat to the United States is a complex issue which, as it encroaches upon U.S. territory, transitions from a Defense and State activity to one managed primarily by the Department of Justice or local law enforcement."²⁴

23. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Press Release, "Domestic Bio, Nuclear Attacks Foreseen," Jan. 22, 1999; see also Global Organized Crime Project (www.csis.org).

24. National Defense Panel, Report to the Secretary of Defense, "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century," Dec. 1, 1997.

Toward this end, the Attorney General's office has established a National Domestic Preparedness Office within the FBI. Various presidential directives issued over the past two years put the FBI in the lead of counterterrorism activities. At the same time, "the mythic G-men, who once concentrated exclusively on solving crime, are today focusing on crime prevention as never before," making use of greatly "increased investigatory and surveillance powers that have come with its new role."²⁵ Another sign of the FBI's expanded "homeland" mission, to go along with its overseas activities, is the massive infusion of funding it has received. Annual funding for the FBI's Counterterrorism program has grown from \$78.5 million in 1993 to \$301.2 million in 1999. In 1995, the FBI's Counterterrorism Center, located at FBI Headquarters, became operational. And thus, as President Clinton recently put it, does "the last big kind of organizational piece"²⁶ on "homeland defense" come together. ■

25. Sam Skolnik, "A New Mission for G-Men," *Legal Times*, Nov. 9, 1998.

26. *New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1999.

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MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY:

THE GLOBALIZATION OF POVERTY: IMPACTS OF IMF AND WORLD BANK REFORMS

BY MICHELE STODDARD

At the end of November, the World Trade Organization (WTO) will meet in Seattle to make a series of decisions with untold consequences for the people of the globe. Untold, in that the full agenda has not been made public, thanks to the efforts of the mainstream and business press, and its provisions are not part of any debate by those most affected. The world's most powerful states and economic actors are making a concerted effort to keep the consequences of this agenda from the public view until they have become a legally binding *fait accompli*.

Despite the blackout, however, hundreds of national and international organizations, unions, foundations, and progressive community groups are disseminating this vital information, and tens of thousands of demonstrators are planning to be in Seattle to oppose decisions of the WTO that could redefine the nature of sovereignty, the planetary environment, agriculture, telecommunications, biotechnology, energy, culture, etc.

For many Americans, events in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and now Yugoslavia, East Timor, and Colombia, are the product of local circumstances and conditions—tribal and ethnic hatreds, corrupt governments, out-of-control militaries, drug trafficking, a culture of vengeance, and so on. The present liberal view is that the devolution of states into atavistic violence and genocide requires an armed humanitarian response by the Great Powers on the grounds that “We had to do something.”


Michel Chossudovsky's very important book, *The Globalization of Poverty*¹ addresses the question, “Who's ‘we’?” He takes us beyond the shell game of world power—“it's the transnational corporations”; “it's G-7 banks and the IMF”; “it's American hegemony.” Chossudovsky confronts head on the links between ever higher levels of civil violence and massacre, and acute social and environmental distress, with the modalities of market expansion.

The devolution of some states into heavily militarized bands and privatized security forces, organized gangsterism, secessionist struggles, and “black” economies are part of the rearticulation of the power of other states with the dominant sources of economic power. The best expression of these hybrid forms of power are the international financial institutions, the IFIs. Chossudovsky examines the underlying mechanisms of a global economic system undergoing a deepening crisis, exploring its political dimensions, which, once understood, make piecemeal and purely economic solutions look impossibly naive or disingenuous. The book offers a darker view than most of what is at stake in the upcoming World Trade Organization (WTO) conference.

The current system, Chossudovsky argues, is one of “capital creation through destruction.” He offers a new perspective that sheds much light on the recent “constitutional” pretensions to sovereignty of the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and various binding trade agreements. The IFIs’ “liberalization”

policies are routinely justified on the grounds they lead to development, local wealth creation, and—at some undetermined future point—the general welfare. On the contrary, says Chossudovsky, in country after country these policies function to increase both urban and rural poverty. Wages and labor costs are regulated on a world level. “Global poverty is an input on the supply side, the global economic system feeds on cheap labor.”

To perceive the effects of the “new interventionist framework,” of macro-economic restructuring in the developing world, the truth is in the details. Fully half the book is a meticulous study of policies implemented by the IFIs in Somalia, Rwanda, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, the Russian Federation, and the former Yugoslavia. The author's recent work on Albania and Kosovo, appearing regularly in this magazine, continues his painstaking appraisal of the civil wars, famine, genocide, economic collapse, and the wholesale destruction of entire national societies inextricably linked to the operation of this regulatory regime. Significantly, developments




United Nations

In addition to large oil deposits, Indonesia's other raw materials include bauxite, manganese, nickel, silver and copper. Here, a Freeport-McMoran copper mining operation.

Michele Stoddard is a historian and freelance writer focusing on the dynamics of state expansion and democratic decline.

1. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 1997. Available from *CovertAction Quarterly*; see p. 66.



Reuters/Archive Photos

Globalization of Coca-Cola in Bangalore, India. In 1998, more than 683 million Cokes sold each day.

elsewhere in the Third World find their echo in the internal policies of the G-7 states, dismantling their own domestic economies and casting whole segments of their national populations into increasing marginality and poverty. The chickens most definitely are returning to roost.

Chossudovsky supplies a succinct history of the principal dynamic driving the global economy forward for the last 30 years: debt. The global economy works as capitalism has always worked, through the relentless search for new commodity forms, new markets, and higher profits. Yet things have changed. It has always been in the interest of capitalists to reduce labor costs and in the interest of capitalist nation-states to increase exports while reducing the volume of imports. Finance capital, with its huge array of lending and speculative mechanisms, underwrote the power of states but did not substitute for it. The current situation is not just a case of the "money" economy outstripping the tangible "real" economy, but a new frame and mode of exercise of power. It is all the more effective because it is covert. Its actions and practices are successively removed from public realms of democratic accountability, embedded in the quantitative expression of money values,

which can be artfully severed from any causal connection to the effects it produces at the proverbial stroke of a computer key.

THE DRIVING FORCE OF DEBT

In the 1970s and 1980s, the combination of huge amounts of dollars available to banks in the so-called First World and corrupt or vulnerable regimes in the Third anxious to borrow them, left many countries massively indebted. As huge interest payments thus created brought these nations to the edge of default, the solvency of lenders in Europe and America became precarious, and their governments stepped in to enforce payment.

The complex dynamic of this spiraling debt has since become a perpetual motion machine of profits and revenues flooding away from developing countries, as recalculated interest payments dwarf the principal and new

loans are used to pay off a piece of old ones. In 1970, these countries owed \$62 billion; by 1996, the figure was \$2 trillion.

The real windfall stems not from the payment of interest, but from what the threat of non-payment allows the lender to do politically. An enormous array of rewards flows to banks and transnational corporations from the "reforms" of the domestic economy imposed by the IMF, World Bank, and others as "conditionalities" for new loans and as a "green light" for foreign investment. "Structural adjustment policies," "shadow programs," "policy-based loans"—a whole language exists to designate the process of reorienting these countries away from their national economies and integrating them into a putatively global "free market."

In the somber-minded pronouncements of these institutions, "liberalization" and "competitiveness" are the unquestioned road to national health, despite thirty-plus years of policy failure. Striking statistics of the increases in corporate assets, global poverty, income inequality, disease and mortality, and environmental degradation have no apparent effect in braking the continued enactment of the measures which largely produced them in the first place. The

primary stated goal of the TFIs is to facilitate debt repayment and restore solvency by converting domestic production to production of goods for export at low prices, entailing low wages and a favorable climate of investment. Foreign multinational corporations oblige by building plants to take advantage of cheap labor costs, extracting concessions from countries by making the latter compete with each other for placement. In the 1970s, when the movement of manufacturing from industrial to "less-developed" countries really got under way, the prices of raw export commodities dropped precipitously, meaning that then, as now, developing countries must export more and more to meet ever-larger debt obligations.

THE CRUSH OF "REFORMS"

Today, debt is both a finely tuned instrument and a sledgehammer for "reforms" whose primary thrust is the formation of a low-wage labor market, a euphemism for intense and massive poverty. Loans from the IFIs are not given on the narrow basis of the soundness of the investment scheme or their contribution to local development or subsistence. What is instead required is the systematic transformation of the debtor society from top to bottom. Any hesitation to comply with the conditions for new loans is met with an immediate interruption of the flow of loans, aid, and assistance. To be certified in compliance, a country must enact a range of "economic" measures that are highly political in their origin, intent, implementation, and effects.

Currency devaluation; a rapid reduction in state spending, subsidies, civil employment, and state subsidies for essential goods and services; and the private purchase of state-run enterprises, public lands, and infrastructure have a calamitous local effect. The leadership of central banks and the ministries of agriculture, industry, health, education, housing, transportation, energy, etc., are replaced with the officers of IFIs and compliant local allies. Not only do they seize control of monetary policy, they exercise formal jurisdiction over most aspects of state policy-making. Devaluation causes soaring prices for food, fuel, housing, medicine, transportation, and housing; massive government layoffs and plant closings spike unemployment rates; and minimum wage laws are repealed.

The purpose, insists Chossudovsky, is blatantly evident in the effect, *i.e.*, the overall reduction of demand. In the name of restoring budgetary solvency for debt-servicing, the IFIs become the exclusive brokers of state economic activity. Farcical bidding arrangements allocate huge construction projects to foreign firms that can un-

dercut local prices and that kick back to local and foreign associates and government officials huge fees for insurance and consulting. These firms then subcontract the real work to the local firms they initially undercut at a fraction of the price.

Loan money funneled in this way leaves the country faster than it arrives, and its destination, as profit or fee, are the multinational corporations and not primarily the banks. Whatever interest is paid, the loan remains. The green light signals that every asset the country possesses is the object of a fire sale: land, crops, forests, petroleum, minerals, labor, the consumer market, essential services, entertainment, etc. The tax structure, reformed to promote fictional productive reinvestment by the rich, bankrupts national low- and middle-level firms, already burdened by the removal of customs barriers to competing low-cost imports.

To add insult to grave injury, international speculators wage bets on the value of the currency, bonds, and stocks, bets so over-extended that the vaguest rumor can and does precipitate an entire region into collapse. The social costs of this ingenious shell game are enormous, but the rewards accruing to those who ally themselves as intermediaries and agents of foreign banks and firms are irresistible.

Desperate popular protest and resistance to the prospect of starvation leads to the reinforcement of the security forces and the signing of military assistance and training agreements that dovetail with economic aid. Governments who surrender sovereignty and willingly acquiesce in the forced march of their national populations toward ever more extreme poverty stay in power only by abandoning democratic practices and resorting to repression.

CRIME PAYS

The profits earned by multinationals and their local representatives are huge, so great that they create a formidable incentive for illicit financial transactions, trade

in drugs, and arms and money laundering. This point is central to Chossudovsky's argument: These lucrative activities further erode state sovereignty, decimate state assets, and hasten the demise of the productive domestic economy. They also militarize society and provide the additional foundation for a spoils system conducive to high levels of civil violence and warfare among its beneficiaries and against the disenfranchised.

Chossudovsky demonstrates that this process, deftly adapted to local circum-

for comparative analysis. The chief difference between late 19th century European imperialism and the current imperial structure under American dominance is in terms of the sophistication of the techniques and institutions and the array of instruments, technological and cognitive, that sustain such a structure. A century ago, imperialism abroad was accompanied by concessions to working people and the poor at home, while mobilizing them around jingoist and racist perspectives. Such concessions are not necessary today,

thanks to the pervasive myth of prosperity, growth, and individual opportunity propagated by the mass media and made more convincing by the fabulous wealth in computer-based technologies. In addition, the threat to the planet is evident in dramatic changes to the earth's climate and the disappearance of whole species.

At this point, the industrial liberal democracies operate, literally, as regimes of impunity abroad and at home. These are governments whose primary domestic policy goal is to be able to act freely, without accountability or constraint vis-a-vis their own citizens. In the media, the world is turned upside down. The contras and the KLA are "democratizers"; the lethal sanctions against Iraq exist to deliver its people from their dictator; the destruction of Yugoslavia through aerial bombardment of civilians and their infrastructure is a "humanitarian intervention."

One question looms. Why would banks, transnational corporations, and their political allies support an array of neo-liberal policies of "structural adjustment" whose

net effect—through increasing poverty, warfare, and even genocide—is to repress demand so far that even exports from their own countries fall away? Why would capitalists destroy the foundations of their own wealth as well as the planet on which all life depends?

Chossudovsky's answer to this is clear. They do it because they can reap huge rewards now. The approach of the beneficiaries of the current international system is *après moi la deluge*. ■



Along with 18,000 other workers at Nike shoe factory in Jakarta, Indonesia, this woman is paid about 64 cents a day.

stances, has proceeded in near lock-step in almost 100 countries around the world. It unfolds with the methodical and well-practiced rhythm of a Mafia bust-out operation. The principal decision-makers of the G-7 countries, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO, are well-endowed with "reflexivity" and "institutional learning" acquired over decades, and well aware of the results from "case to case."

The broad range of these operations at this point provides an impressive sample

DISCOVER


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(continued from page 2)

During 1991, when Yugoslavia struggled to hold the country together in the face of armed secessionist attacks, the U.S. and the European Union publicly stated their commitment to a united Yugoslavia. This was strictly for public consumption, as they imposed the Brioni agreement, which, among other things, specified that "the control of border crossings will be taken over by the Sloven police," ensuring the continued flow of illegal arms shipments. It also required the "unconditional withdrawal" of the Yugoslav People's Army to its barracks.

Further economic pressure forced Yugoslavia to appoint as its president Stipe Mesic, who had promised to destroy the Yugoslav state; Mesic did everything possible to block the functioning of the Yugoslav government in a time of crisis.

The European Community organized a conference on Yugoslavia in late 1991, which called for "sovereign and independent republics with an international personality for those within it."

Shortly, thereafter, the EC excluded Yugoslavia from further meetings of the conference.

By the end of the year, the West had imposed more severe sanctions on what remained of Yugoslavia. On December 17, the EC announced that "the Community and its member states have agreed to recognize the independence of all the Yugoslav republics which ... wish to be recognized as independent states." U.S. recognition quickly followed. With a stroke of the pen, the West had smashed Yugoslavia.

Arms shipments and trainers flowed to secessionist forces, particularly from Germany and Austria. German instructors even engaged in combat against the Yugoslav People's Army. Throughout the war in Bosnia, the West strongly supported the secessionists. CIA personnel and retired American military officers, acting under contract to the Pentagon, provided training for Bosnian Muslim forces. Many operations were directly planned by American generals.

These are just a few examples, all from a time in which Mr. Meares asserts that the West was not "assisting"

Yugoslavia's "fragmentation." Far from "very reluctantly" seceding, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat militias stocked up with western arms shipments during the year preceding the declaration of secession.

The view that those who favored a united state were responsible for secession, and that secessionists and those who supported secessionists were not responsible for secession, strikes me as extremely bizarre.

Finally, I would like to add that Mr. Meares will be depriving himself of access to a truly wonderful publication, containing well-researched articles which dig beneath the surface of events. Whether he agrees with every article or not, he can gain a new, more complex perspective on events.

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Mr. Meares's request for a refund after receiving all the issues covered by his subscription was a first for us. We choose not to revise our policy against refunds.

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